COLLABORATIVE LEADERSHIP AMONG SECURITY ACTORS
TO ACHIEVE SUSTAINABLE NATIONAL SECURITY AND
PROSPERITY IN MALAWI: A PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK

By

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Dedication

Firstly, I dedicate this Thesis to the Almighty God for His unwavering promise and fulfilment; “Ask, and it will be given to you; seek, and you will find; knock, and it will be opened to you” (Mathew 7:7). I asked God that I pursue a PhD programme to support my positive contribution in making Malawi a more secure and safer nation. He has guided me through.

Secondly, with my patriotic value, this study, which does not discuss secret information but unclassified strategic issues, is dedicated to our beloved nation, Malawi, for her greater prosperity.
Abstract

Collaborative leadership (CL) is a managerial concept that entails full inter-agency coordination in order to achieve enhanced security goals. The problem in Malawi, however, is limited collaboration among security actors (SAs), which has resulted in breakdown of some security issues such as border disputes, illegal migration, internal crime, violent demonstrations, corruption and political intolerance. Using a combination of both in-depth comparative security case studies and surveys of fifteen security organisations and 100 individual respondents, this study examined the effectiveness of CL among SAs for achieving sustainable NS and prosperity (SNS) in Malawi. The empirical findings show that while SAs are working together and making Malawi one of the most peaceful countries in Africa, adoption of CL approach for SNS management is still limited. In turn, these issues have affected economic development of Malawi. Based on the research findings, the study recommends a practical policy framework (PPF) called “NACUSSEPA” which is an inter-agency collaborative model for CL, SNS, and hence prosperity in Malawi. The recommended PPF is rooted in the strategic focus on SNS priorities, promotion of national cultural practices and mind-set change, sharing power, information and training security officers together for effective decision making and establishment of collaborative structures with legal mandate. Others include evaluation measures and parliamentary approval of the practical NS policy framework.

Keywords: Collaborative Leadership, Sustainable National Security, Security Actors, Inter-agency coordination, Practical Policy Framework, Malawi.
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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own work and does not incorporate any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university except, where due reference is made in the text. The views expressed are my own and any queries on this study are my sole responsibility.

Signature:……………………………….

Name: Reuben Paulos Ngwenya

Date: November, 2015
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Core Categories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHRR</td>
<td>Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>Collaborative Leadership</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPD</td>
<td>Economic Planning and Development</td>
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<td>DNI</td>
<td>Director of National Intelligence</td>
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<td>DoDMA</td>
<td>Department of Disaster Management Affairs</td>
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<td>F</td>
<td>Factor</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau Investigation</td>
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<td>FIU</td>
<td>Financial Intelligence Unit</td>
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<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General of Police</td>
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<td>MACRA</td>
<td>Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDF</td>
<td>Malawi Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEPD</td>
<td>Ministry of Economic Planning and Development</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
<td>Malawi Police Service</td>
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<td>MYP</td>
<td>Malawi Young Pioneers</td>
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<tr>
<td>NACUSSEPA</td>
<td>National Security Focus, Cultural practices, Sharing power and influence, Structures, Evaluations and Parliamentary Approval</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>NIB</td>
<td>National Intelligence Bureau</td>
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<td>NRB</td>
<td>National Registration Bureau</td>
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<td>NS</td>
<td>National Security</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Advisor</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSCC</td>
<td>National Security Coordinating Committee</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSCO</td>
<td>National Security Coordination Office</td>
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<td>NSP</td>
<td>National Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPC</td>
<td>Office of the President and Cabinet</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Security Sector</td>
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<td>SSPSS</td>
<td>Statistical Software Package for Social Sciences</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations Human Commission for Refugees</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND

1. Introduction

This chapter provides the framework within which the study is set. It engages with the National Security Sector effectiveness together with the paradigm of organisation action and discusses how my professional role, values and beliefs are integrated in the study. The strands and journeys that infuse the study are also introduced in this chapter.

“The days of agencies at all levels of government, operating primarily as singular entities, are over. In an increasingly globalised world, policy challenges transcend geopolitical, socio-economic, cultural, and generational boundaries. Issues such as pandemics, aging populations, climate-change, rising citizen expectations and public safety are both global and local in nature. These types of complex challenges will increasingly test government interactions than ever before in the years to come.” - Paul MacMillan (2007)

The above quote from Macmillan (2007, p.7) opened the discussion on which this study was formulated and designed. Indeed, the days of government agencies operating primarily independently are over globally in general and in particular, Malawi. It is recognised in this study that leaders have to create strategies, build systems and align people across many different organisational boundaries in their management duties in order to achieve specific objectives. Archer and Cameron (2013, p.9) define this arrangement as collaborative leadership (CL). The concept of CL has attracted considerable scholarly arguments, mainly in the private business sector and academic fellowship research. This study, however, focused on CL in the public policy arena, its application to the National Security Sector, which is very limited in its publication (Coates, 2011, p.24). This view sees CL as part of a continuum of change in the security sector, where bureaucracy is moving from being hierarchical, separated, specialised and inwardly focused towards a system that is flexible, responsive and efficient. In the security sector, this system proves to respond to the dictates of upholding successful national security policies.
This study explored the effectiveness of Collaborative Leadership and factors that would improve national security (NS) and inter-agency collaboration. The study also examined the challenges that hinder effective collaboration in the NS. More importantly, the study also aimed at developing the first ever-practical inter-agency policy framework that would enable the security sector in Malawi to collaborate efficiently and effectively, which is non-existent at the moment (Kuwali, 2012, p.89). To attain this, it is important to look at the specific setting for Malawi as a country.

1.1. Setting the scene

“Great countries need to secure their borders for national security purposes, for economic purposes and for rule of law purposes.” - Jeb Bush (12 May 2013)

Malawi is one of the most peaceful countries in the sub-Saharan Africa, which has not experienced any civil war and is generally known as the “Warm Heart of Africa” (Kayira, 2010, p.3). While this is true, however, it still faces a number of threats to National Security (NS). According to Curtis and McBride (2011, p.3), threats and issues of NS vary from country to country due to different environment. Malawi, like other African countries is faced with threats to NS as evidenced by border disputes with Tanzania, terrorist bombings in the neighbourhood countries of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Nigeria (Zegart, 2007, p.24; Omolo, 2012, p.1; Straziuso, 2014, p.1 & 2; Mahony et al., 2014, p.14), acts of terror in Malawi (Muheya, 2011, P.1), cross border crime and armed robberies (Malawi Police report, 2010, p.4), increased illegal immigrants (Nkhoma, 2013, p.29), political violence (Musuva, 2009, p.1) and disasters including earthquakes, floods and droughts (Mijoni, 2009, pp.490-503).

According to Chalabi (2013, p.4), in the year 2013, Malawi was ranked at position 10 in Africa and 74 on the world peace index basing on absence of violence and some threats mentioned above among other factors. This was in comparison with other countries like Iceland at position one, Botswana at 32, United Kingdom (UK) number 44, United States of America (USA) at 99 and Somalia ranked 161.
In Malawi, threats to NS are further compounded by its central geographical location, which makes Malawi more vulnerable to transnational trafficking routes and other clandestine threats.

1.1.1. Malawi’s geographical context
Malawi is a constitutional peaceful and progressive democratic land-locked country in Southern Africa (Map 1) bordered by Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique (Map 2). The geographical location makes Malawi as one of the main routes for migrations from war torn countries in North Africa going to South Africa for greener pastures (Map 3; Kainja, 2012, cited by Nkhoma, 2013, p.35).

Maps (1, 2 and 3) Location of Malawi in Africa, Neighbouring Countries and Migration Routes

Malawi is also located in the Great Rift Valley with rich agricultural land; and recently, the discovery of various precious minerals including uranium, coal, rare earth metals, iron, and oil in Lake Malawi makes a lucrative destination for different development partners. These resources could also be a source of conflict (Omolo, 2013, p.1; Mahony et al., 2014, p.17). According to Nkhoma (2013, pp.38-40), these threats require effective coordination at both central government and regional level to effect meaningful security and economic development.
1.1.2. Economic development and national security context

The Government and security organisations in Malawi are increasingly acknowledging the importance of NS as a requirement for economic development (Kakhobwe et al., 2012, p.8). According to Nkosi (2012, p.2) Malawi’s economic growth averaged 8% between 2007 and 2010. Nkosi (2012, p.2) adds that this was driven by positive growth in the various sectors of agriculture, building and construction, transport and communication, financial and professional services, manufacturing, but also due to a stable environment. While these were commendable developments, they also contributed to more illegal immigrants flocking into Malawi and increasing criminal activities and scramble for resources, which affect economic growth (Nkhoma, 2013, p.29). Nkosi (2012, p.2) contends that in 2012, Malawi’s economic growth dropped to 4.3 % due to unavailability of foreign exchange on the domestic markets among other factors.

Myers and McConnell (2009, p.316) previously noted that the ability for a nation to function and prosper relies heavily on its level of national security.

1.1.3. What is National Security?

According to Watson (2008, p.5), National Security (NS) is the concept for promoting freedom, justice, human dignity and confronting the challenges of leading a growing community of democracies. For purposes of this study, NS is defined as the requirement to protect Malawi’s National Interests and Values by:

- Using diplomacy to rally allies and isolate threats.
- Marshalling economic power to facilitate cooperation through peaceful environment.
- Maintaining effective armed forces to deter external aggression.
- Implementing civil defence and emergency preparedness measures including disasters and anti-terrorism.
- Using intelligence services to detect and defeat or avoid threats and
- Using the police to protect the nation from internal threats and crime.

According to Shanahan (2011, p.17), achieving effective national security requires the involvement of several stakeholders through collaborative leadership that focuses on workable policy responses.
1.2. **Collaborative Leadership**

“Alone we can do so little; together we can do so much.” -Helen Keller *(Quoted by Dorothy Herrmann, 1999)*

As the quote alludes to, the concept of Collaborative Leadership (CL) is the management that focuses on leadership skills to get more results and came into use in the 19th Century as a result of industrialization (Wanna, 2008, p.8). This culminated into the emergence of more complex organisations that created division of labour and increase in management of tasks. According to Archers and Cameron (2013, p.10), collaborative efforts cross many boundaries, participants are not members of a single organisation, but rather come from many different organisations and their training, experiences, and values differ markedly. Rabinowitz (2013, p.2) defined CL as an influence relationship and process, which promotes safety, trust and commitment, among leaders and their partners who intend substantive or transforming change that reflect their mutual purpose, shared vision and common goals. For proper understanding, this study defined collaborative leadership as the capability of several security organisations and actors to enter into, establish and sustain inter-agency systems in pursuit of NS. The study then explored the need for CL in the Malawian NS, which are discussed in the following sections.

1.3. **What is the need for Collaborative Leadership in the National Security of Malawi?**

“Threats that are brought by illegal immigration, terrorism, cyber-crime, human rights abuse, or indeed poverty, disease and hunger, affect every aspect of our society as they negatively impact on the economy and the whole social fabric of our Malawian citizens. It's therefore pleasing that this realisation has brought us together to share this knowledge and experience to come up with meaningful interventions to deal with the threats that we face today.” –Former President Dr Joyce Banda *(September 12, 2012)*

The need for more collaboration among the security organisations in Malawi
cannot be over emphasised if it has to compare with the most peaceful countries in
the world and champion as a model. Most security threats to Malawi include
external aggression, transnational and cross border crime, corruption, acts of terror,
internal security challenges, disasters and effects of international conflicts
(Gondwe, 2003; Ngoma, 2008; Phimbi, 2011; Masina, 2012; Mutharika, 2014,
p.9). The following sub-sections explain the need for effective collaboration by
the security sector in Malawi, as leaders mainly concentrate on their Ministerial or
departmental duties as stipulated in the Constitution of Malawi (2010). The need
for collaboration is also amplified by some of the direct quotes by top political and
security leaders, who have different threat perceptions and priorities to deal with
them.

1.3.1. Threats of external aggression and support international peace

“Our borders are top security issues and Malawi would not give an inch of its
land.” - Honourable Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Ephraim M’ganda Chiume
(September 2, 2012).

Malawi being a Sovereign State has the responsibility of defending itself from
external aggression. An example of external aggression was the statement by the
Chairman of the Tanzania Parliamentary Standing Committee for Defence,
Security and Foreign Affairs, who stated that the Tanzania People’s Defence
Forces were well prepared for any operation to safeguard the country’s borders
against Malawi’s claims on the Lake Malawi wrangles (Omolo, 2012, p.1;
Mahony, 2014, p.17). Although the chairman later on advised the government to
use diplomacy to resolve the conflict amicably after considering the cost of war
experience in Uganda, he emphasised that Tanzania was ready to go to war and
defend her sovereignty at any cost. The Malawi Government also cannot stand
idle, but defend its territory and citizenry using all its powers of national security
(Constitution of Malawi, 2010). According to Mahony (2014, p.17), these disputes
of sovereignty could end up costing the two countries more than they might
receive from resources exploitation for economic prosperity if not well
coordinated.
This was one of the reasons that study explored effective and lasting solution on such important issues. Malawi also has to look at international cooperating partners that understand its national interests and make strategies for full collaboration, as the Treaty between Germany and Britain in 1890 clearly stated that the whole Lake Nyasa, now Lake Malawi, belonged to Nyasaland, the current Malawi (Mahony, 2014, p.14).

The need for effective collaboration was also evident between 1987 and 1996, when Malawi deployed its troops and members of Malawi railways to construct and protect the Nacala Corridor in Mozambique against the armed bandits during the Mozambican Civil War (Rupiya, 2005, p.123). This was an important undertaking economically as Malawi is a landlocked country had to safeguard her interest through protection of this import and export trade route. Additionally, Malawi had to demonstrate to the Mozambican Government that they supported peace to prevail in Mozambique by working with the Frelimo Party led Government and troops to fight the opposition Renamo bandits that were destroying the railway line (Mandiza, 2002, p.125). During this operation called “Kwaeni,” some soldiers and servicemen from the Malawi railways lost their lives through direct combat and explosion of landmines, as witnessed by the author, who was also deployed in this operation. Thanks to these servicemen and other stakeholders for their dedicated duty that enabled the Nacala corridor to re-open in 1997 after over 10 years closure (Malonda, 2002, p.29).

According to Brigadier Malonda, who was a senior staff officer in the Directorate of Military Operations in Malawi responsible for coordinating Operation Kwaeni, some of the personnel from Malawi Railways were killed in Mozambique through direct combat fire because they had no joint training with security organisations prior to deployment and limited communication procedures to alert them of the upcoming dangers (Malonda, 2002, p.2). This study also seeks to explore practical measures that will strengthen collaborations between private and public security organisations and institutions, which could mitigate a number of problems. Terrorist attacks in Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania and political uprising in Egypt,
Tunisia and wars in Democratic Republic of Congo are also examples that Malawi always needs to be prepared to respond to the impact of external threats (Zegart, 2007, p.24; Gondwe, 2012, P.2; Nkhoma, 2013, p.29; Straziuso, 2014, p.1 & 2). For instance, Kainja (2012) observed that cross border crime and illegal migration are also problems for Malawi and a concern for collaboration.

1.3.2. Mitigate cross border crime and illegal migration

“Illegal migration is a major threat to Malawi’s security. Currently, there are more than 300 illegal migrants being held at Maula prison from the Great Lakes Region that need to be repatriated. This is part of our international obligations, but we are facing resource constraints”. -Honourable Minister of Home Affairs Mr Atupele Muluzi (August 1, 2015).

According to Kainja (2010, p.8), illegal immigrants include foreigners that enter into Malawi through chartered or legal means, but they decide to remain in the country after the expiry of their visas given to them. Migration in Africa is dynamic and extremely complex (Nkhoma, 2013, p.30). This is reflected in the feminisation of migration, diversification of migration destinations, transformation of labour flows into commercial migration and the brain drain from the region. Complicating this picture are trafficking in human beings, the changing map of refugee flows, and the increasing role of regional economic organisations in fostering free flows of labour. Malawi is keeping over 14,000 migrants and refugees at Dzaleka Refugee camp in Dowa District in Central Region (Kachale, 2012, p.1). According to Malawi Police report (2010, cited by Nkhoma, 2013, p.29), the country receives about 5,000 illegal immigrants per annum, who mainly come from Burundi, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Democratic Republic of Congo. Mponda (2012, p.1) adds that on 18th June 2012, about 60 Ethiopians and Somalis drowned while trying to cross Lake Malawi into Karonga using unchartered route by a Tanzanian boat.

Kachale (2012, p.1) adds that some illegal migrants even operate businesses in Malawi and are not confronted due absence of individual identity cards and
limited coordination by the Malawi Government to share information and engage the United Nations Commission for refugees to repatriate them. This is further compounded because of the old and lenient laws to punish illegal immigrants with a fine of MK 25,000 (equivalent to $60) or one year imprisonment as per Immigration Act 15:03, Section 36 cited by First Grade Magistrate Court (Mtika, 2013, p.1; Nkhoma 2013, p.38). Wezi (2011, p.1) also quoted the Inspector General (IG) of Malawi Police Service, who said “Efforts to deal with crime in Malawi are rendered useless because some lawyers quickly defend suspects. He gave an example of 136 Ethiopians and Somalis who were arrested in April 2010 after hiding in a forest in Nkhatabay district who were being aided by human traffickers to go to South Africa for greener pastures.

The IG of Police also deplored acts of some immigration officials who aid illegal migrants (Kufa, 2012, p.1 & 2). Nkhoma (2013, p.30) adds that in Malawi, there is ample, yet unsubstantiated evidence of the crimes related to these illegal immigrants such as human trafficking, armed robberies and smuggling. In 2007, a car was hijacked in Mzuzu and when the robbers were caught, it was found that they were from Tanzania (Nkhoma, 2013, p.35).

Efforts to control this situation is being a problem in Malawi as there are conflicts of interests and approaches among players such as the Office of President and Cabinet, the Malawi Police Service, United Nations Human Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), trade and industry, civil society, immigration, army and the intelligence (Nkhoma, 2013, p.39). For example, the police accuse the army of interfering in domestic security, which falls exclusively under their domain. The UNHCR considers the immigrants as refugees that need their protection, while the police consider them as illegal immigrants who have to be arrested, fined and deported to their countries of origin. Meanwhile, the Malawi Revenue Authority (MRA) enjoys the custom revenue, which immigrants bring into the country through international trade (Nkhoma, 2013, p.40). Whether founded or not, there is a belief held by immigrants, especially from Tanzania and Nigeria, that it is
easy to obtain a passport in Malawi with which to travel to countries like South Africa and USA, where their entry is highly regulated (Nkhoma, 2013, p.34). In Malawi, a lot of lessons were learnt from this illegal migration. If security actors do not collaborate, more illegal migrants will enter Malawi, a case for increasing crime rate and deprive Malawians of economic prosperity as they scramble for limited resources (Kakhobwe et al., p.11). Malawi will also continue to be blamed by other countries, as it would be acting as a safe transit route to countries like South Africa (Kainja, 2010, p.12). One example of the blame was in 2009, when South African security leaders called for a joint meeting in Pretoria with Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia to find solutions for stopping illegal migrants transiting these countries into South Africa. The author as NSA at that time coordinated Malawi’s attendance from the MDF, Police and Immigration. Follow up reports indicated effective coordination among these countries and reduced transit of illegal migrants, although the issue remains a security challenge.

1.3.3. Prevent threats to internal security and acts of terrorism

“Acts of cash gate, human trafficking, albino killings and human body parts were all sophisticated crimes and emerging threats that Government will crackdown”. - Hon. Minister of Home Affairs Mr Atupele Muluzi (July 13, 2015).

Internal crime is becoming a significant threat to the country’s societies, communities and economy (Musa, 2013, p.4). In their earlier survey on crime statistics in Malawi, Gondwe et al. (2003, p.20) reported that a total of 2,984 respondents representing 43.5%, experienced one or more crimes over the 12 month period between 1st May, 2002 and 1st May, 2003. These were mostly theft of crops and livestock, corruption, murder, theft of motor vehicles, robberies, sexual assault and vandalism to buildings and vehicles. This study used this survey to advance the argument that there are internal threats in Malawi as it was one of the first academic studies on security in Malawi. The survey, however, did not address the need for collaboration, which this study addressed.
To support the author’s concern, the Malawi Police Service Annual Report (2010, p.4) also indicated that some of the crimes they mainly dealt with were motor vehicle thefts, cross border crime, demonstrations, theft of livestock and smuggling among others. The report also acknowledged the successful achievements in dealing with these crimes through the support of other partners like International Police, National Intelligence Bureau, members of the local communities and donor partners (pages 4 and 55). The Malawi Police report (2010, p.246) further outlined that one of the objectives in year 2013-14 was to reduce crime from 85,728 to 69,632 incidents, which was evidence that internal crime is still prevalent and needs improved collaboration.

The report also observed that the police efforts to deal with crime were hampered due to lack of collaboration and support from other stakeholders like political parties, urban community committees and health committees among others (Malawi Police report, 2010, p.57). Muheya (2011, p.1) adds that the subsequent burning of the vehicle belonging to Zodiak Broadcasting Station and individual houses for some Malawian citizens with differing political views is also a security concern that requires a cultural mind-set and support of the general public. The political violence in Mangochi in 2009 (Musuva, 2009, p.1) and in Thyolo on 16th March, 2014 where a police officer and one civilian were killed, are some examples of internal threats (Nyirongo, 2014, p.1).

Musa (2013, p.4) also outlined a number of crimes that happened just in the month of September, 2013, which included; burning of four houses in Thyolo following chieftaincy wrangle (Sep. 1), petrol bomb on Traditional Authority Nsamala’s house (Sep. 6), killing of George Maluwa in a failed attempt to steal a vehicle (Sep. 9), shooting of Paul Mphwiyo, who was the government Budget Director (Sep. 23) and several cash gate cases on corruption as examples to indicate internal threats to NS.

The study also contends that when there is security breakdown and security actors are not coordinating enough to end these threats, people resort to mob justice, as
was the case of the burning of Msundwe police unit, allegedly because the police could not arrest a murder suspect (Muheya, 2011, p.1). In the author’s view, these terrorist incidents, which are secretive in nature (Zagart, 2007, p.91), lead to the argument that it is only through effective collaboration that security organisations can be able to identify and mitigate them.

1.3.4. Manage and mitigate disasters

“In Malawi, intensive rain and flooding have challenged communities, damaged infrastructure and continue to threaten many livelihood and loss of life. In addition to extreme rain and floods, the country also experiences severe droughts that continue to threaten food security and availability and access to water resources. These need to be mitigated with utmost priority” - Honourable Minister of Environment and climate change management Ms Halima Daudi (November 19, 2013).

There have been disasters caused by floods, earthquakes and accidents including burning of produce markets in Malawi that require coordinated response. Banda (2012, p.1) testified that about 6,157 families lost their property, over a thousand hectares of crop fields were ruined and 343 houses were destroyed in a matter of minutes when tropical cyclone hit Nsanje district in the southern region of Malawi.

The region is hit annually by high rainfall, as was also the case in 2015, where over 176 people were killed, over 200,000 displaced and several property destroyed (Nyondo, 2015, p.1). In Karonga, there was also a wave of earthquakes of magnitude5 and 6 on the local magnitude scale from 6th and 27th December 2009 respectively, where over 24,000 people were affected, four dead and a lot of property damaged (Nyirongo, 2009, p.1). The challenge has been when and how quickly to respond and how resources are managed (Kuwali, 2012, p.85; Mijoni, 2009, pp.490-503).

The author contends that the problem is limited written protocols and legislation on joint training and procedures that would enable first line respondents or actors
in the security sector to act instantly and collaboratively in pursuit of NS. The following section outlines more on security actors.

1.4. Security Sector and Actors

“We cannot continue to rely only on our military in order to achieve the national security objectives that we’ve set. We’ve got to have a civilian national security force that's just as powerful, just as strong, just as well-funded.” -President Barack Obama (May 12, 2013)

Cawthra (2009, p.22) defined the Security Sector as a cluster of actors and agencies that provide security to the state, people and/or the environment. Watson (2008, p.15-29) previously provided a clarification that the security sector comprises core institutions that are mandated to use fire-arms such as the Military, Police and Intelligence organisations. She adds that Ministries of Defence and Internal Affairs are also part of the security sector because of their management roles, whereas Parliament is an important legislative and oversight body that passes and promulgates state policies including the passing of security policy. Ministry of Foreign Affairs is another arm of the state that is responsible for Foreign Policy, which guides Security Policy for international involvement. Additionally, Ministry of Justice plays a role for the Security Sector as guarantor of rule of law. Non-State actors including Civil Society also play a crucial role in security. Cawthra (2009, p.23) emphasises that all these institutions need to collaborate in order to realise effective national security. The author, however, found this as a challenging task in Malawi as security organisations do not collaborate fully (Kakhobwe et al., 2012, pp.7-9), hence motivation for this study.

1.5. Motivation for this Research

The author was once a National Security Advisor (NSA) to the President of Malawi and his roles included coordinating the agenda for NS. In the course of duties, the author realised that today’s threats are dynamic, diffuse and ambiguous, making it difficult for any single security organisation to address them alone. For instance, illegal migration, child trafficking, robberies and money laundering just
to mention but a few required concerted efforts by various organisations and individuals, but these were not well coordinated (Kainja, 2010, p.17; Osman, 2012, p.1).

Both political and security leaders openly talk about these problems and they appeal to the general public to assist in security improvements and collaboration. However, there are several challenges including limited written practical guidelines to cement the collaboration (Kakhobwe et al., 2012, p.8). The need for someone to champion the practical process is, therefore, an important step to take, which the author has initiated. The author was motivated by what other countries like the United States of America (USA), Australia and Japan just to mention but a few, are doing to deal with these threats; for example, the formulation of integrated National Security Policy, which Malawi does not have. In 2009, the author started working on developing a National Security Policy, but realised that it required more research and input for it to be more effective.

Whilst the Government of Malawi has made some commendable provision on collaboration in National Security through the establishment of a Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security (Malawi Constitution, 2010, chapter XVI, section 62) and the office of the National Security Advisor (Tenthani, 2011, p.1), which is one of the first countries in Africa, there are still several gaps in the collaborative system that require proper and practical arrangements to be put in place to guide the security actors to meet the objectives. For example, when the author was the National Security Advisor (NSA), there were no written documentation on mandates and procedures for liaising with other organisations. Every time the author made the initiative to coordinate, some leaders of security organisations wondered and challenged the legitimacy, despite the roles assigned to him by the appointing authority.

The author was also a senior lecturer at Mzuzu University (MZUNI) Centre for Security Studies and noted that there was limited literature in this field in Malawi and globally, that added strong impetus for this study.
1.6. Research Problem
The research problem was to examine the effectiveness of Collaborative Leadership among Security Actors in Malawi. In turn, the findings were sought to provide inputs to improve Collaborative Leadership in order to achieve sustainable NS and prosperity in Malawi. As stated earlier, Kakhobwe et al., (2012, p.7) show that the major security challenge in Malawi was limited collaboration among the security actors due to different culture and roles, which resulted in continued threats to NS. There were cases where a number of illegal immigrants entered Malawi and were given business permits without checking their visa status as relevant security organisations did not collaborate effectively on such security clearances (Nkhoma, 2013, p.29). Worst still, others use Malawi as a transit route to other countries, such as South Africa, because of limited collaborative structures to check on these illegal immigrants, resulting in other nations blaming Malawi for such safe passages (Kainja, 2010, p.12).

The other gap was lack of information sharing and joint threat analysis among leaders of security organisations and other actors (Chirwa, 2013, p.10). The violent mass demonstrations of 20th July, 2011 over governance, which resulted in destruction of valuable property and deaths of 20 people, was one of the examples of limited collaboration (Kapito et al., 2011, p.10).

Another challenge was transforming values, attitudes and skills in the security sector of Malawi. Security organisations have their own roles, cultures and structures to follow, and therefore difficult to make them understand the need to work together (Northouse, 2013, p.5). According to Chrislip (2002, p.44), Collaborative Leaders work as peer participants and they do not have authority. The author saw this as a huge problem that needed new mechanisms with sufficient legal authority if organisations have to collaborate effectively. The other problem facing Malawi, like most countries in the world, was the absence of an Integrated Practical Framework and National Security Policy that would outline a more cohesive approach to guide inter-agency collaboration and procedures for the Security Sector (Kakhobwe et al., 2012, p.8).
Compounding these research problems was that the top five threats to global National Security in the coming decade have been recognised to also include biological and nuclear weapons, cyber-attacks, climate change and transnational crime (Erwin *et al.*, 2012, p.1 & 2). For Malawi to achieve a sustainable National security, collaborative leadership responds significantly to these domestic and external challenges. In this respect, this study precisely answered the following research problem:

*What is the effectiveness of collaborative leadership and how could it be improved among the security actors of Malawi, while encompassing the individual organisations’ mandates and roles?*

### 1.7. Hypothesis

This study sought to prove that effective Collaborative Leadership (CL) provides better security to the Nation than other styles of leadership to achieve sustainable peace and economic development.

### 1.8. Aim

The aim of this research was to develop a holistic strategic framework for practicing CL by the Security Actors (SAs) of Malawi to enhance National Security and Prosperity. To attain the research goal, the following objectives were addressed in this study.

### 1.9. Objectives

a. To understand the extent of collaborative leadership within the security sector of Malawi and its effectiveness on National Security and economic development.

b. To identify key factors that would influence greater collaboration across security actors of Malawi during both crisis and peaceful periods to achieve highest national security, particularly on domestic level.
c. To understand the new concept of national security, threats and relevant security actors.

d. To identify barriers that hinder effective collaboration among the security actors and solutions to mitigate them.

e. To develop a holistic and strategic practical policy framework for achieving successful CL in Malawi in order to be number one (1) most peaceful and prosperous country in Africa.

1.10. Research Methodology

A mixed methodology of in-depth case studies and surveys were the two approaches adopted for this study to generate quantitative and qualitative data (Saunders et al., 2009, p.153). The use of mixed research methods in the same study has the advantages of enabling triangulation, can be complementary and is a powerful mix (Miles et al., 2014, p.42). In the first phase of the study, a conceptual framework was developed by analysing literature and case studies in collaborative leadership in the security sector. This framework was further enhanced by incorporating the findings from questionnaires and interviews of professional and experienced leaders from fifteen security organisations and actors. The questionnaire was distributed personally, by e-mail and use of three research assistants (Yin, 2014, p.89). The methods of this study are explained in more detail in Chapter three.

1.11. Theoretical and practical contribution

“It is by what we ourselves have done, and not by what others have done for us, that we shall be remembered in after ages.” - Francis Wayland (1796-1865, cited by Lawrence M. V. Feb. 8, 2007)

While there have been some collaboration among the Security actors in Malawi, it has been to a limited scale. The author contributed to knowledge through:
1.11.1. Factors to improve CL on domestic and international level
A comprehensive list of factors to effectively improve collaborative leadership for sustainable national security, particularly on domestic level, where more security threats are emerging, as security leaders mainly uses autocratic style of leadership and manage single organisations to achieve tactical and very clear objectives.

1.11.2. Empowering collaborative leaders with legal mandate
Empowering collaborative leaders such as the National Security Advisor (NSA) with legal mandate to coordinate with other organisations, unlike the current practice where they work as mere participants. This would enable the NSA to collate vital information and advise the President accordingly on appropriate actions.

1.11.3. Strategic fusion of NS information in peace and crisis period
Systematic fusion of strategic information for the security professionals through a central national security coordinating office and joint security committees that would enhance long term capability and rightful decision making process on domestic and international level; and during both peacetime and crisis periods.

1.11.4. Addition to knowledge on effective CL
Filled the literature gap and created a better understanding of the benefits of collaborative leadership in the security sector of Malawi on domestic level and globally. In the academia, the departments of Security Studies at Mzuzu University and Political Affairs at Chancellor College in Malawi would greatly benefit from this study.

1.11.5. Development of national security policy framework with parliamentary approval
Development of the first ever integrated National Security Policy Framework for Malawi with written protocols and parliamentary approval to guide collaboration, which is very critical at the moment for sustainable peace and prosperity.
1.12. **Thesis Structure**  
This study is structured in six chapters, references and appendices.

1.12.1. **Chapter 2: Literature Review**  
This chapter provides an outline review on the current literature on leadership theories for achieving the desired objectives. Leadership styles such as autocratic and bureaucratic, which are mostly used in the security sector, have been discussed. The review concludes with an introduction to collaborative leadership, which is a desired concept in order to achieve SNS and prosperity in Malawi.

1.12.2. **Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology**  
This chapter provides an in-depth discussion on the methodological foundations and design. It provides arguments for the selection of the research approach and strategy for data collection and analysis used in this study. Based on the analysis, the author used mixed methods for both quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis procedure. This enabled the research to answer why, what, how, who, where and many other questions (Yin, 2014, p.134).

1.12.3. **Chapter 4: Data Analysis, Findings and Discussion**  
In this chapter, findings of the study were analysed. Based on the analytic findings of the study, a comprehensive list of factors for practicing CL among the security actors was identified. The chapter also critically discussed the findings against the current Collaborative Leadership literature and National Security.

1.12.4. **Chapter 5: Practical framework for CL and NS.**  
A practical national security policy and strategy framework termed “NACUSSEPA” model was developed and presented here basing on the findings of this study to guide collaborative leadership in pursuit of national security management of Malawi.

1.12.5. **Chapter 6: Conclusions and Further Research Work**  
This chapter provides a summary of findings of the research project with critical
discussion on its benefits and challenges. It discusses the contributions made by this study to CL body of knowledge, and also outlines recommendations for further research work to enhance the findings of this empirical study.

1.13. Summary
This chapter provided a concise introduction to the Collaborative Leadership arena. It started by defining the concept of CL and its effectiveness in achieving National Security goals. The chapter then outlined the need for CL among the security actors of Malawi, as various security organisations have different priorities in their perception on security threats according to their roles and responsibilities as per the Constitution of Malawi (2010). The chapter also highlighted the research problem and set the objectives for this study. It has also briefly described the research methodology adopted for this project.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2. Introduction

“The old leadership model, in other words, just being a manager-doesn’t work. Now schoolteachers, have to know teaching inside and out. They have to know best practices. They have to know how to structure a school to support teaching and learning. They have to know about professional development for on-going learning-job-embedded, collaborative types of learning.” - Wendy Katz (1987)

This chapter discussed the new concept of National Security (NS), its providers and the effectiveness of Collaborative Leadership (CL) to achieve extraordinary NS goals. It also presents other leadership styles used in the security organisations and their implications on National Security. A number of successful cases that helped to achieve NS in Malawi and at international level due to effective collaboration have been illustrated. Case failures, where there was limited inter-agency collaboration have also been highlighted. This chapter focuses on the challenges to effective collaboration and explored best mechanisms and models to resolve them, after noting the gaps in the success and failure cases as mentioned above.

For comparative purposes, the national security strategic planning frameworks of the United States of America (USA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are described to highlight the analytical rigor and coherent mechanisms that support long-term strategic thinking and collaboration in those countries and multilateral setting. MacFarlane (2012, p.6) advises that for stakeholders to understand the need for effective Collaboration in the security sector, it is essential to clarify the definition of National Security and its providers.

2.1. Concept of National Security

The concept of security of a nation goes back to the dawn of nation-states themselves after the Second World War in 1945 (Watson, 2008, p.3). The modern term of national security came into common parlance in the 20th Century during
the cold war (Charrett, 2009, p.9). Since then, methodologies to achieve and maintain the highest desired state of national security have been consistently developed over the modern period to this day (McFarlane, 2012, p.6). Consequently, the simultaneously terrorist attacks on New York, Pennsylvania, and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001, and other threats also signalled the emergence of some striking changes in America and in the world (Vigoda-Gadot, 2003, p.5).

The concept developed in the United States of America (USA) after World War II, initially focused on military might, but now it encompasses a broad range of facets, including the non-military and economic security of the nation and the values espoused by the national society (Watson, 2008, p.5). Charrett (2009, p.13), however, warns that not everything should be considered as a security issue, hence the need for appropriate analysis of the securitisation process. According to Buzan et al. (1998, cited by Charret, 2009, p.13), securitisation is a method of understanding the threats to security for the survival of the nation and initiating priority policies, which demand urgent attention as well as the use of extraordinary measures to counter these threats.

Cawthra (2009, p.20), further clarifies that security issues are categorised in four components; National Security, Societal Security, Human Security and Environmental Security (Table 2.1). While the author commends this concept as it outlines components of security and its providers, it has some difficulties in that the heading for these components should have been components of National Security as all other security elements are covered in this new concept (Watson, 2008, p.12). The author is of the opinion that Cawthra (2009, p.23) has described the national security in a narrow view, covering military attack, economic and terrorist threats only. Elements of political and information security are also missing in this table, which are critical in National Security (McFarlane, 2012, p.3).

In Malawi, issues of NS cannot be over-emphasised as there are threats of external
aggression by Tanzania over Lake Malawi border (Omolo, 2012, p.1), cross border crime (Kainja, 2012) and violence (Musa, 2013, p.3). While Malawi has been developing fast, there have been some challenges due to illegal immigrants who have depleted the available resources from the local citizens (Nkhoma, 2013, p.31). On political security, issues of bad governance have at times caused the withholding of international donor aid resulting in negative impact on economic growth, scarcity of fuel, foreign exchange and price increase in basic commodities (Kapito et al., 2011, pp.7-9; Ntata, 2013, p.51).

Table 2.1. Components of Security and Actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of Security</th>
<th>Threats</th>
<th>Security Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National security</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Military attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expanded Economic</td>
<td>State Treasury Customs services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>threats</td>
<td>Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal security</td>
<td>Genocide, Ethnic</td>
<td>Armed forces Self-defence groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cleansing</td>
<td>Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human security</td>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disease</td>
<td>Disease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>Poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental security</td>
<td>Security from the</td>
<td>Natural Disasters and Global warming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>environment</td>
<td>Global warming Poaching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security of the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cawthra (2009, p. 20)
According to Cawthra (2009, p.21), human security is people centred and entails protection from crime, freedom from violence and from the fear of violence. It also includes a broader range of threats, including environmental pollution, infectious diseases, and economic deprivation. Ideally, national security and human security should be mutually reinforcing, but in the last 100 years, far more people have died as a direct or indirect consequence of the actions of their own governments or rebel forces in civil wars than have been killed by invading foreign armies (Carafano and Smith, 2006, p.6). Acting in the name of NS, governments can pose profound threats to human security (Schnabel, 2008, pp.87-95; Charret, 2009, p.25). The author feels that if all these components of NS are to be achieved, there is need for effective leadership by various stakeholders and agrees with Northouse (2013, p.3).

2.2. Leadership Defined


According to Northouse (2013, p.5) “Leadership” is a process by which a person influences others to accomplish an objective and directs the organisation in a way that makes it more cohesive and coherent. Halligan (2010, p.91) earlier stated that leadership comes when people need to be shown a new way ahead with motivation, even if their instinct is to stick with the familiarity of the old tendencies. Northouse (2013, p.6) adds that leadership should effect meaningful change for a particular course of action. This makes it different from normal management, which is usually misinterpreted to mean the same as leadership. According to Northouse (2013, p.12), leadership is far more critical for an industry or organisation to realise more profits and achieve desired objectives as it concentrates on vision, change and strategies. Archer and Cameron (2013, p.9), however, points out that leadership is probably the most researched and yet the least understood topic in the context of management, hence the need to understand the leadership styles and compare their positive-negative impacts.
2.3. Leadership Styles

Leadership styles encompass how leaders relate to others within and outside the organisation, how they view themselves and their position and to a very large extent, whether or not they are successful as leaders (Northouse, 2013, pp.4-5). If a task needs to be accomplished, how does a particular leader set out to get it done? If an emergency arises, how does a leader handle it? If the organisation needs the support of the community, how does a leader go about mobilising it? All of these questions could best be answered depending on the leadership style. Factors that also influence the style to be used include: how much time is available, whether relationships are based on respect and trust or on disrespect, who has the information; you, your employees, or both, how well your employees are trained and how well you know the task, internal conflicts, stress levels, type of task whether it is structured, unstructured, complicated, or simple and laws or established procedures and training plans (Miller, 2008, p.5). For purposes of this study and to remain focused on the current topic of study, only leadership styles more practiced in the security sector with a few cases in other sectors have been discussed. These are autocratic, bureaucratic, transformational and collaborative leadership.

2.3.1. Autocratic Leadership Style

Autocratic is a classic/tactical model of “military” style of leadership termed, “Commanding”, probably the most often used because the objective is very clear, such as “defeat the enemy”, but the least effective (Chrislip, 1994, p.127; Goldman, 2000). Autocratic management style operates with the manager in control and issues orders because he/she feels more knowledgeable. Subordinates are given some level of flexibility in carrying out their work, but within specific limits and procedure (Bass, 2008, p440). The communication in groups led by autocratic leaders is top-down and individuals are promoted on favouritism and office politics (Chrislip, 1994, p.128). Since it rarely involves praise and frequently employs criticism, it undercuts morale, job satisfaction and leads to absenteeism of employees (Nordmeyer, 2012, p.1). In security organisations, this leadership style is, however, used in time of critical missions or during
emergencies, where taking the time to debate orders would cause property damage, mission failure or injury (Nordmeyer, 2012, p.1).

While the author understands the need for autocratic directives in combat scenarios, it is important to look at long-term strategic leadership when it comes to broader issues on NS in peacetime that involves several actors and not just a single organisation. In Malawi, the autocratic directive by the one party state government in 1983 where 3 Ministers (Aaron Gadama, Dick Matenje and Twaibu Sangala) and a Member of Parliament (David Chiwanga) were brutally killed by the Malawi Police Mobile Force in Mwanza district because of their democratic opinion in parliament (Kalinga, 2012, p.175) was a good example of the problems of this leadership. According to the author’s knowledge, who was working at the MDF headquarters, the MDF and other security actors were not consulted to find a peaceful solution to this tragedy, as is also indicated by Kalinga (2012, p.339).

2.3.2. Bureaucratic Leadership
According to Bass (2008, p.30), the bureaucrat knows the rules of the institution and has the team abided by them. When there are rigid policies and guidelines in place, the bureaucrat makes sure that they are maintained and used to the best of their ability. Northouse (2013, p.100) show that leaders in organisational departments that used coercive/directing and bureaucratic styles of leadership had low productivity. This seems to be in line with what the author is arguing that these are routine responsibilities in a similar organisation and not effecting meaningful change for inter-agency functions. Lamb and Marks (2010, p.16) point out that in the USA, bureaucratic leadership has affected most international operations as intelligence officers report to their headquarters in Washington instead of their immediate commanders or Ambassadors or working partners. These are similar challenges to Malawi as was the case stated earlier (Paragraph 2.3.1) where the Police killed prominent Malawian politicians. The Inspector General of Police at that time did not share this information with his counterpart the Army General in order to seek a better solution to this problem, but only got orders from his top authorities (Mandiza, 2002; Kalinga, 2012, p. 339).
2.3.3. Transformational leadership

Transformational leadership is defined as a leadership approach that causes change in individuals and social systems (Northouse 2013, P.186). Enacted in its authentic form, transformational leadership enhances the motivation, morale and performance of followers through a variety of mechanisms. These include connecting the follower’s sense of identity and self to the mission and the collective identity of the organisation; being a role model for followers that inspires them; challenging followers to take greater ownership for their work, and understanding the strengths and weaknesses of followers, so the leader can align followers with tasks that optimise their performance (Bass 2008, P.618).

Burns (1978) first introduced the concept of transforming leadership in his descriptive research on political leaders, but this term is now used in other organisational systems as well. Burns related to the difficulty in differentiation between management and leadership and claimed that the differences are in characteristics and behaviours. He established two concepts; “transforming leadership” and “transactional leadership”. According to Burns, the transforming approach creates significant change in the life of people and organisations. It redesigns perceptions and values, and changes expectations and aspirations of employees. Unlike in the transactional approach, it is not based on a “give and take” leadership, but on the leaders’ personality, traits and ability to make a change through example, articulation of an energising vision and challenging goals. Transforming leaders are idealised in the sense that they are a moral exemplar of working towards the benefit of the team, organisation or community and can change organisational culture (Northouse 2013, P187).

Archer and Cameron (2013, p.11) are quick to observe that in complex organisations with different tasks, there is need for more professionalism and characteristics of collaborative leadership styles. They add that most leadership styles used only focus on one organisation, maybe with different departments or sections. They suggest, therefore, that all leadership styles should culminate into collaborative leadership which would include various skills and working with different organisations and stakeholders.
Equally, in Malawi, transformational leadership has been a topic for discussion by various studies. According to Kakhobwe et al. (2013, p.2), Malawi needs to transform in the conduct of NS issues to enable stakeholders to work together. This is echoed by Chirwa (2013, p.12) that security actors need to transform and share relevant information in order to respond to threats in a coordinated manner. Chilima et al. (2015) also emphasise on transformed leadership in the Public Service in Malawi by initiating a number of reforms that include promotion of NS interests through effective collaborative leadership that this study aims to achieve.

2.3.4. Collaborative leadership

“Collaborative Leadership is about leading as a peer, not as a supervisor, excite and influence a group to achieve a shared goal.” -Russell Linden (2010, p.77)

Collaborative leadership (CL) refers to taking a leadership role in a coalition, organisation, or other enterprise, where everyone is on an equal footing and working together to solve a problem or create something new (Archer and Cameron, 2013, p.10). It has more benefits of money savings, increased capacity, waste is reduced and investment can be made once so that the wheel is not reinvented (McKenna, 2011, p.1). According to Chrislip (2002, p.44), the leader is not in control of the group, with no distinction for position or money, but has responsibility for guiding and coordinating the process by which the group decides upon and carries out actions to accomplish its goals. Collaborative leaders usually have no formal power or authority and they exercise leadership in what is perhaps the most difficult context.

Archer and Cameron (2013, p.213) adds that CL involves listening and understanding possible answers from various perspectives, unlike Autocratic Leadership which tends to do all the talking and “has the answer” and imposes solutions and decisions. Chrislip (1994, p.52) earlier explained that collaborative leaders share common qualities as they are willing to take risks, share knowledge and power; and acknowledge the achievement of others and emphasise the success of the group over the success of specific individuals. Collaborative leaders
understand that the benefits of success outweigh the setbacks that may be encountered along the way. They are, thus, comfortable with risk and will see routes that others avoid as potential opportunities for advantage in order to get things done. Table 2.2 by Linden (2010, p.xxvi) illustrates the levels of collaboration.

Table 2.2. Levels of Collaboration Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Networking</td>
<td>• Dialog and common understanding</td>
<td>• Non-hierarchical</td>
<td>• Low key leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Clearinghouse for information</td>
<td>• Loose/ flexible link</td>
<td>• Minimal decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Create base of support</td>
<td>• Roles loosely defined</td>
<td>• Little conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Community action is primary link among members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation or</td>
<td>• Match needs and provide coordination</td>
<td>• Central body of people as communication hub</td>
<td>• Facilitative leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>• Limit duplication of services</td>
<td>• Semi-final links</td>
<td>• Complex decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensure tasks are done</td>
<td>• Links are advisory</td>
<td>• Some conflict and some little communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Group leverages/raises money</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>• Share ideas and be willing to pull resources from</td>
<td>• All members involved in decision making</td>
<td>• Shared leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>existing systems</td>
<td>• Roles and time defined</td>
<td>• Decision making formal with all members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Develop commitment for a minimum of three years</td>
<td>• Links formal with written agreement</td>
<td>• Communication is common and prioritised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>• Accomplish shared vision and impact</td>
<td>• Consensus used in shared decision making</td>
<td>• Leadership high, trust level high,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Benchmarks</td>
<td>• Links are formal and written in work assignments</td>
<td>productivity high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Build interdependent system to address issues and</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Ideas and decisions equally shared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>opportunities</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Highly developed communication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Linden (2010, p.xxvi)

The table above outlines a good explanation of various levels and this study is emphasising on full collaboration in order to accomplish shared vision and
decision-making. The author, however, finds some gaps in this collaboration model, as it does not mention about the effectiveness of CL and strategies in decision making. Archers and Cameron (2013, p.142) comments that CL is not easy; as up to 70% of strategic alliances fail due to various factors. This study examined strategy and decision making process for effective collaboration, which are discussed in the following sections.

2.4. Strategy and Decision Making
The concept of Strategy has been adopted from the military and adapted for decision making in management, leadership, and business development (Nickols 2012, p.2). According to Strachan (2013, p.235), Strategy is a declaration of intent or plan and an indication of the possible means required to fulfil that requirement. Freedman (2013, p.554) adds that Strategy is a position; that is; it reflects decision(s) to offer during different situation(s) to accommodate a changing reality for better. While both definitions of strategy by Strachan (2013, p.235) and Freedman (2013, p.554) are appropriate, Freedman’s definition conforms well with this study as it is concerned with processes for making appropriate strategic decisions and actions in the interest of NS and prosperity for Malawi.

Allison and Zelikow (1999, p.1) defined Decision Making as a thought process of selecting a logical choice from the available options. They constructed three different ways through which analysts can examine events: the "Rational Actor" model, the "Organizational Behaviour" model, and the "Governmental Politics" model. To illustrate the models, Allison and Zelikow (1999, p.4-6) posed three questions in the case study of the Cuban crisis that took place in 1961: First, Why did the Soviet Union decide to place offensive missiles in Cuba? Second, why did the United States respond to the missile deployment with a blockade? And Third, Why did the Soviet Union withdraw the missiles? In order to synthesize the concept of decision making while taking into account of the case of Soviet Union, each of the model proposed by Allison and Zelikow (1999, p.1) are hereinafter described with appropriate literature:
2.4.1. The "Rational Actor" Model

Basically, under this model, Governments are treated as the primary actors. The Government examines a set of goals, evaluates them according to their utility maximizing potential, then picks the one that has the highest "payoff" (Allison, 1999, p.18). While this is a good model, Allison (1999, p.24), however, described that at times, using rational actor models are dangerous as they ignore a lot of new emerging facts. By using such models and modes of thinking, leaders may make unreliable assumptions about reality, which could have disastrous consequences. In *Essence of Decision*, Allison (1999) suggests that one reason for the popularity of rational actor model is that, compared to other models; it requires relatively little data and provides researchers with an "inexpensive approximation" of the situation. However, humans are not inextricably bound to act in a rational manner, which history has proven time and time again; hence the need to look at other alternative models.

2.4.2. The Organizational Behaviour Model

Allison and Zelikow (1999, p.143) noted there were many facts that the rational model had to ignore, such as why the Soviets failed to camouflage the nuclear sites during construction, but did so only after U-2 flights pinpointed their locations. Allison (1999) cited work by James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, which argue that existing governmental bureaucracy places limits on a nation's actions, and often dictates the final outcome. According to the ‘bureaucratic politics’ paradigm, one cannot safely assume that security functions will always be the ones determining the actual behaviour of such agencies, as all agencies are selfish in the sense of promoting their own corporate interests (Allison 1971; Halperin *et al*. 2006 cited by Cawthra 2009, p.27). To improve the same, Allison and Zelikow (1999) then urged the following "organizational process" model propositions:

- When faced with a crisis, government leaders don't look at it as a whole, but break it down and assign it according to pre-established organizational lines,
• Because of time and resource limitations, rather than evaluating all possible courses of action to see which one is most likely to work, leaders settle on the first proposal that adequately addresses the issue,
• Leaders gravitate towards solutions that limit short-term uncertainty, that is emphasis on "short-term" solutions,
• Organizations follow available set "repertoires" and procedures when taking actions, and
• Because of the large resources and time required to fully plan and mobilize actions within a large organization or government, leaders are effectively limited to pre-existing plans.

Under this theory, the crisis is explained that since the Soviets never established nuclear missile bases outside of their country at the time, they assigned the tasks to established departments which, in turn, followed their own available set procedures. However, their procedures were not adapted to Cuban conditions, and as a result, mistakes were made that allowed the U.S. to quite easily learn of the program's existence. Such strategic mistakes included such gaffes as supposedly undercover Soviet troops decorating their barracks with Red Army Stars viewable from above. Without any back-up plan, the Soviets had to withdraw (Allison and Zelikow 1999, p.121).

4.2.3. The "Governmental Politics" Model

Furthermore, Allison and Zelikow (1999, p.255) proposed a third model, which takes into account of "palace politics". While statesmen don't like to admit they play politics to get things done, especially in high-stakes situations such as the Cuban missile crisis, they nonetheless do. Allison and Zelikow (1999) proposed the following propositions for this model to work optimally:

• A nation's actions are best understood as the result of politicking and negotiation by its top leaders,
• Even if they share a goal, leaders differ in how to achieve it because of such factors as personal interests and background,
- Even if a leader holds absolute power, such as the President of the United States, is technically the commander-in-chief, the leader must gain a consensus with his underlings or risk having his order misunderstood or, in some cases, ignored.

- Related to the above proposition, the make-up of a leader's entourage will have a large effect on the final decision such as an entourage of "yes men" will create a different outcome than a group of advisors who are willing to voice disagreement.

- Leaders have different levels of power based on charisma, personality, skills of persuasion, and personal ties to decision-makers.

- If leaders are certain enough, they will not seek input from their advisors, but rather, approval. Likewise, if leaders have already implicitly decided on a particular course of action, an advisor wishing to have influence must work within the framework of the decision the leaders have already made.

- If a leader fails to reach a consensus with his inner circle or, at least, the appearance of a consensus, opponents may take advantage of these disagreements. Therefore, effective leaders must create a consensus, and

- Because of the possibilities of miscommunication, misunderstandings, and downright disagreements, different leaders may take actions that the group as a whole would not approve of.

Whilst Allison and Zelikow (1999) did not claim that any of their additional two models could fully explain anything, they noted that policymakers and analysts alike would benefit from stepping away from the traditional model and exploring alternate viewpoints. Another argument is that the information needed for bureaucratic and political models is so large that it is impractical to use in such a crisis. Although Allison (1999, p.401) has conceded that this is true, he argued that this does not mean that a person should automatically revert to the rational actor worldview. Moreover, he pointed out that the "rational actor" model continues to be applied even in long-term analyses including analyses that take place long after the event or "crisis" is past. Considering the three decision making models
outlined in the three sections above, this study also explored the decision making process for Malawi. The brief explanation is provided for in the next section.

2.4.4. Political Decision Making in Malawi

Like other democratic countries, the Republic of Malawi is institutionally governed by the Constitution which was formulated and passed in 2010 by the majority citizens of Malawi. Consistent with the constitutional mandate, the Constitution of Malawi (2010, Chapter 1, Sections 7-9) provides the establishment of the three arms of Government; the Executive, the Legislature or the Parliament, and the Judiciary. These institutions have different roles and are also required to work independently without interfering into the mandate of the other. The Executive, which comprises the State President, the Cabinet Ministers, Government Ministries, and Departments, formulates policies, goals, and objectives. The Parliament discusses and passes bills and regulations that reflect the interest of the majority people of Malawi. The president is further mandated by the Constitution (2010, Chap. 7, Sec. 89) to assent to these bills to be enacted into laws of Malawi. In turn, the Judiciary interpret and protect these laws and policies and make the necessary implementation measures including punitive rewards for those that breach NS programmes. This study arrangement contends that there is the highest support and endorsement from both political and government leadership for NS related issues in Malawi.

According to the Inspector General of Police, however, at times, these institutions in Malawi have had problems in working together to promote inclusive NS (Mtika, 2012, p.1). He cited a case, where illegal immigrants and criminals were arrested by the Malawi Police, which is part of the Executive arm of the Government, but they were quickly defended and awarded very lenient punishments by the Judiciary. Explaining the possible reasons for the NS implementation problems in Malawi, Chirwa (2013, p.4) argue that information failure is one of the main causes to the problems. He points out that there is limited sharing of information among the security stakeholders in order to make effective informed decisions in Malawi. For better understanding in strategies and
realistic decision making processes, this study also examined other models in the NS set up on the international scene, which can also be borrowed by Malawi for promotion of NS and prosperity of Malawians.

2.5. Inter-organisational collaborative models on national security

“Benchmarking models are useful to determine who is very best; how good are they and how do we get that good.”- F. John Rey (2002).

Thomas et al. (2011, p.3) defined an Inter-organisational Collaborative Capacity model as the capability of organisations to enter into, develop, and sustain inter-organisational systems in pursuit of collective security outcomes. This usually functions without an over-arching command authority and is used to a limited extent in NS (Coates, 2011, p.4). As such, it requires leadership engagement to guide, motivate, and structure the collaborations needed to be successful in the complex security environment. In this study, the author examined a comparative case of the USA National Security collaborative model as benchmark, which has been successful in achieving both the domestic and international security agenda (Lamb and Mark, 2010, p.6).

2.5.1. The United States National Security collaborative model

The USA National Security organisation was first established on 26th July 1947, when U.S. President Harry Truman signed the National Security Act after the Second World War. Together with its 1949 amendment, this act created the Department of Defence, and the Department of the Air Force from the existing United States Army Air Forces. It subordinated the military branches to the Secretary of Defence, established the National Security Council (NSC) and chartered the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The NSC is the President's principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. The Council also serves as the President's principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies. According to Lamb and Mark (2010, p.8) today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and
political influence because of this collaborative arrangement and recognition of lead agencies.

While the USA model is a good example to benchmark with other collaborations, Lamb and Mark (2010, p.3), however, observe that most national security systems have several problems. They point out that at the heart of the problem is the inability to reconcile a desire for a clear chain of command from the President down through the heads of the departments, organisations and agencies with the need to empower new mechanisms with sufficient authority to integrate efforts across the departments. The national security advisor is just an advisor to the President and neither the advisor nor staffs have any directive authority over the departments and agencies to be able to integrate inter-departmental efforts (Kanter et al., 2006; Lamb and Marks, 2010, p.5). According to Myers and McConnell (2009, p.281), the USA has, however, greatly improved its inter-departmental coordination with the appointment of the National Director of Intelligence (DNI) after the 2001 terrorist incident.

Impediments to inter-agency integration are rooted in the basic structure of the national security system, which is hierarchical and based upon a functional division of labour among powerful departments and agencies with authorities and prerogatives codified in law and often protected by corresponding congressional committees (Lamb and Mark, 2010, p.7). These departments and agencies resist cooperation with one another and the heads of department assert tight control over their subordinates and strong organisational cultures. The clear line of authority from the President down through the department and agency heads and their subordinates, often referred to as “unity of command”, comes at the expense of unity of effort because, for fear of losing their powers, departments refuse to work together, even on missions of national importance.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the USA National Security model (Lamb and Mark, 2010, p.6). It must be mentioned here that competition for power and authority for any National Security System rests on the President; thus, the President has the
authority to direct integrated efforts (Lamb and Marks, 2010, p.5). According to Zegart (2007, p.59), the limited collaboration in the USA national security structure, especially between the CIA, the Federal Bureau Investigation (FBI) and the Defence Force, resulted in the breakdown of information exchange.

**Figure 2.1. USA National Model**

As a result, in September, 2001, Al-Qaeda made simultaneous attacks using hijacked commercial aircrafts and destroyed the World Trade Centre in New York, the Pentagon headquarters in Washington DC and Pennsylvania and there were little or delayed responses from the security sector (Zegart, 2007, P.40). Complicating this issue was that attempts to increase collaborative leadership in the intelligence community were also dismissed by the Pentagon and Defence oversight officials, who succeeded in obstructing intelligence reform bills in both the House and the Senate to enable security organisations to work together (Coates, 2011, p.36). The Malawi National Intelligence Bureau (NIB), which is equivalent to the combination of the CIA and FBI in the USA, is also yet to develop a Parliamentary Act to guide its collaborative activities with other organisations. At the time of this study, the NIB was operating under the Police Act 2009.
According to the Constitution of Malawi (2010) the structure and command of the security organisations are similar to the American model. The President is the Commander In-Chief of the Malawi Defence Force (Malawi Constitution, 2010 Chap. V111, Sec. 78) and directs other organisations and departments as head of the Executive branch. In 2008, the Office of the President and Cabinet established the office of the National Security Advisor (NSA), one of the few positions in Africa. The author was appointed the first NSA with the responsibility of coordinating the agenda for National Security.

The author, however, observed that collaborative efforts in Malawi were challenging like the USA model as practical frameworks for inter-agency collaboration at horizontal levels were limited and that the NSA has limited binding authority to coordinate with other security actors (Lamb and marks, 2010, p.5). The author tried to initiate written and practical guidelines for collaboration with other organisations including the formulation of the National Security Policy and Strategy. The President, Professor Bingu Mutharika, approved this process in 2008 and consultations and meetings to draft the policy had commenced. There were, however, some setbacks in that some leaders from other organisations like the NIB could not send their representative despite the president’s approval and directive, which the author had communicated to them. They verbally claimed that they had their own mandate and way of doing things. These are some of the challenges experienced due to limited legal mandate and authority for collaborative leaders to drive the coordination. Considering that the effective USA model example was outside the African continent, this study further explored the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Defence and Security Pact to benchmark in the African context.

2.5.2. SADC Mutual Defence Pact model
The SADC model is an example of collaborative success on the African Security regional context. It was chosen because there were no other individual country case study models in the sub-Saharan Africa. The climax of the long evolution towards regional security in the SADC occurred at the organisation's August, 2003
Summit with the signing of the community's Mutual Defence Pact to enable Defence and Security organisations to work together (Ngoma, 2007, pp.411-423). The SADC is now able to coordinate Defence and Security programmes through enforcement of peace in the region, joint training and exercises among multi-country security organisations and sharing of information through its headquarters in Botswana. This is an effective arrangement to learn from as Malawi is a member of SADC and participates in these programmes. This study, however, noted some challenges in that at present, there are only two individuals at the Secretariat with a mandate to deal with issues of peace and security (Schalkwyk, 2005, p.37). There is need for more staff from other security organisations that would ensure effective analysis of the threats and coordinated action.

The other problem is separation of the secretariat. According to the SADC Treaty (1992, articles 9 and 10 of the Protocol), the SADC Secretariat is responsible for providing services to the Organ of Politics, Defence and Security Council (Adebajo et al., 2013, p.38). As an interim measure, the country chairing the Organ has been providing secretarial and administrative support. This arrangement has created problems of continuity and institutional memory that need to be addressed at the earliest possible stage through the creation of relevant processes and policies to manage the transfer of control to the Secretariat. According to Adebajo et al. (2013, p.38), the Executive Secretary is also accorded little authority for decision-making, which also creates power vacuum, a problem that this study is addressing.

It is also noted that the Defence Pact Model still lacks some detailed written modalities on exactly how to share information with codes and what measures to be taken to those that do not contribute as required. These are clear examples that without written protocols, whilst such collaborations are good, they would be questioned and cannot be very successful. The other challenge is that this is a regional security model and may not address specific collaboration for a single country. The author suggests that the arguments presented above could perhaps be addressed if stakeholders have a clear understanding of the need for CL and its
impact through practical case studies in Malawi and other countries. This led the author to study some practical examples, where Collaborative Leadership made positive impact on National Security and prosperity.

2.6. Positive Impact of Collaborative Leadership in the Security Sector of Malawi

In the following sections, cases indicating the positive impact of collaborative leadership have been discussed including the joint operations to combat crime in Malawi and efforts to prevent proliferation of small arms. Challenges that hinder their great successes have also been highlighted.

2.6.1. Successful Case A: Joint operations to combat crime

Operations code named “Chotsa Mbabva” (Remove criminals) in 1995, 2013 and 2014 jointly conducted by the Malawi Defence Force and Police service in Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu cities are examples of good collaboration in combating crime and maintaining law and order (Msiska and Lazarus, 2014, p.4). The National Intelligence Bureau was also involved to provide information for criminals and suspects, while the departments of immigration and Local Government officials were tasked to inspect resident permits and trade licenses for suspected illegal immigrants, who were doing businesses. According to police report by Nankhonya (2013, p.1), in the joint operations conducted in the cities of Lilongwe and Mzuzu in October 2013, over 800 criminals and illegal immigrants were arrested, while several stolen properties were recovered. In 2014 joint operations, 218 illegal immigrants were arrested and 2 illegal rifles recovered.

The author, however, observed some problems here because there are limited detailed written joint documents on allocation of tasks in joint operations apart from organisational roles stipulated in the constitution (1995). Kuwali (2012, p.85) also stated that while the Malawi constitution provides that the Military assist the civil authorities in combating crime, the questions that still need to be worked on are when and how? These operations are only temporarily measures to silence criminals at a certain period and could not sustain the required NS (Lusinje,
2014, p.1). This supports the view that if these operations will continue without proper guidance on who is the lead agency and how to measure success, one day there could be a breakdown in civil-military relations as it could create power struggle and non-satisfaction on the common goal resulting into a democratic coup de tat as was the case in Egypt (Varol, 2013, p.1). The author feels that these could be sustained if there were clear written joint inter-agency procedures for coordinated plans as is the case with small arms committee in Malawi.

2.6.2. Successful Case B: Prevention of proliferation of illegal small arms

The study conducted by independent experts Mwakasungura and Nungu (2005), showed an increase in violent armed crime and recommended that the matter be urgently addressed through coordinated effort. Of singular importance, the study undertook to shed light on the sources of small arms. Among other sources, some illicit arms like AK 47, pistols and homemade muzzle-loaded guns came from Malawi’s neighbouring countries such as Mozambique, which had been at war (Mwakasungura, 2005, p.80). This arrangement was a great success as a number of firearms were recovered and over 1,000 illegal firearms were destroyed in 2006 and 3,127 were destroyed in 2014 (Chauwa, 2014, p.1). This is a good revelation that supports the author’s view that transnational threats are real and need a number of actors to collaborate to be effectively mitigated.

Based on the study of Mwakasungura and Nungu (2005), Malawi established the inter-Ministerial committee on anti-proliferation of small arms in 2006 (Kayira, 2010, p.2). Members of the National Committee comprise the Malawi Police Service as the lead agency, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, President’s Office, Education, Police, Defence, Malawi Revenue Authority, Immigration, Justice, Trade and Industry, Economic Development and Planning, Intelligence, Parks and Wildlife, Ombudsman, Malawi Human Rights Commission and Malawi Law Commission. Civil society organisations that are incorporated on the National Focal Point are: Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (CHRR), Public Affairs Committee, National Initiative for Civic Education and Regional Community Policing Forums.
The problem, however, is that, again, there are limited tasks laid out in a joint written document to clarify this collaborative effort. There have been some armed robberies in the recent past, which is an indication that this collaborative committee need to work more to eradicate illegal firearms. Kayira (2010, p.3) adds that the challenge is also that the national focal point has no supporting staff secretariat and gets more support from CHRR. There are also limited written strategies on how security actors could jointly respond to this threat apart from conducting ad-hoc inter-departmental meetings to share information and respond to the United Nations requirement on ratification of illicit proliferation of small arms. Sometimes these meetings are not conducted at all depending on the relations of various leaders at the time. These limited written details to outline collaborative actions where several organisations need to be involved have resulted in serious breakdown and negative impact in National Security in various countries including Malawi.

2.7. Negative impact due to limited collaborative leadership among security organisations.

The clashes between the Malawi Defence Force (MDF) and Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) and civil mass demonstrations of 20th July 2011, are some examples, which required more collaboration among security actors. The following sections outline these cases.

2.7.1. Unsuccessful Case A: Clashes between Malawi Defence Force and Malawi Young Pioneers, worked as rivalries

Malawi is one of the few African countries that have not experienced a military coup or a civil war. However, the country experienced clashes between the MDF and MYP due to competition for power and limited policies to enable them work collaboratively (Mandiza, 2002, p.127). The MYP was a party militia; trained by the Israelis in 1964, whose main roles included the development of engineering, mechanics, agriculture and development of the youth (Rupiya, 2005, p.119). On 31st October, 1964, speaking at a graduation of pioneers, the former president Dr Kamuzu Banda, recorded that he wanted ‘tractors and rifles’ for the MYP; tractors
to till the soil and rifles to defend the nation, and indeed the pioneers paraded with their rifles on that day (Mandiza, 2002, p.121). According to Phiri (2008, p.24), the MYP was the president’s most favoured organisation, it became an auxiliary organ of the presidency and subordinated to the president alone. Its main purpose was to ensure that everyone conformed to political party policy and in doing so it became increasingly secretive and militarised.

In 1985, there was an attempt to turn the MYP into an overt military organisation along the lines of the army, a departure from the territorial concept as stipulated by the president in 1964. Their rank structure was militarised with their commander holding the rank of Lieutenant General. However, the army resented this move and when the media began to carry reports of Majors, Colonels and Brigadiers from the MYP addressing political party meetings, the army had serious reservations and political leaders became uneasy. The MYP then discontinued the use of military ranks but with reservations and resistance.

In 1990’s, there was a global wave of multi-party democracy. The National Consultative Council (NCC), the most effective forum for managing the transition, resolved to have MYP delinked from the ruling party and its members absorbed into either the police or the army, but the Army declined as the issue was not like reconciliation after civil war. The pioneers became increasingly hostile to the army as they sought to maintain the status quo. According to Phiri (2008, p.29), on 1st December, 1993 members of the MYP deliberately shot and killed two soldiers in Mzuzu after a disagreement at a local drinking place. When a senior official of the MYP, speaking on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) said that the MYP were preparing to deal with any reaction from the army, the conflict erupted.

On the morning of 3rd December, 1993, the army attacked the MYP headquarters, the ruling party headquarters in Lilongwe and Mzuzu office in an operation that was code named “Bwezani”, meaning return all (Chazema, 2010, p.1). This was like an act of rebellion, but technically, it was legitimate since the NCC, the only credible body at the time, had called for the dissolution of the MYP (Chiziko,
2006, cited by Phiri, 2008, p.29). According to Mandiza (2002, p.124), during operation “Bwezani”, the Army retrieved secret documents that indicated that the MYP intelligence operatives kept dossiers on every army officer and mostly reported on personal negative issues to the President instead of issues of national importance. In addition to this anomaly, the MYPs did not collaborate much with the police special branch and worked as rivalries (Rupiya, 2005, p.120). According to historian Richard Mkandawire (2008, cited by Kachipande, 2013, p.2), the MYPs were extremely unpopular among the general population for their sometimes ruthless and coercive manner in mobilising local communities for supporting the ruling party. According to Phiri (2000, pp.1-15), the MYPs were, however, useful in economic development and youth empowerment programmes.

The author noted that there are many lessons to be learnt here. Initially, the MYP did a very commendable job in improving economic development, agriculture and security because of their professional training and that they were deployed throughout the country even in rural areas (Mandiza, 2002, p.121). However, there are several challenges as seen by their ruthless intimidation (Kachipande, 2013, p.2), competition for power and limited written protocols on how the MYP would work together with other security organisations in addition to their initial role of youth and economic development. Kachipande (2013, p.3) suggests that the youth programme could still be revived, but need to be non-partisan if it has to be productive. What is also very worrisome is that while the disarmament of the MYP was done, there has been no post-mortem among stakeholders on how best to resolve such future challenges within the security sector (Chazema, 2010, p.3).

2.7.2. Unsuccessful Case B: Violent civil demonstrations of 20th July, 2011 and death of 20 People

According to the Malawi government commission of inquiry (Khoviwa et al., 2012), the civil demonstrations on 20th July 2011, resulted in the death of 20 citizens and destruction of several properties in the cities of Mzuzu, Lilongwe, Blantyre and Karonga. The Malawi Human Rights Commission report by Kapito et al. (2011, p.7), which is a government parastatal organisation (Malawi
Constitution, Section 129), indicated that the problem started after the Civil Society Organisations (CSO) supported by the opposition political parties compiled a petition that was submitted to government prior to the July 20 demonstrations. The petition outlined some issues including the acute shortage of foreign exchange and fuel, the need for holding of Local Government Elections, sale of the Presidential Jet and raising the minimum salary wages to MK25, 000 among others (Kapito et al., 2011, p.10).

What really happened to provoke this situation to violent demonstrations cannot conclusively be put to light in this study, as some issues were political in nature. However, what can vividly be recognised is that there was lack of collaboration between the leadership from the CSO organising the demonstrations on one hand; and the executive and security arms of government on the other (Kapito et al., 2011, p.10). For example, both leaders of the CSO and core security organisations were not at the major demonstration scenes to closely monitor the security situation and advise effective strategies to control them. It also appeared that there was limited sharing of information and practical collaborative procedures as the Defence Force only came in the following day to assist the Police when valuable property and life were already lost.

The Commission of Inquiry established that this violence was precipitated because some media houses conducted themselves in an unprofessional manner that contributed to the public disorder (Khoviwa et al., 2012, p.10). For instance, the media houses carried live coverage of the looting, arson and the consequent deaths and injuries as they unfolded, which in the opinion of the Commission incited violence in other parts of the country. Sometimes, there was lack of balanced information, which entails the important role that non-military institutions could play in promoting or betraying national security (Kapito et al., 2011, p.11; Kakhobwe et al., 2013, p.9). While demonstrations are people’s rights and may not be denied as they achieve some desired objectives, violent demonstrations usually have negative impact on the economy as property is destroyed and some
investors lose confidence, as was the case in Egypt (Varol, 2013, p.1; Abdou and Zaazou, 2013, p. 92).

It is observed that violent civil demonstrations are defined as an incident that requires practical ways to mitigate. For example, the Defence Force Act (2006), states that the Army will assist the Police in maintenance of law and order, but there are limited written procedures to determine exactly when and how to intervene (Kuwali, 2012, p.76). This problem may not just be for Malawi as a similar scenario occurred in the United Kingdom on 9th August, 2011, when the worst violence broke out. Rioters damaged property worth over 100 million pounds and there was no practical framework to deploy the military to assist the police (Hawkes, et al., 2011, p.1). This was a hot debate in the Parliament House of Commons and a concrete solution is yet to be resolved.

Further, this study illustrates a concern on how Malawian stakeholders sometimes debate on issues of national security and development. For example, the demand to sell a presidential jet was a step backwards. Leaders should avoid individual interests, political affiliations and organisational differences in key national issues. A presidential jet is an important facility for Malawi, although others have different opinion due to Malawi’s low level of economic development (Kapito et al., 2011, p.10), which also need to be respected. It should be recalled, however, that the contested jet was a replacement of the old one that was sold because it was used for over 30 years by the former Presidents Dr Kamuzu Banda and Dr Bakili Muluzi.

Moreover, it is contended that, “why should the jet not be used by President Prof Bingu Mutharika and other presidents?” A presidential jet, which is a fixed wing aircraft, is considered more convenient for safety particularly during longer distances, such as flying between Blantyre and Chitipa districts, as well as use within Africa. A jet is also preferred in bad weather like heavy rain and limited visibility instead of using a helicopter. Other countries and leaders also support this observation, as was the case, where the former Malawi President Dr Joyce
Banda was assisted by the Nigerian President with a jet to fly from Lagos to Lilongwe on March 1st, 2014 instead of using a commercial aircraft (Chiumia, 2014, p.1). Similar jets are also used by several African countries, which are equally operated by their Defence Forces. While this could be a long debate, some stakeholders were of the view that Malawians need to be more patriotic in understanding the importance of national sovereignty and provision of essential security services for the State President regardless of political differences. Malawi replaced and maintained a smaller jet, unlike other more developed countries, which use big jets according to their financial status.

Whilst this study is also mindful that legal provisions are clear in violent scenarios, where lives of security personnel and destruction of valuable property are at stake, the public need to be aware that security officers need to defend themselves and protect these vital properties through use of firearms (Police Act, 2009, Sec. 44; Defence Act, 2006). This is another reason that this study is emphasising on practical collaborative measures to prevent such mishaps, but still achieve the desired national security. In supporting such a view, Linden (2010, p.38) argues that, unless there are practical frameworks and procedures to enable collaboration, there will always be challenges to collaborative leadership.

2.8. Challenges (Barriers) to effective collaborative leadership

“There has never been a great athlete who died not knowing what pain is.”
Bill Bradley quoted by Nobulele Phuza (October 29, 2012)

Several barriers have been identified in the literature by those implementing and evaluating collaborations (Linden, 2010, p.14). They include lack of clear focus and results, political and social climate, different culture, trust, information sharing, power dynasty and funding.

2.8.1. Lack of clear focus on results: Leaders miss priority targets

While CL is the most desirable, it is not always applied (Cabayan, 2009, p.96). According to the American Army General Myers and McConnell (2009, p.284),
the major problem is that top leaders have failed to identify and define their adversaries. This makes organisations fail to deal with the threat and only concentrate on tactical operations and not long-term strategies. Compounding this problem is that some leaders see collaboration as the goal, rather than a process that facilitates the achievement of a company goal (Archer and Cameron, 2013, p.11). People and organisations collaborate just for the sake of collaboration just to say they are partnering. When they are asked about what changes will be achieved as a result of their collaboration, they usually say that they are collaborating and integrating programs, but they do not tell about improved results. This problem is further complicated when the political leadership is unfavourable and tries to make security organisations work independently (Mandiza, 2002, p.127).

2.8.2. Unfavourable political and social climate
Linden (2010, p.15) states that in some cases, political public opinion may not support collaborative mission as well as support individuals and independence. In Malawi, Mandiza (2002, p.124) gives an example that during the rule of one party system of government between 1964-1994, security organisations were encouraged to work independently as a way to balance security checks amongst themselves. The MYP had an intelligence branch, which was mainly reporting on their fellow security organisations (Mandiza, 2002, p.124). This made it difficult for the soldiers to cooperate with the MYP and the police. Phiri (2011, p.33) add that President Dr Kamuzu Banda used the party and security structures as instruments to control and eliminate political opponents. The mysterious deaths of the three Ministers and a Member of Parliament in 1983 in an alleged car accident because they expressed opposing views, were examples of the unfavourable political climate and limited collaboration among the Malawi Police, MYP and MDF (Robinson, 2009, p.11). Locke (2003, pp.271-284) warned that there is only one thing which gathers people into seditious commotion, and that is “oppression.” This is yet another reason that this study emphasised on exploring best factors that would enable security organisations to collaborate and achieve sustainable security in order to prevent re-occurrence of the previous atrocities.
Cheema and Popovski (2010, p.6) also observed that unfavourable political climate leads to limited trust and sharing of information.

2.8.3. Limited information sharing and fear of leakage

Security intelligence or information is used to warn the government about activities that may threaten security. Information sharing includes providing information, confirming that the information has been received, and confirming that the information is jointly understood. When information is not effectively shared, which is mainly the case, collaborative group work fails as there is limited informed decision making (Linden, 2010, p.59). This study intended to provide an appropriate mechanism for sharing information to deal with the current problems that may have resulted in the loss of confidence and fear of leakage of sensitive information due to limited procedures (Linden, 2010, p.59). In Malawi, for example, during the joint operation “Chotsa Mbabva”, some criminals had vacated their houses a night before the operation because they were forewarned by some sympathisers.

According to Riggio (2011, pp.1-3), mistrust and accusations have also been evident between the US and Pakistan governments over the harbouring of Osama Bin laden, the former leader of Al-Qaida terrorist group. Osama Bin Laden was killed in a raid by the US marines on 1st May 2011, inside Pakistan without involving the Pakistan Defence Forces. The US said that they did the operation alone because some Pakistan military officials alerted the al-Qaida terrorist on pending operations. They also blamed Pakistan for harbouring the most wanted person in their territory and yet they were working together to combat terrorism, although Pakistan denied that she was not aware of Osama hiding in their country. The CIA chief met the Pakistan’s army chief and intelligence head in a move to remove the mistrust caused by the US unilateral raid, but had a lot of challenges as there was no proper framework for sharing information (Riggio, 2011, p.1). The CIA chief eventually called on the Pakistan Chief of Army Staff to discuss the framework for future “intelligence and sensitive security information sharing.” These discussions support this study’s observation that leakage of information can
be controlled if security organisations have ultimate trust and confidence in the system through effective collaboration practices, legal frameworks to deal with offenders and classification codes.

The President of USA in 1982, Ronald Regan, identified three classification levels for information: “Top Secret” - expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security; “Secret” - expected to cause serious damage; and “Confidential” – expected to cause some damage. According to members of the senate Obey and Sabo in their letter to the US Government Executive, while admitting that sensitive material needs to be protected, they said that; the public also needs to be informed because it affects their safety and security (Blogger, 2004, p.1). While some authors agree that some information should be shared, others want to hold such information to boost their organisations’ power at the expense of national security (Shanahan, 2011, p.22). This is a challenge as it also affects use of available limited resources.

2.8.4. Limited funding and resources
Adequate funding to all responsible organisations throughout the nation is an important process to strengthen national security collaboration and achieve national prosperity (Myers and McConnell, 2009, p.314). In Malawi, funding for National Security Organisations has been on average scale at 3.3% of the total National Budget and 1.9% for Malawi Defence Force (Kruger and Martin, 2013, p.3). They argue that this is a low figure to cover the programmes for collaborative activities among National Security actors such as compatibility of equipment and other technology systems. The challenge of limited funding and resources is, however, further complicated when there are limited regulatory frameworks on the source of funding and how these would be used in time of collaborative work.

2.8.5. Lack of regulatory and institutional framework
According to Cabayan (2009, p.96), key challenges to collaboration are as a result of absence of framework, definitions, standing operational procedures (SOPs) and
Hiwa (2009, p.10) notes the importance of law reform that strengthens the legislative processes in terms of shaping the security sector prowess and cannot be over-emphasised. Most countries in Africa inherited their present laws from the colonial masters, hence the bulk of it is out-dated and archaic laws are hidden in the statute books (Katopola, 2009, p.1). This is supported by Archers and Cameron (2013, p.142) that 70% of CL fails because of insufficient structures and limited legal authority, which adds more voice to this study.

The challenge observed by the author is that there are few practical frameworks that are documented to enable all security actors to effectively collaborate when there is security breach (Kuwali, 2012, p.89). According to Osman (2012, p.1), one of the country’s top human rights lawyers in Malawi, add that one of seemingly simple but significant security breach is child abuses. He points out that every year almost 1,500 children and women from Malawi are being trafficked within and to other neighbouring countries, such as Zambia, Mozambique and South Africa, where they are forced into the sex trade and/or domestic slavery because there are limited laws to mitigate this. The literature study that was undertaken in view of this research, points to a lot of lessons. First, lack of regulatory framework is one reason that Malawi is not collaborating well to improve national security. Secondly, laws are non-consistent as at times they are not specific on what the security actors need to do in joint efforts. A clear example is when an under aged child is employed in Malawi; there are no guidelines how best the security actors could address the problem. (Osman, 2012, p.1) The author observes that there is need for several strategies and mechanisms that need to be put in place to resolve these many challenges to collaboration.

2.9. Strategies to facilitate successful collaboration

In the opinion of Archer and Cameron (2013, pp.131-139), the success of collaboration depends on the existence of a number of strategies, including sharing credible information, ground rules concerning power sharing and communication and policies ensuring mutual empowerment and collective action. The following sections outline some of these mechanisms relevant to this study.
2.9.1. Share credible information

Myers and McConnell (2009, p.305) state that information is “Soft power”. Information needs to be adequate, relevant, not excessive, and accurate and up to date (Linden, 2010, p.60). There should be proper procedures for checking that information is of good quality before it is shared, methods for making sure that shared information is recorded in a compatible format and methods for making sure that any problems with personal information, such as inaccuracy, are also rectified by all the organisations that have received the information. Thomas (2007, p.15) sheds more information on source reliability matrix and verification methods to attain the highest standard of information (Table 2.3).

Table 2.3 Source Reliability Matrix and Information Methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Reliability</th>
<th>Information Validity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A: Knowledgeable with direct access to information</td>
<td>1: Suggested by several independent sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: Knowledgeable with no direct access to information</td>
<td>2: Very likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: Usually reliable</td>
<td>3: Likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Source is not usually reliable</td>
<td>4: Not likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E: Source is not reliable</td>
<td>5: Probably wrong information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F: We do not know</td>
<td>6: We do not know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O: Open source</td>
<td>NFDK: No further details known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GNK: Grid or location not known</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Thomas (2007, p. 15)

This study accepts the need to verify source reliability and validity of information, which can best be done through efficient fusion of information and professional skills of the informer. When these important elements are overlooked, there is distortion of information and leaders do not make informed decisions; but instead, they generate more problems than resolving threats. Further, this study has highlighted that most leaders may not accept this arrangement, but this is where it is very important to have some degree of transparency in sharing information and
this will usually result in credible national security system as it eliminates unnecessary gossips and serving personal interests (Coates, 2011, p.33). A good example was in 2005, when the author was amazed at one of the joint security meetings, which were called for by the State President. When the president asked one of the security leaders from NIB to explain the information that was reported to him to call for the meeting, he simply answered; “As I briefed Your Excellency”. The author is of the view that a brief synopsis of the situation based on proper analysis of information would have been presented, even without disclosing the source, if it was for security reasons.

This literature has informed the study to critically examine the research problem and formulate research questions for this study.

2.10. Research Questions
The main research questions addressed by this Thesis were twofold. First, what is the effectiveness of Collaborative Leadership (CL)? And second, how could it be improved in Malawi to achieve sustainable National Security and economic development? Specifically, the research was guided by the following six research questions:

Q1. How is CL practised among security actors in Malawi and what is its effectiveness in the National Security context?

Q2. What are the key factors that would influence greater collaboration among the security actors of Malawi to enhance National Security and prosperity?

Q3. How do security leaders in Malawi understand the term “National Security?”

Q4. Who are the actors to be involved in achieving National Security in Malawi?

Q5. What are the barriers to effective collaborative leadership in Malawi and how can they be resolved? And,
Q6. How do security leaders in Malawi see the need for an inter-agency collaborative and practical national security policy framework? If yes, what critical issues should it comprise of to improve effective CL and NS in Malawi?

2.11. Summary

“The measure of intelligence is the ability to change.” - Albert Einstein (1879-1955).

In summary, Chapter 2 defined the concept of NS and styles of leadership. It also outlined the strategies and decision making models that have been used by various organisations and individuals to achieve their desired goals, although others failed due to prevailing situations (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, pp.4-6; Strachan and Freedman, p.235). The chapter then identified a number of examples where effective CL led to successful measure to national security such as joint operations to combat crime and proliferation of illegal firearms. Cases on breakdown in security due to limited collaboration were also unveiled like the clashes between the Malawi defence Force and Malawi Young Pioneers, illegal migration and the violent civil demonstrations of 20th July 2011. This study has revealed that while Malawi is one of the most peaceful countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa, it still faces a number of threats to National Security including border disputes, crime, corruption, political intolerance and disasters among others (Omolo, 2012, p.1; Mulata et al., 2013, p.287; Mahony et al., 2014, p.14). There are, however, still some misunderstanding on what the new concept of National Security (NS) and Collaborative Leadership (CL) means and therefore difficult to clearly agree on the national security players (Coates, 2011, p.4; Myers and McConnell, 2013, p.84).

This study’s literature review has further indicated that there are several barriers that hinder effective collaboration including different cultures and absence of an overarching national security policy and strategy (Kuwali, 2009, p.89; Kakhobwe et al., 2012, p.8). The study has also highlighted that the current practice is that
security actors mainly collaborate and share information during crisis period, which does not achieve the desired NS (Lamb and Mark, 2010, p.6; Kakande, 2012, p.1). It has been noted that leadership style is the way in which a leader accomplishes his/her purposes. It can have profound effects on an organisation and its staff members, and can determine whether the organisation is effective or not. Some very stereotyped possibilities are: Autocratic - totally in control, making all decisions himself and Collaborative - sharing leadership, involving others in all major decisions and spreading ownership of the inter-organisational goals.

To close the gaps and improve collaborative leadership and national security in Malawi, this study embarked on a practical research design and methodology outlined in Chapter 3.
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

“There is one thing even more vital to science than intelligent methods; and that is, the sincere desire to find out the truth, whatever it may be.” -Charles Sanders Pierce (1878)

3. Introduction
This Chapter provides a comprehensive description and rationale for the research methodology adopted in this study. The way in which research is conducted may be conceived of in terms of the research philosophy subscribed to, the research strategy employed and the research instruments utilised in the pursuit of a goal, the research objectives and the quest for the solution of a problem. The research problem was outlined in chapter one as follows:

“What is the effectiveness of Collaborative Leadership and how could it be improved in the national security of Malawi while encompassing the individual organisations’ mandates and roles?”

The following goal was, therefore, formulated for this study:

“To develop a strategic practical policy framework for effective and sustainable Collaborative Leadership and National Security in Malawi.”

3.1. Research Philosophy
A research philosophy is a framework that guides how scientific research should be conducted to gain the required knowledge (Saunders et al., 2009 p.107). There is, an agreement in the scientific research community that a philosophy constitutes four major ways of thinking: ontology, epistemology, axiology and methodology (Saunders et al., 2009, p.109).

Ontology is concerned with the beliefs about physical and social reality, views and assumptions of what actually exists (Saunders et al., 2009, p.110). This author used this to find out the actual practical procedures in Malawi for coordinating on
security issues. Epistemology focuses on the study of the nature of knowledge by asking questions about what is true or false, and what constitutes valid information. The author found this valuable by designing research methods to investigate on whether security organisations have inter-agency policies to effect collaboration and not just mere speculation that they are collaborating (Lawson et al., 2003). Axiology is the researcher’s view and interpretation of the role of values in research. This enabled the author to use personal knowledge and experience in the study’s contributions and to read between the lines of respondents who may not have provided the holistic picture in their responses (Yin, 2014, p.168).

Methodology is the systematic procedure for collecting empirical information. This helped the author to carefully select the different research techniques and paradigms for this study. According to Kuhn cited by Kandadi (2007, p.50), a research paradigm is a framework, which comprises perceptions and understanding of several theories and practices that are used to conduct research. Saunders et al. (2009, p.108) mentions ten research paradigms that have been identified in the Western tradition of science, namely; Positivism, Realism, Interpretive, Objectivism, Subjectivism, Pragmatism, Functionalist, Radical Humanist and Structural Humanist. Saunders et al. (2009, p.119) compare the philosophies according to the criteria of sample size, location, theories and hypotheses, quantitative and qualitative data, reliability, validity and generalizability. The author used the pragmatic philosophy outlined in the following sections.

3.2. Pragmatism
Pragmatism is described as a deconstructive paradigm that debunks concepts such as “truth” and “reality” and focuses instead on “what works” as the truth regarding the research questions under investigation (Saunders et al., 2009, p.109). Pragmatism encourages the researchers to consider the research questions to be more important in answering the research question and that mixed method designs of quantitative and qualitative can be used. Pragmatic philosophy also benefitted
the author to achieve better interaction with the respondents through in-depth interviews (Saunders et al., 2009, p.152). Miles et al. (2014, p.42) add that use of numbers and words are both needed to understand the world better. Since the aim of this study was to examine and improve the effectiveness of CL in the security context of Malawi to sustain national security, there was need for quantifying numbers that support this concept, but also to explain the reasons. These requirements necessitated the author to use in-depth case studies and surveys to generate both qualitative and quantitative data to enable triangulation (Saunders et al., 2009, p.154). The following sections outline these methods.

3.2.1. Quantitative Research

Quantitative research involves generating and converting data into numerical form so that statistical calculations can be made and conclusions drawn (Saunders et al., 2009, p.151). Researchers will have one or more hypotheses. These are the questions that they want to address which include predictions about possible relationships between the things they want to investigate. In order to find answers to these questions, the researchers will also have various instruments and materials and a clearly defined plan of action.

The author used this method through a prepared and structured questionnaire to quantify the number of leaders who would support the use of Collaborative Leadership in the security context. This also helped the author to check on numbers who would consider sharing of information and establishment of joint protocols to enable effective collaboration. These numerical figures made clearer understanding of the leaders’ support and different views, which were easy to highlight in graphic form. Quantitative figures also helped the author to identify leaders’ perception of the most challenging threats to national security and barriers to collaboration. The author, however, noted some challenges in this method because it needed more respondents. This problem was, however, overcome in that several organisations were represented in this study and also that the author used qualitative method, which added some explanations to triangulate the findings (Miles et al., 2014, p.43).
3.2.2. Qualitative research

Qualitative research is the approach usually associated with the social interpretive paradigm, which emphasises the socially constructed nature of reality. It is about recording, analysing and attempting to uncover the deeper meaning and significance of human behaviour and experience, including contradictory beliefs, behaviours and emotions. Researchers are interested in gaining a rich and complex understanding of people’s experience and not in obtaining numerical figures, which can be generalised to other larger groups (Saunders et al., 2009, p.152).

This approach tends to be inductive, which means that they develop a theory or look for a pattern of meaning on the basis of the data collected (Saunders et al., 2009). Data generation and analysis is methodical but allows for greater flexibility than in quantitative research. Data is generated in textual form on the basis of observation and interaction with the participants, that is, through participant observation, in-depth interviews and focus groups. Data generation may be carried out in several stages rather than once and for all. The researchers may even adapt the process mid-way, deciding to address additional issues or dropping questions, which are not appropriate on the basis of what they learn during the process. In other cases, the process of data generation and analysis may continue until the researchers find that no new issues are emerging (Miles et al., 2014, p.70).

The author used this method through selection of a small sample (Saunders et al., 2009), in-depth interviews with experienced respondents in the security sector and the flexibility of continuing data collection, as security issues are contemporary (MacFarlane, 2006). In Malawi, for example, there have been several changes in security situations from the time that the researcher started this study in 2011 to the time of completion in 2015. There was change of political leadership and some top leaders in security organisations including the Police, Intelligence and Immigration, which are main actors in collaborative relationships. The qualitative research was very useful as it enabled the author to continue shaping the thesis as it allows continuous data generation. The author, however, experienced some challenges in that this method did not highlight much of the statistical figures.
This problem was resolved because the author also used quantitative methods. The author also converted qualitative analysis into statistical numbers and codes (Saunders et al., 2009, pp.153 & 497). The researcher also resolved some challenges through use of effective research design that helped to collect the most required data.

3.3. Research Design and Strategy
According to Saunders (2009 et al., p. 136), research design is the general plan of how you will go about answering your research questions and provides the glue that holds the research project together. Yin (2014, p.29) adds that the research design comprise five important components: a case study questions, its propositions, its units of analysis, the logic linking of data to propositions and criteria for interpreting the findings.

The first component necessitated the author to develop the study’s questions (Qs1-6 and the detailed questionnaire at Annex B). The second component was used to develop hypothetical propositions for the study, which, was indicated in the first chapter of this study (Para 1.7). The third component was used for case selection and provided a detailed description of the selected case organisations. The fourth subsection assisted the author to describe the adopted techniques and the types of empirical materials to be gathered. The fifth component enabled the author to analyse data and interpret the findings of the study (Chapter 4). To complement the design, the author used survey and case studies to collect the required data (Saunders et al., 2009, p.141). In the following sections, the researcher justifies the choice of strategies and explains how they both operate in this study.

3.3.1. Surveys
The survey strategy is usually associated with the deductive approach and is mostly used to answer who, what, where, how much and how many questions (Saunders et al., 2009, p.144). Surveys are popular as they allow the collection of large amount of data from a sizeable population in a highly economical way. A sample size of 101 respondents from 15 organisations was used for this study,
which was an appropriate number for meaningful statistical analysis as it was more than 30 (Saunders et al., 2009, p.237).

Surveys enabled the author to obtain data about practices, situations or views at one point in time through questionnaires or interviews. The use of surveys permitted the author to study more variables at one time than is typically possible in laboratory or field experiments, whilst data was collected about real world environments. A key weakness, however, was that it was very difficult to realise insights relating to the causes of or processes involved in the phenomena measured. There are, in addition, several sources of bias such as the possibly self-selecting nature of respondents, the point in time when the survey is conducted and in the researcher him/herself through the design of the survey itself (Saunders et al., 2009). The author, however, resolved this through selection of more than 2 respondents from fifteen organisations who are directly involved with collaboration as units of analysis to triangulate the data.

The other challenge, however, was that there were several organisations that participated in the study were spread throughout the entire country, making it difficult to reach the respondents physically. The author, however, managed to overcome this as he used three research assistants, emails and phones in the modern technological advancement. Considering the advantages of using a questionnaire instrument, which can be sent out to many respondents in a short period of time and to have larger statistical figures by using individual respondents, the author decided to use the survey strategy in this study. To supplement the survey strategy, the author also used the case study research.

3.3.2. Case Study Research
Case studies involve an attempt to describe relationships that exist in reality, focus on contemporary as opposed to entirely historical events and, very often in a single organisation (Yin, 2014, p.9). The case study strategy appears to be most promising in terms of data collection. This is because the major research questions are how and why questions (Saunders et al., 2009, p.146). Case studies give
examples of what has happened before and can be used to provide better understanding of the complex issues. Within the case study approach, there are a number of variables including demographics such as age, education, and positions, roles and in-process experiences of numerous individual participants. The author found this useful to select leaders of various responsibilities, different positions and from several organisations.

Another key feature of the design of case study research is the number of cases included in a project. The author used this method through use of fifteen organisations and 100 individual participants. The author also studied several cases both in Malawi and on international scene from the USA and SADC among others on practices of collaborative leadership and identified the gaps that the author is striving to improve on. Furthermore, a case study methodology helped the researcher in “reading between the lines” to expose and understand realities of the situation that participants may not be able or willing to see or discuss due to their long-term involvement in such non collaborative effort. A thorough evaluation of the case study methodology has revealed its suitability to the research of this study.

Case studies, however, can be considered weak as they are typically restricted to a single organisation and it is difficult to generalise findings since it is hard to find similar cases with similar data that can be analysed in a statistically meaningful way (Saunders et al., 2009). Furthermore, different researchers may have different interpretations of the same data, thus adding research bias into the equation. The author, however, overcame this problem by selecting a number of organisations as case study units and individual leaders that deal with common security issues.

3.4. Units of Analysis (Case organisations)

The unit of analysis is the major entity that is being analysed in the study (Yin, 2014, p.31). It is the ‘what’ or ‘whom’ that is being studied. In social science research, typical units of analysis include individuals and social artefacts. When conducting research, investigators can encounter problems as regards
sampling and the incorrect information provided by undesirable respondents (Miles et al., 2014, pp.30-32). This can be the result of misunderstanding the questions or lack of knowledge about the subject. Several authors suggest purposive sampling to build variety and intensity (Saunders et al., 2009, p.237; Miles et al., 2014, p.31). In purposive sampling, the researchers need to select the units of research based on the characteristics that are important in evaluation and to answer the research questions and objectives (Kandadi, 2006, p.67). In this case study, the author selected organisations that have direct responsibility in core security issues and respond to emergency and disasters. Basing on the problem, goal and research questions, three criteria were defined to select the case organisations and respondents for this study. First, the cases should be large organisations within the National Security sector of Malawi. Second, the case organisations should be distributed in all the three regions of Malawi. Third, the case organisations and the respondents should be involved in the leadership intensive duties and definitive collaborative leadership roles and activities.

This sampling, however, had the challenge in that it could not be considered statistically representative of the total population (Saunders et al., 2009, p.239). This problem was, however, overcome because the author identified a number of organisations and respondents who are conversant with security matters for triangulation (Table 3.1). The following sub-sections provide brief description of the case organisations selected for this study.

3.4.1. Case study unit 1: Malawi Defence Force
The Malawi Defence Force (MDF) is established by the Constitution of Malawi (2010, Chapter 16, Sec 160) and Defence Force Act (2006).

*Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees*
The MDF was selected for this study because it is the main security actor in defence of the nation from external aggression (Constitution, 2010, Chap 16, sec 160). It is also the first line respondent to assist civil authorities and the police in maintenance of law and order and provide technical assistance in time of disasters.
and emergencies in all the regions of Malawi. A total of thirty officers at MDF were interviewed. Ten were from the Defence Headquarters and twenty from the regions. Interviewees were mainly working in the command element, directorates of operations, training, intelligence, information technology and logistics. The Defence Force provided valuable knowledge on the daily operations, sharing of information and resources with other organisations in time of joint operations. It was also useful because it operates in all the three regions of Malawi and with other international security forces in peacekeeping operations. Figure 3.1 depicts an overview structure of the organisation of the MDF.

**Figure 3.1. Overview structure of the Malawi Defence Force**

![Diagram of the Malawi Defence Force structure](image)

**Source:** MDF Headquarters (2014)
### Table 3.1. Selected study case organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Unit No.</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Distribution of operations and Case Selection Rationale</th>
<th>Sector Roles</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Malawi Defence Force</td>
<td>All 3 Regions</td>
<td>Territorial Defence</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Malawi Police Service</td>
<td>All 3 Regions and 30 districts</td>
<td>Public Safety and Internal Security</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>National Intelligence Bureau</td>
<td>All 3 Regions and 30 districts</td>
<td>State Security</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Immigration Department</td>
<td>All 3 Regions and border districts</td>
<td>Border Entry Control</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Malawi Prisons</td>
<td>All 3 regions and 30 districts</td>
<td>Correctional Services</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>National Registration Bureau</td>
<td>Coordinate all regions and districts for Malawians identification cards</td>
<td>National Identification System</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>Coordinates Defence programmes in all 3 regions</td>
<td>Management Role</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Ministry of Internal Security</td>
<td>Coordinate all 3 regions</td>
<td>Management Role</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Coordinates Foreign Policy for all organisations</td>
<td>Foreign Policy</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Disaster Management</td>
<td>Coordinates all 3 regions</td>
<td>Disaster Coordination</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Ministry of Local Government</td>
<td>Coordinates all 30 districts</td>
<td>Regional and District coordination</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>All 3 regions and 30 districts</td>
<td>Guarantors of Rule of Law</td>
<td>2 (one declined to respond)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
<td>Oversight of all organisations and members of parliament from all 30 districts. Also passes legal bills.</td>
<td>Oversight on Defence and Security</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Malawi Regulatory Authority</td>
<td>Coordinates and regulates information policy for all institutions</td>
<td>Information Technology Policy</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Malawi Universities</td>
<td>Conducts Academic Research in Social Science and Security studies</td>
<td>Policy Formulation</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Respondents</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>101 (Actual Responses 100)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.4.2. Case study unit 2: Malawi Police Service
The Malawi Police Service (MPS) operates under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Public Security. Its operations are provided for in the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi (2010, Chapter 15, Sections 152-154) and the Malawi Police Service Act (2009).

Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees
The MPS was chosen for this study because it is the major organisation responsible for combating crime and maintaining law and order in Malawi. It also has police stations in all the 29 districts and some posts in rural areas. The Police are also responsible for coordinating with the community policing who assist in maintenance of law and order in the most remote areas and in the city suburbs through night vigil patrols (Kainja, 2010, p.32). It was useful for this study because it provided critical information on collaborative duties that they conduct with other security organisations in Malawi and international peace operations. They also meet various challenges in the conduct of their duties due to limited sharing of information from other stakeholders to combat crime.

Fifteen officers were interviewed from the MPS. Interviewees were from the command element at police headquarters, departments of criminal investigation branch, operations and community policing from the three regions of Malawi.

3.4.3. Case study unit 3: National Intelligence Bureau
The National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) operates under the Office of the President and Cabinet, but it established under the Police Act (2009) as it does not have its own legislation.

Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees
The National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) was chosen for the interviews because it is an important organization responsible for State Security. NIB is the leading agency in collecting, analysing and dissemination of information to the President on all issues related to State Security. They have offices in all the 29 districts of
Malawi. They were useful in sharing their knowledge on how they collaborate with other organisations on assessment of threats and decision-making processes.

Fifteen officers were interviewed from NIB. Nine interviewees were from the headquarters including command element, departments of domestic and external intelligence and technical section. Six were operators from the three regions.

3.4.4. Case study unit 4: Department of Immigration

The Immigration department falls under Ministry of Internal Affairs and Public Security. Its operations are governed by the Immigration Act 15:03 and the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi 2010, Section 47.

Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees

Immigration Department was selected for this study because it regulates and controls all the people entering and leaving Malawi. It also issues passports, work permits as well as processing and issuing Malawi citizenship. They were very valuable in providing knowledge on how they collaborate with the police, defence, NIB and other stakeholders on prevention of illegal migrants, detection of terrorists and other criminals. Ten officers were interviewed working at the Immigration headquarters, regions, border posts and Lilongwe International Airport, which acts as another border post.

3.4.5. Case study unit 5: Malawi Prison Services

The Malawi Prison Service operations are provided for under the Laws of Malawi Chapter 9.02 and the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi (2010, Chapter 17, Section 163) and Prisons Act (1966).

Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees

The Malawi Prison Services was chosen because it keeps all the criminals in detention and act as a correctional department to transform such offenders into good citizens. It was useful in this study because it provided information on understanding how security organisations could collaborate to prevent criminals...
repeating same crimes. They also helped in elaborating some challenges they face with the judiciary on minimal punishments for core criminals. Five officers were interviewed from Prison headquarters in Lilongwe working in operations and general administration.

3.4.6. Case study unit 6: National Registration Bureau
The National Registration Bureau (NRB) is a government department established by the National Registration Act number 13 of 2010 under the OPC. It is mandated to establish the National Registration and Identification System (NRIS) for Malawi. In Malawi, there are no identification cards (IDs) at national level apart from passports and some cards issues by individual organisations.

Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees
The NRB was chosen because it contributes greatly to national security through up to date registration of all Malawians to differentiate with foreigners. Registration is also important to quickly identify possible criminals. Two officials were interviewed from the NRB headquarters in Lilongwe dealing with national IDs and registration. They provided valuable knowledge on how they collaborate with the police and local community leaders on verification of Malawian nationals and foreigners.

3.4.7. Case study unit 7: Ministry of Defence
The Ministry of Defence (MOD) was established in 1994 to bridge the gap between the civil authorities and the armed forces. It was designed to act as a central organisation for strategic management of Malawi Defence Force focusing on policy and control. It is also responsible for formulating strategic defence programs and preparation of the defence budget (Malawi Constitution, 2010).

Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees
The MOD was chosen because it is responsible for overall oversight, management and civil control and policy direction of the Malawi Defence Force (Kalilangwe, 2003). Two officials were interviewed from the Ministry headquarters responsible
for Defence Policy and Liaison. They were useful in shedding light on current
defence policy, collaboration strategies and challenges.

3.4.8. Case study unit 8: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Public Security
The Ministry is composed of the Ministry Headquarters, Malawi Police Service,
Malawi Prisons Service, Immigration Department, and National Intelligence
Bureau. The Ministry’s mandate is derived from Constitutional Provisions, Acts
and Government Policies related to the machinery of public service administration
(Ministry website, 2013).

Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees
This Ministry was chosen because it oversees all the operations and overall
management of key security actors including the Police, Intelligence Service,
Immigration and Prison Services. It also plays a crucial role in the provision of
advisory services on specific and general matters of concern in the area of security
to other ministries, departments and the general public. Two officials were
interviewed from Ministry headquarters responsible for policy support and liaison.

3.4.9. Case study unit 9: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a link between Malawi and the rest of the world
including multilateral organisations in facilitating the promotion of political,
economic, social relations and foreign policy of the Republic of Malawi (Malawi
Foreign Policy, 2003).

Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees
The Ministry was chosen because it oversees international relations and guides all
ministries on Foreign and International Policy for Malawi including peace and
security. The Ministry also chairs the inter-ministerial committee on counter
terrorism and the Joint Permanent Commissions with other countries on Politics,
Defence and Security. Two officials were interviewed responsible for Foreign
Policy and International Treaties at the Ministry headquarters.
3.4.10. Case study 10: Department of Disaster Management Affairs

The Department of Disaster Management Affairs (DoDMA) is under the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC) established through Disaster Preparedness and Relief Act (1991).

Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees

The DoDMA was chosen because it is responsible for overall coordination of disaster management and prevention policy in Malawi. Two officials were interviewed from the headquarters in Lilongwe.

3.4.11. Case study 11: Ministry of Local Government

Based on the Malawian Constitution of 2010, the Local Government Act of 1998 and the National Decentralisation Policy of the same year, Malawi is devolving decision-making powers, functions, responsibilities and resources to a total of 40 local governments, called Councils.

Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees

This Ministry was chosen because it oversees all the districts and city council management and activities. The Ministry is also responsible for coordinating all traditional chiefs who have a duty in maintaining peace and stability in the rural communities. It is also mandated in promotion of local governance, participatory democracy, and socio-economic development of the districts; provide policy and legal framework for the efficient and effective operations of the assemblies (Constitution, 2010). They also coordinate all security activities with other organisations, particularly during disasters and civil demonstrations.

Five officials were interviewed from the headquarters in Lilongwe and three city councils of Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu.

3.4.12. Case study unit 12: Ministry of Justice

The Ministry of Justice exist by virtue of the general power vested in the President of Malawi under sections 93 and 94 of the Constitution (2010).
Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees

The Ministry was chosen because it is responsible for drafting and reinforcing law and order through effective prosecution of the criminals. They are useful for this study because they are also responsible for guiding on the collaborative National security policy and prevent conflicts. Two officials were interviewed from the Ministry headquarters responsible for formulation of laws and prosecution. However, one in the prosecution department declined to respond stating that she was not conversant with security issues, despite explaining to her to respond on how she feels Judiciary and the courts could assist in security. The author did not force her, as it was her consent in line with the ethics of this study.

3.4.13. Case study unit 13: Malawi National Assembly

The National Assembly has the following functions and powers as provided by the Constitution (2010):

- To receive, amend, accept or reject bills (both Government and Private bills);
- To debate and vote on motions in relation to any matter including motions to indict and convict the President or Vice President, who are key policy makers; and
- To confirm certain public appointments made by the Executive.

Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees

The Parliament was chosen because of its great responsibility to oversee the activities and operations of all government ministries and institutions. They also enact laws that would enhance security, not just to punish criminals, but also to safeguard Human Rights. There is also a Defence and Security Committee of the National Assembly, which represent proportionally political parties having seats in the National Assembly (Chapter XVI, section 162). Their main functions are to oversee the Defence and Security organisations including performance and lobbying in parliament for the budget to support their duty. Two members of Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security were interviewed.
3.4.14. Case study unit 14: Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority
The Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA) was established pursuant to Section 3 of the Communications Act (1998) of the Laws of Malawi to assume the regulatory functions of the communications sector.

Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees
MACRA was chosen because it regulates the overall policy on telecommunications and security coding for all Ministries and institutions. They also promote the development of the ICT sector through investment, monitoring, research and training to professionally deliver reliable and affordable communication services throughout Malawi (Constitution, 2010). Two officials were interviewed from MACRA headquarters responsible for Policy and regulating communication technologies.

3.4.15. Case study unit 15: Mzuzu University
The Mzuzu University (Mzuni) plays an important role in conducting research in various aspects and has many “think tanks” that help to shape policy that promotes good governance, peace and security.

Case selection rationale and description of the interviewees
This study is for academic purposes and therefore the input by the University professionals is important. Since 2007, the centre for Security Studies has been interfacing with the security sector in Malawi through executive courses such as Parliamentary oversight of the security sector and security sector governance (Kakhobwe et al., 2013, p.1). Five lecturers were interviewed from departments of Security Studies and Academic Research from MZUNI.

3.5. Research respondents
In the preliminary stages of the research, a critical reference group from the security sectors were established, a selected group of personnel who represent a stakeholders’ interest in the research topic area. This stakeholder group included senior officers at decision-making level including heads of organisations and
directors, middle managers such as commanding officers and operational staff. These individuals provided research perspective, which was grounded in their experience with security performance, civilian engagement and the government. A total of 100 respondents participated in this study. After a brief orientation to the “Collaborative Leadership” concept, the respondents were requested to specifically provide responses to the questions and comment on a set of questions with reference to their sector unit. The respondents’ responses helped the author concisely interpreting whether effective Collaborative Leadership could provide the answers to the mitigation of national security threats and achieve prosperity. To ensure that respondents provided the required answers, the author conducted a pilot testing of the questionnaire.

3.6. Pilot testing and assessing credibility

The purpose of pilot testing was to refine the questionnaire so that respondents have no problems in answering the questions and that there will be no problems in recording the data (Saunders et al., 2009, p.394). In addition, it enables the researcher to obtain some assessment of the questions’ validity and the likely reliability of the data that will be collected. In this study, the researcher sent questionnaires to five people and conducted some interviews and discussions with them on one to one basis. These included three research assistants who were also professionals in security issues and two senior lecturers from University of Malawi and Mzuzu University who were conversant in both academic and security related issues.

One question on National Security had challenges to be answered because it was left very general and the author was advised to rephrase it to reflect the new concept. Another question was on whether collaborative leadership was useful or not in the security sector. The academic professionals advised that it was not a good research question as answer would just be, “yes or no”, but rather ask about its impact and effectiveness in the security sector context in Malawi. The author revised these two questions after the pilot testing to eliminate potential problems in the desired data collection (Birks and Malhotra, 2007, p.391).
3.7. Data generation and response rate

Data was generated at several discrete points during the investigation in line with the literature cycles (Saunders et al., 2009, p.256). The questionnaire and semi-structured interviews were the main research instruments of data generation. Interviewees were leaders and managers in Malawi security organisations and government departments who have significant role in joint operations and collaborative leadership in managing security issues when need arise. A list of security agencies and security units was prepared to provide a guide to potential respondents. This list was later categorised into three groups for the purpose of analysis: senior security leaders, middle managers, and officers receiving directives.

One hundred and one (101) questionnaires were sent out to 15 organisations, which included the Malawi Defence Force, Malawi Police, National Intelligence Bureau, Immigration, Prisons, Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Local Government, Justice, National Assembly, National Registration Bureau, Disaster Management, Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority and Mzuzu University (Table 3.1). The questionnaire was distributed personally, by e-mail and use of three research assistants, who were recruited to assist the author to generate the data and clerical support (Saunders et al., 2009, pp.395-401).

The response rate was very high as 100 out of 101 participants responded to the questionnaire and only one declined. The author used a number of strategies to achieve this rate, including using well-known and experienced research assistants in the security sector. Research assistants were further trained and carefully briefed to ensure that responses were received by email or personally collected within three weeks after distribution of the questionnaire (Saunders et al., 2009, p.399). The introductory letter also explained the purpose of the study, which stimulated the respondents to contribute. The author emphasised that postal services should not be used to prevent delays and possible loss of responses.
Additional data was generated from reports and documents in these organisations. This technique of using multiple data sources is known as data triangulation, through which “converging lines of inquiry” build internal validity by corroborating data across sources (Yin, 2009, pp.115-16). The collection of both qualitative and quantitative data is a means of methodological triangulation that also serves to reinforce the validity of the case study (Saunders, 2009, p.154).

The challenge, however, was that this study covered a wider concept of security involving other security organisations spread out in the three regions of the country and not just the military. This made it difficult for the author to reach out to all organisations in the required research time and was expensive. The author, however, resolved this problem by using three research assistants; one to covering each region. The other problem was that the author guided the research assistants to ensure that responses to the questionnaire were generated within two weeks period after delivery to the respondents to increase the response rate. This made some respondents to write in their responses that time was short, and that they would have given more information if they were given more time. This challenge was, however, managed as the author conducted interviews to follow up on gaps to responses from the questionnaire (Yin, 2014, p.110).

3.8. Sampling procedure and sample size
The multi-stage sampling was used to select organisations and respondents. According to Saunders et al. (2009, p.231), multistage sampling is a strategy used when conducting studies involving a very large population who are grouped into clusters, organisations, regions and individuals. The researcher made clusters of core security organisations, supporting and oversight government institutions, which were subdivided into three regions of Malawi. Stratified sampling was then used to randomly select the individual respondents in the organisations, mainly targeting departments and leaders who are involved in day to day management and coordination of security operations. Saunders et al. (2009, p.224) state three main advantages for using this sampling as; reduced cost and speed that the survey can be done, convenience of finding the survey sample and normally more
accurate than just cluster sampling for the same size sample. This also ensured that all relevant organisations and leaders were represented to prevent bias.

The number of respondents required depended on the survey goals and how confident this study wanted to achieve its results. The premise was that the research should provide more confidence with the less of a margin of error that should be accepted. Based on the prior knowledge of the author from work experience that the number of security personnel in Malawi does not exceed 50,000, which was also confirmed during the interview process, a sample size of 101 respondents was a reasonable number and statistically sound. This conforms to the representative sampling to achieve 95 per cent confidence level with 10 percent margin of error (Saunders et al., 2009, p.219). Furthermore, respondents were from core security organisations and that they freely expressed their views (Yin, 2014, p.31).

There were, however, some challenges to decide on the number of respondents from each organisation or region to ascertain the sample size or ratio with the number of employees. The random sampling also made it difficult to determine whether the respondents were of the required leadership professionals. Nonetheless, these challenges were overcome as the author interviewed at least more than two leaders from each organisation through the questionnaire instrument. Again, the guiding emphasis was that interviewees should be leaders who work in departments that foster daily collaboration within other organisations. The author also indicated in the questionnaire for respondents to indicate the number of years that they have worked with the organisation and the position held; whether senior management, middle or operational staff.

3.9. Interview strategy
The author conducted in-depth face-to-face interviews with twelve (12) leaders from the core security organisations, who deal with daily collaborative security duties in order to clarify any gaps or misunderstandings from the answered questionnaire, thereby triangulating the findings (Saunders et al., 2009, p.235).
This was done over a five months period between February and June 2013. The author arranged with interviewees through emails and phone calls to agree on date, time and quiet location.

Seven interviews were conducted in the interviewees’ offices, while the other five were held at Lilongwe hotel (1), Mount Soche hotel in Blantyre (2) and Mzuzu Club (2). These were key individuals identified as having had significant leadership positions and roles in collaborative working and joint operations with other security organisations. Initially, the author had planned to interview fourteen leaders, but two gave excuses that they were busy. As reported by Saunders et al. (2009, p.344) the author conducted three focus group interviews in Lilongwe and Mzuzu, which lasted between 1.5 and 2.0 hours. In Lilongwe, 7 participants attended from MDF, MPS and NIB; while in Mzuzu, 5 participated from MDF, MP, and MZUNI. Invitations were through phone calls and made reference to the initial questionnaire that they responded to.

Interviews were guided by gaps identified in the questionnaire responses at Annex B and analysed data (Yin, 2014, p.110). Some specific questions were; 1) In your view, what are the major factors that would improve effective CL among security actors? 2) What do you understand by National Security? 3) What do you think are the main threats to national security? 4) Who are the security actors to mitigate threats in Malawi? 5) Does your organisation encourage collaboration with other organisations? 6) Are you involved in collaborative decision making and planning on national security requirements and operations with other organisations? 7) Do you share information on regular basis with other organisations on national security? 8) What is your view on establishment of the national security coordinating secretariat and joint committees? What joint security committees do you suggest for Malawi? 9) How should the National Security Advisor function to enable effective coordination? 10) Do you have a policy to guide inter-organisational collaboration? 11) What are the positive and negative impacts of CL that you have experienced? 12) Do you see the need for establishment of an inter-agency collaborative national security policy framework and if yes, what
issues should it comprise of in order to be more effective? Interviews were arranged in advance and each interview was focused and took about 30 minutes as advised by Yin (2014, p.111). Responses were recorded using the author’s iPhone and transcribed on the questionnaire for later analysis with the permission of the interviewee (Yin, 2014, p.110). These interviews provided vast knowledge as interviewees said that they were free to express their opinions and felt more secure to talk to the person that they could see. The disadvantages, however, were time and financial costs for transport to cover all the three regions of Malawi to conduct these in-depth interviews.

3.10. Data analysis
Data analysis indicates that all evidence has been attended to, analytical strategies cover the research questions and prior expert knowledge is used (Saunders et al., 2009, p.414). The data generated through interviews and literature reviews were examined to remove ambiguous information and find the common patterns and themes between generated data through the SPSS and thematic theory approach.

3.10.1. Quantitative analysis: SPSS
This study used the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software version 18 for quantitative analysis and descriptive statistics (Saunders et al., 2009, p.421). Descriptive statistics is a statistical computation describing the characteristics of a sample or the relationship among the variables (Saunders et al., 2009, p.444). The SPSS measured the central tendency and frequency such as mean, median, and measures of dispersion, which included standard deviation to produce statistical percentages and tables for the presentation and interpretation of the results. Quantitative analysis was very useful as the author used the statistical figures to test the hypothesis of the study at Para 1.7 (Saunders et al., 2009, p.450). The author, however, noted the challenge in that statistical figures still did not fully answer the research questions of how and why collaborative leadership would be successful or not (Yin, 2014, p.134). This problem was, however, resolved as the study also used qualitative analysis.
3.10.2. Qualitative analysis: Thematic approach

The data generated from qualitative research was analysed by using thematic analysis approach, wherein line-by-line coding was conducted to identify main factors that would provide inputs for improvement of CL in the security sector. Consistent with Guest (2012, p.12) and Miles et al.,(2014, p.70), this method was chosen because it focuses on examining themes within data and incorporates respondents’ experiences, feelings and their free expressions, which was the emphasis of this study. According to Guest (2012, p.11), thematic analysis also goes beyond simply counting phrases or words in a text and moves to identifying implicit and explicit ideas within the data. It should be noted that thematic analysis is not a separate theory, but supports many other analysis methods Boyatzis, 1998 cited by Anderson, 2008, p.88).

This study was designed to construct theories that are grounded in the data themselves. In this study, specific codes were assigned to the pieces of text that represented important concepts and distinct responses from the respondents. The interpretation of these codes included, comparing theme frequencies, identifying theme co-occurrence and graphically displaying relationships between different themes and developing a practical collaborative framework model. A theme refers to a pattern found in the data that “at the minimum describes and organises the possible observations and at the maximum interprets aspects of the phenomenon” (Anderson, 2008, p.88). Saunders et al. (2009, p.509) lay down a structured process for analysing qualitative data using thematic analysis, which is done in six phases; Becoming familiar with data, generating initial codes, searching for themes, how themes supports the data, what is interesting about the themes and deciding on writing the report that make meaningful results of the study. The following sections outline these in detail.

3.10.2.1. Phase 1: Becoming familiar with the data

In this analysis phase, the author read all transcripts in an active way at least three times to gain familiarity with them. This was useful in order to begin searching for meanings and patterns in the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Prior to reading the
interview transcripts, the author created a "start list" of potential codes from the literature review and quantitative analysis. These start codes were written in a reflexivity journal or memo with a description of representations of each code and where the code was established (Miles et al., 2014, p.99). The author ensured that data that addressed the research question was clearly marked for accuracy and to avoid bias in the coding process (Guest and MacQueen, 2012, p.17).

3.10.1.2. Phase 2: Generating initial codes
The second step in thematic analysis was to generate an initial list of items from the data set that had a reoccurring pattern. According to Miles et al. (2014, p.81), this systematic way of organising, and gaining meaningful parts of data as it relates to the research question is called coding. This coding process evolves through an inductive analysis and is not considered to be a linear process, but a cyclical process in which codes emerge throughout the research process. The author followed this cyclical process, which involved going back and forth between phases of data analysis as needed until the author was satisfied with the final themes, which made more sense of the data and tell an accurate story (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.93).

The coding process is rarely completed the first time. Each time, researchers should strive to refine codes by adding, subtracting, combining or splitting potential codes (Saldana, 2009, p.19). This made the author to concentrate on the actual terminology used by participants during the interview and responses to the questionnaire. This was by conducting line-by-line coding, which gave at least one code to each phrase, line, or sentence in the data set (Guest and MacQueen, 2012, p.17). Throughout the coding process, full attention was paid to each data item because it helped in the identification of unnoticed repeated patterns (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.96). In this study, jotting and analytical memos were techniques used from the beginning of the coding process to the final steps of identifying and describing the themes (Miles et al., 2014, p.99). These were useful to strengthen emerging codes as well as reactions and feelings from some
respondents. The author used different colour marks to easily follow up on the themes and the linking factors (Miles et al., 2014, p.93).

3.10.1.3. Phases 3-6: Searching for themes and interpretations
A theme in qualitative research is defined as an idea that captures an important aspect of the data in relation to the research question (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.96). Themes differ from codes in that themes are phrases or sentences that identify what the data means. Themes consist of ideas and descriptions within a culture that can be used to explain causal events, statements, and morals derived from the participants' stories (Saunders et al., 2009, p.511). In subsequent phases, it is important to narrow down the potential themes to provide an overarching theme. In this study, thematic analysis allowed for themes or core categories and linked factors to emerge from the data through: repeating ideas: similarities and differences of participants' linguistic expression (Saldana, 2009, p.69). This phase of qualitative synthesis was the most difficult to describe and the most controversial, since it was also dependent on the judgement and prior expert knowledge of the author (Yin, 2014, p.168). To avoid the author’s bias and misinterpretation, however, this study emphasised on the coding of words of the respondents’ quoting themselves, which is referred to as “In vivo coding” (Miles et al., 2014, p.74).

While the thematic analysis was the best tool for this study, the author experienced some challenges in that it required more time to do the coding, particularly that open ended questions had many different answers. Thus, thematic analysis could miss nuanced data (Guest, 2012, p.17). This was, however, overcome because the author also had some questions that required the use of quantitative analysis with statistical figures for triangulation.

3.11. Data management
A data management plan is a formal document that outlines what the researcher will do with data during and after completion of the research (Miles et al., 2014, p.50). Developing a data management plan can be time-consuming, tedious, and
daunting, but it's a very important step in ensuring that the research data is safe, easily accessible and sound for the present and future. The author stored data in several places including the external disc, computer, email account and a hard copy filed as a backup to prevent loss of useful information.

For this study, the author will securely keep data, as it is for academic purposes and in case there is need for further reference. The published thesis will, therefore, be submitted to the University of Bolton.

3.12. Research ethics

Saunders et al. (2009, p.184) define research ethics as “the application of ethical standards to human action within the research process and write up research findings in a moral and responsible way”. For privacy and confidentiality agreement of this study, details of respondents were deliberately not mentioned (Miles et al., 2014, p.63). In this study of security nature, great care was exercised in ensuring that the rights of respondents and organisations were protected (Yin, 2014, p.77). Consideration was taken into account for the following ethical issues during the entire study:

(a) The purpose of this study was clearly explained to all participants in an introductory letter (Saunders et al., 2009, p.179) that was sent with the survey questionnaire (Appendix 1).

(b) The participants in the study were given an opportunity to give an informed consent to participate in the study (Yin, 2014, p.78). Interviewees were also made aware that their participation was voluntary and that their names will not be disclosed to anyone (Miles et al., 2014, p.59). The detailed consent letter is attached at Appendix 111. For focus group interviews, participants were advised not to mention their last names and exact job titles. Before the interview session, the author also presented his credentials for identity and confidence to the interviews.
(c) Anybody who was not interested to participate was free to refuse or withdraw from the study interviews (Saunders et al., 2009, p.190). A good example was one interviewee from Judiciary who sent her regret not to participate because she was not conversant with security issues, despite explaining to her that she had to respond to issues on academic and related to the way Judiciary could help to improve collaboration and national security in Malawi.

(d) All responses are kept by the author and names of respondents will not be disclosed to anyone, during and after this study as advised by Saunders et al. (2009, p.180 & 197).

(e) Great care was also given to the organisations’ secretive nature and only unclassified information from official documents was used in this study (Saunders et al., 2009, p.199). For example, the exact numbers, locations and capabilities of the security organisations were not mentioned.

3.14. **Summary**

In this chapter, the author has presented a detailed account of the research philosophy, strategy and methodology that was used for this study. Mixed research methods and mixture of survey and case study strategies were used. This included a substantial literature review, the enhancement of earlier research models and the development of data collection instrument. Finally, the chapter also outlined details of the cases, recounting how the author identified suitable organisations and respondents for study and detailing the broad procedures for data analysis and software intervention. For privacy and confidentiality agreement of this study, details of the respondents were not mentioned.
CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS, FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

4. Introduction

“The ultimate authority must always rest with the individual's own reason and critical analysis.”-Dalai-Lama (2009)

This chapter analyses the results obtained from respondents through case studies, the survey questionnaire and in-depth interviews. It also presents the findings, discussion and the proposed CL framework. Fifteen organisations and one hundred respondents that deal with security issues and oversight functions participated in this study. Two demographic variables consisting of professional experience through leadership positions and years of service of the individual respondents were also considered in this study. Seventy five per cent (75%) of the respondents were in senior/middle management positions and over 10 years’ service, while 15% were in lower positions with less than 10 years’ service. This assisted the author to understand how various leaders and length of service in the security organisations viewed issues of CL and its effectiveness on NS.

The goal of this analysis was to examine the effectiveness of CL and how it can shape security personnel attitudes, institutional values, actual organisational activities and ultimately national engagement that will assist to develop a holistic framework for practicing CL by the Security Sector (SS) of Malawi to enhance National Security. The study findings are discussed simultaneously by comparing with the contemporary CL and NS literature for better follow up and understanding. The analysis and discussion are also combined to illustrate the transparency and credibility of the findings. Thematic analysis approach was used in this study and five main themes to improve Collaborative Leadership and National Security were identified. The themes are: Clear focus on national security and visionary priority goals, promote national cultural practices and change individual mind set, sharing power and influence, creating collaborative structures and effective evaluation measures and parliamentary legal authority. These themes or core categories overlap and provide a framework for
understanding the study results (Saunders et al. 2009, p. 495). The following sections outline the findings of this study in detail.

4.1. Findings and discussion

Findings confirmed literature that security actors in Malawi are working together. Successful cases included joint operations to combat crime and multi-departmental collaboration to control illicit trafficking of illegal small weapons and firearms. However, findings revealed that CL is practiced to a limited extent as evidenced by the clashes between the MDF and MYP, increased illegal migration and violent civil demonstrations among others. Using thematic analysis and the grounded theory approach by Saunders et al. (2009, p.149), however, have also resulted in identifying a total of five Core Categories (CC) or themes unique to effective and sustainable collaborative leadership and national security (Table 4.1). The core categories directly answer the main research question, which was: “What is the effectiveness of Collaborative Leadership and how could it be improved in Malawi to achieve sustainable National Security and economic development?” The five core categories were further expanded to 25 constituent factors (F1-25) in Table 4.1. These relate to strategies and activities that would be implemented to achieve the core categories.

Figure 4.1. Core Categories/Themes for improving CL

Source: Ngwenya (2015)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Categories</th>
<th>Constituent factors</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clear focus on national security and priority goals (CC1).</td>
<td>Need for agreement on the new concept of national security.</td>
<td>F1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assessment of threats to national security</td>
<td>F2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identification of core organisations to mitigate threats</td>
<td>F3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engagement of other supporting organisations</td>
<td>F4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agreement on collaboration in national security concept</td>
<td>F5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote national cultural practices and change individual mindset (CC2).</td>
<td>Leadership style is key and review of policies to achieve National Security</td>
<td>F6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impact and effectiveness of CL in sustaining National Security</td>
<td>F7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identification and mitigation of barriers to CL</td>
<td>F8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reducing conflicts among collaborative set up</td>
<td>F9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing power, influence and training security leaders together (CC3).</td>
<td>Conduct joint training, exercises and contingency plans to be implemented collaboratively</td>
<td>F10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time for practice of collaborative programmes</td>
<td>F11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incentives for practicing CL</td>
<td>F12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Generation of credible information through fusion centre</td>
<td>F13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building trust to share information and avoid leakage</td>
<td>F14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sharing relevant and credible information</td>
<td>F15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implementation of further security sector reforms</td>
<td>F16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seek support from security and political leaders</td>
<td>F17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of collaborative structures with legal mandate (CC4).</td>
<td>Understanding of national security policy</td>
<td>F18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organisational written security policies</td>
<td>F19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Setting up protocols and technology for sharing information</td>
<td>F20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of a joint National Security Coordinating Office (NSCO)</td>
<td>F21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organisations represented at the NSCO</td>
<td>F22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint security committees</td>
<td>F23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Integrated national security policy and governance structure</td>
<td>F24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation measures and parliamentary approval (CC5).</td>
<td>Setting out measurable outcomes and impact with parliamentary approval</td>
<td>F25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following sections present the analysis and discuss these findings of the core categories (CC) and their constituent factors (F) in detail.

4.1.1. Clear focus on National Security and priority goals (CC1)

The study has revealed that in order to improve Collaborative Leadership (CL), respondents believe that it is important to have a clear focus and priority goals in the identification of threats to national security (Charrett 2009, p.13). However, to achieve this, it requires that a number of organisations must clearly identify their adversaries, common goals, and strategies to work together so that this new concept of CL can be meaningful in a national security context (Myers and McConnell, 2009, p.284). Table 4.2 depicts some of the factors that respondents considered important for a clear focus on national security issues.

The following sections provide detailed explanations of the factors relating to national security focus and priority goals.

4.1.1.1. Need for agreement on the new concept of National Security (F1)

Agreement and clear understanding that the new concept of national security refers to both military and non-military nature of threats, is the focal point for effective collaboration among the security actors (Myers and McConnell, 2009, p.301).

This study asked respondents to provide their understanding of national security in Malawi. Responding to the question, respondents have, however, brought out different versions of the definition of national security. Sixty three (63%) of respondents defined national security as protection of national interests that includes values and non-military threats, while 37% defined it as a procedure that deals with threats to external military aggression only (Chart 4.1).
### Table 4.2 Substantiating quotes on clear focus on National Security and priority goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clear focus on National Security and priority goals: Constituent factors and substantiating quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constituent factors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National security goal and understanding of national security concept (F1), threat assessment (F2), core security actors (F3), other security organisations (F4) and collaboration in NS context (F5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Substantiating quotes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Leaders should be visionary with clear goals and objectives agreed by stakeholders. This could be best achieved if national security is well understood and focussed to include non-military issues, as it plays a major role in ensuring economic developments if proper measures are taken in relation as it attracts foreign investment”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“National security is not only about traditional physical/ military security, but also includes conditions treat sustain lines and livelihoods and there is need for several stakeholders to work together.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“National security needs to curb political imbalance, hunger, lack of rule of law, too much political power, intolerance among security actors and other threats.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Security organisations or actors refer to those fully engaged to carry out different security activities for the benefit of the majority”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Core security actors are those that are mandated to use force like police, military, etc., the institution of the Presidency, Ministry of Defence, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs and National Intelligence Services and they need to work together”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Other actors to achieve security are parliamentary committee on defence – oversight on service delivery of security organisations, civil society organisations by offering alternative government channels of participation and influence in national security policy making, citizen by influencing policy makers in making policies that affect them security wise and media – providing information on national security issues and debates”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Academia and think tanks provide a part of knowledge as well as solutions for specific threats and are important stakeholders in achieving CL and NS”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These different versions are indicative that not all security leaders understand the modern concept of National security and hence difficult for them to understand the need to collaborate and achieve a common goal (Watson, 2008, p.5). Table 4.4 presents the substantiating concepts and quotes for this factor.

**Discussion**

The findings of this study are encouraging as the majority of security leaders understand the new concept of NS. The author is, however, concerned that 37% of respondents who said that National Security only involves military defence of a sovereign state is on the higher side. This misunderstanding could result in some resistance by leaders to collaborate, as they may not see common threats and a coordinated approach to mitigate them as imperative and important. This shows the need for more modern professional education and awareness through joint courses like the one conducted at Mzuzu University centre for security studies. The study also suggests that while a majority of respondents are aware that National Security deals with other threats, practically, most case organisations like the USA, and SADC models seem to be arranged to look more at external threats than internal challenges and coordination (Zegart, 2007, p.40; Adebajo et al., 2013, p.5).
Table 4.3. Substantiating quotes on National Security includes non-Military threats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent factors</th>
<th>Substantiating Quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of National Security, National interests and values, human security, economic security, societal security, environmental and technological security.</td>
<td>“For effective collaboration, understanding of the modern concept of NS is vital. National security entails measures put in place to safeguard existence of people in a defined territory from political, economic, environmental and military threat. The benefits are many; prime among them will be peace and security”.  \n“National security includes non-military threats. The reason is that security these days in encompassing. It covers a wide range of areas other than focussing on traditional intervention”. \n“National interests and values face multi-faced threats hence the need to have multi-dimensional measures”. Vibrant economy, which can woo investors and synergised effort in securing the nation, which would reduce security expenditure. \n“In my view, national security is about defence of a nation that is borders and Lake Malawi and other non-military threats. To achieve this, however, there is need for alliances or collaboration”. \n“National Security is the interest of the whole nation regardless of political, religious, tribe affiliation and can be compromised by entire internal and external factors or combination of the two”. \n“Security is broad view of people’s welfare. It is the absence of worry, be it food, freedom and war”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Schnabel (2008, pp.87-95), however, warns that too broad a definition that includes everything from protection against HIV to water resources management might create a lack of clarity on national security, hence the requirement for proper securitisation and assessment.

4.1.1.2. Assessment of threats to National Security (F2)

Answering the question on what respondents see as threats to national security in Malawi, 50% of the responses said military aggression, corruption and environmental degradation; 34% said internal crime, robberies, cross border crime
and illegal migration; 11% said political intolerance and 5% said health hazards particularly HIV and malaria (Chart 4.2).

**Chart 4.2. Major threats to NS in Malawi**

- Military Aggression, Corruption and Environmental Degradation: 50%
- Internal Crime, Robberies and Cross Border Crime: 34%
- Political Intolerance: 11%
- Health Hazards (HIV, Malaria): 5%

**Discussion**

Respondents identified a number of threats to National Security in Malawi including threats of military aggression, cross border crime, illegal immigration, corruption, political intolerance, lack of rule of law, environmental degradation acts of terrorism and negative economic growth among others as observed by other researchers (Gondwe 2003; Ngoma, 2008;Phimbi, 2011 and Masina 2012).

Ignorance of this vital form of security has resulted in continued laxity by many states and other actors in the international political arena in support of their pursuit for power and other personal interests otherwise known as ‘national interests’. National vis-à-vis human security can be emphasised in that it requires the cooperation and coordination of all the other actors in one’s country to avoid spill over to the neighbouring countries.

It can be stated here that advancement of national security in conflict situation starts with deterring skirmishes or defusing conflicts and crimes in their early stages through trust-building and negotiated settlements. The terrorist bombings and kidnapping of students by Boko Haram in Nigeria (Straziuso, 2014, p.2) are...
some examples that need to mitigate conflicts before they escalate. These threats are a concern, as they seem not properly mitigated in the absence of a written integrated national security policy and strategy. Typical examples are illegal immigration and corruption which have been mentioned so many times but until now, no specific written collaborative mechanisms have been put in place for coordinated effort to root out these malpractices and stop illegal migrants apart from verbal statements and some seminars. As a result, more and serious crimes are being committed affecting the economy of the country, as is the case with the cash gate scandal, where millions of Malawi Kwacha was looted from the Malawi Government accounts (Kasunda, 2013, p.1).

This study has also indicated that corruption was a factor for the downfall of past regimes in Burundi by-way of undermining legitimacy of the government and weakening their structures, reducing productivity, hindering development and marginalising the poor and creating social unrest (Gabriel, 2013, cited in Mulata et al., 2013, p.287). Threat assessment ensures that priority areas are identified.

It is, however, encouraging that this study has revealed that Malawi has uncovered the problem of corruption and taken positive steps to be resolved (Ntata, 2013, p.51). The challenge that this study observes, however, is that leaders could be talking about solving these through courts or change of appointments, but if there are limited written mechanisms for long-term collaboration among the security actors, the problems will resurface.

The cash gate scandal for example could have been prevented before getting to the level that forced the donor community to suspend their budgetary support (Ntata, 2013, p.51). This reinforces the author’s observation that it is time for all core security actors to collaborate in an efficient manner through documented strategies in order to mitigate such threats to successfully achieve National Security.
Table 4.4 Substantiating quotes from respondents on threats to National Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent factors</th>
<th>Substantiating Quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| External aggression, corruption, transnational crime, illegal immigration, robberies, terrorism, political intolerance/ violence, democracy without responsibility, population growth, diseases, hunger and religious extremism. | “It is important to identify security threats or risks in order to ascertain how they can be prevented. In this regard, threats to NS in Malawi include military aggression from neighbours, corrupt economic activities, environmental degradation and political harlots aiming to be in power all the time for the individual gains”.

“Territorial integrity which is ‘vital’ interest. Because it threatens sovereignty = survival, land/ lake/ or border disputes”.

“Threats include external aggression e.g. current Tanzania Scenario”.

“Political intolerance, hunger, lack of rule of law, too much political power, Intolerance among security actors, political stability, economic development and environmental threats”.

“Natural resource competition, illegal immigration, transnational crime org, religious extremism, terrorism, population growth and illiteracy”.

“Democracy without responsibility, acute corruption mainly by intelligence and investigative agents, non-governmental organisations and government officials”.

4.1.1.3. Identification of core security actors to mitigate threats to NS (F3)

On the question of which core security organisations are responsible for mitigating threats to National Security, sixty three percent (63%) of respondents mentioned security organisations, which included the Military, Police and Intelligence Services, Immigration, government agencies, Private Security companies and NGOs. On the other hand, thirty seven percent (37%) of the respondents indicated that only Ministry of Home Affairs and Internal Security should deal with these threats (Chart 4.3). The result clearly indicates that there is confusion amongst the respondents as to who is responsible for dealing with
threats to national security, supporting the case for more collaboration between the key players. Even though there are varied indications of who should be responsible to mitigate the national threats, what this statement identified in the respondents’ answers signifies the lack of a policy that streamlines how the security units in Malawi can deal with them in a more collaborative manner.

Chart 4.3. Core security actors to mitigate threats

The goal of collaboration should be to recognise and realise that their missions overlap, and work to share resources and achieve common goals for the betterment of the citizenry.

Discussion
Most respondents indicated that core security organisations are actors that deal with hard-core security issues, which include sovereignty, crime and disasters. In an effort to define security sector reform and formulating its goals and objectives, the problem that might arise is that too narrow a definition, for instance, special focus on military department alone might lead to an inadequate security programmes (Charrett, 2009, p.13). This is because security sector reform is not just about disarmament or reducing the size of the army, but also about security in the wider sense for the security of every single human being within the communities.
Table 4.5   Substantiating quotes from respondents on core security actors to mitigate threats to NS in Malawi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core organisations mandated to use force, oversight organisations and supporting institutions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substantiating Quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Core organisations are agencies which deals with hard-core security i.e. army, police, civil intelligence, immigration, prison”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Management, Ministry of Finance are oversight bodies”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Core actors include Immigration dept., prisons, the civilian intelligence service, government agencies, non-governmental organisations, private security companies, the general public and civil society organs”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Office of the President and cabinet. Foreign Affairs, Information, Human Rights Commission, Ministries of Health, Environmental Affairs, Agriculture, Local government, the academia, Parliament, Women organisations, think tanks, media, national parks and wild life, Financial Intelligence Unit, Civil Aviation, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Disaster and management, Malawi Revenue authority, meteorological services and Bureau of standards”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Ministry of Information for dissemination of information, Ministry of Finance to support on joint activities and necessary equipment”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Ministry of Justice for enabling laws and punishing offenders, customs dept. to check on illegal items and tax evasion”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“United Nations Human Commissioner for Refugees, Religious institutions and Traditional leaders”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Core security organisations, however, also need to work with other agencies because modern security is wider and dynamic in its scope (Watson, 2008, p.12).

4.1.1.4. Engagement of other relevant organisations to be involved in National Security goals (F4)

In chart 4.6, responses also indicated the need to involve the media, Ministry of Agriculture, Political Parties, Parliament, Judiciary, Civil Society, human rights
commission and Universities. However, 14% of the responses indicated Judiciary to be vividly involved in national security.

**Chart 4.4. Other organisations to be involved in NS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Involvement (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Information and Media</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO and Human Rights Commission</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**

It is also commended that this study recognised the important role by the media. They are crucial in informing the public of some security dangers and the need to promote national security through education awareness and balanced reporting (Khoviwa et al., 2012). Customs would check on suspicious, illegal and dangerous consignments of goods, Judiciary would look at the laws and appropriate speedy punishments, as well as informing the victims on the legal action taken in order to maintain credibility to investors and other stakeholders, while the academia would look into providing their expertise in research and development.

Involvement of other organisations in mitigating threats to security is well articulated by Cawthra (2009, p.20), who said that security involves various components that require several providers working together. The study, however,

96
observes that there is a lot to be done in Malawi and globally to achieve this collaboration as there are limited written documents and procedures, as per current literature, to affect this desire.

Table 4.6. **Substantiating quotes from respondents on other security actors to mitigate threats**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supportive organisations, Legal Institutions, media awareness and academic research institutions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Substantiating Quotes**

- “Financial intelligence unit, National Parks and Wild life, Malawi Revenue Authority (Customs Control) – suspicious and illegal consignments of goods. Malawi Bureau of Standards – Detecting dangerous consignments and able to advice consumers and Department of meteorological service – advances warning of danger in weather and climate changes” (83bs). “Judiciary by overseeing the legal aspect of the national security”.
- “Parliamentary committees to oversee on appointments and make sure qualified individuals are heading appropriate organisations. Check and balances on expenditure”.
- “Parliamentary committee on Defence-oversight on service delivery of sec orgs. Civil society organisations-by offering grassroots alternative channels of participation and influence in Nat Sec policy making. Citizenry-Influencing policy makers in making policies that affect them security wise. Media- Providing info on Nat sec issues and debates”.
- “Academia in providing their expertise in research and development”.
- “Private security firms currently operating in Malawi though there could be a challenge in their professional way of handling security matters”.
- “Ministry of information and media houses by reporting and exposing issues that can be threat to National Security. When they are not corrupt and biased, they can act as whistle blowers to matters of national security”.
- “UNHCR, Religious leaders, communities and traditional leaders”.
- “Ministry of Finance to offer the necessary financial support and OPC to coordinate the different players/actors, the donor community to give financial support”.
- “The way media report security matters can help to promote peace or bring conflict. The other institutions (Universities) can bring expertise based research or case studies”.

This study indicated that the solution to make different organisations work together is to review policies on collaboration.
4.1.1.5. Agreement on collaboration in national security concept (F5)

In responding to the challenges facing Malawi in the rapidly developing environment, as leaders in the security sector, there is an urgent need to make imperative assessments about kinds of relationships to be developed with other people and organisations. Considering the different understanding of the term collaboration by other authors (Linden, 2010, p. xxvi; Thomas et al., 2011, p.3), a question was included in this study to identify how the security personnel in Malawi understand what collaboration means. This understanding is what was partly used in developing proposals for the policy changes. The respondents also had different understanding of the term with 10% saying it is alliances, 19% saying Networking and 71% saying that it includes all (alliances, cooperation, networking and partnerships) with external organisations (Chart 4.5).

**Chart 4.5. Understanding collaboration in NS context in Malawi**

Discussion

Different understanding of this term would also be another reason for organisations not working on full collaboration. While respondents stated that they knew the concept of collaboration as alliances, cooperation, partnerships and networking, they indicated that this is done among international organisations with similar objectives. These differences, in the author’s view, indicate that some leaders are still not aware of true collaborative culture (Glanz, 2006, p.2). The author was further amazed to read responses from almost all respondents who said that collaboration is the working together of all international agencies to achieve
security in the global region. The author noted that both literature and respondents did not concentrate much on collaboration at the domestic level.

Table 4.7. Substantiating quotes from respondents on collaboration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concept of collaboration, Collaborative Leadership, Inter-agency collaboration and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>benefits.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substantiating Quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Collaborating means cooperation with international partners to achieve similar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>objectives in the global security”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“In general terms collaboration means working with others for a common goal”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Collaboration means partnering with known agencies with similar objectives. It</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>means that there is sharing of ideas, knowledge, or total communication between</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agencies with the aim of solving a problem/having a shared approach in handling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matters”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Collaboration would enhance holding of joint conferences, threat analysis, planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and exercises”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Joint strategies on national security policy interactions and financial resource</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>harmonisation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The coordination of several organisations through appointment of liaison personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and collaborative leaders”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Collaboration is seen through holding joint conferences, lectures, interactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meetings, radio, and television debates”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Collaboration entails cooperating through sharing of information and resources in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>order to achieve shared objectives”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Inter-agency collaboration involves two or more organisations working together to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>achieve common or shared objectives”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Collaboration encourages the ownership of the desired outcome and the necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>procedures and actions to that end and it is motivational”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Collaboration is the alliance with international forces and partners”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Sharing action plans and measuring the same after implementation”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No wonder, most case studies of collaboration in the security sector are among security organisations of different countries as per case examples of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation forces (Phillips et al., 2000) and SADC Mutual Defence Pact...
(Ngoma, 2007). Some respondents also said that collaborative leadership is working together within the same agency, which is contrary to the real concept of collaborative culture (Archer and Cameron, 2013, p.11). This is one of the reasons that the author is trying to make both political and security leaders work together in Malawi with other organisations to attain the required collaboration as observed by Henry Ford (1932) who said, “Coming together is a beginning, staying together is progress, and working together is success”.

This study emphasises the need for both horizontal and vertical communication and flow of ideas from leaders and employees of different security organisations in Malawi. This will help leaders at various levels to share relevant information and facilitate a clear understanding of the security situation in order to make informed decisions and the right action. To achieve this, it is suggested that appropriate and effective leadership style is required to drive the collaborative process through appointment of collaborative leaders and formulation of coordinating national security policy frameworks.

4.1.2. Promotion of national cultural practices and change individual mindset (CC2)

This study identified that assessing and application of the appropriate style of leadership to a particular situation is an enabling core factor to initiate and improve collaboration and national security in Malawi. Some other authors support this requirement that appropriate leadership has a major impact on CL and NS (Coates, 2011, p.3; Northouse, 2013, pp.4-5). The key element is recognition that leadership in collaborative networks should focus on the processes of building a new whole integrated relations for a common goal (Table 4.9). This draws attention to different styles of leadership that would drive collaboration and the impact of collaborative leadership in the national security context. The following sections outline these factors in detail.
### Table 4.8. Substantiating quotes on national cultural practices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent factors</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use of appropriate style of leadership and review of policies (F6) and Identification of barriers to CL mitigation measures (F7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Leadership is key and is the ability to lead others through directing and guiding and it is important to use the appropriate style in a given security situation”.

“A good leader must be listening, transformational result orientated, and facilitating skills, tolerant and understanding of the group processes. Change mind-set is crucial.”

“Collaborative leadership shows a system whereby a leader or managers share responsibility for set goals or objective to arrive at a successful solution. This helps in allowing subordinates define a problem and find solution with full hopes that leaders will assist them in focusing their effort and resources towards the agreed agenda.”

“Decisions made under collaborative leadership are owned by majority and they are responsible for any fault. Existing policies need to be reviewed to suit this collaboration”.

“Collaborative leadership is more preferred because decisions made would be owned by the whole group and everyone would put in effort to achieve them”.

“Collaborative leadership should be visionary, led by example and ability to think strategically.”

“Sometimes authorisation leadership is important especially in hostile conduct and war situation”.

“Collaborate leaders are able to think out of the box and get new ideas”.

“Some barriers to collaboration in our organisations are lack of capacity, lack of cooperation among security leaders’ organisations and bad organisational culture”.

“Silo mentality. We are barred from collaborating and hand shaking”.

“Lack of resources, political capital and interest, personal resistance, competitive spirit, inadequate orientation and absence of protocols and structures for collaboration”.

---

### 4.1.2.1. Leadership style is key and review of policies to achieve NS (F6)

Leadership is the process of getting followers to comply with the leader’s wishes, achieving group/organisational goals and indeed it is defined as influential (Northouse, 2013, p.5). Furthermore, leadership is equivalent to management, as the sum of the leader’s traits and it is transformative. Based on foregone statements, thirteen percent (13%) of respondents mentioned that they prefer Authoritarian Leadership, 76% attributed Collaborative Leadership as the best
leadership style in the security sector whilst 11% of them mentioned that both styles are appropriate (Chart 4.6).

**Chart 4.6. Leadership style most preferred to achieve change and goals in security organisations**

Most of the respondents were in strong agreement with the Collaborative Leadership, which *inspires a shared vision* and common purpose, integrity, openness, interactive, knowledgeable, tolerance, command and control and guidance as advocated by Linden (2010, p.85). They promoted modelling the way by leading by example in a way congruent with their stated beliefs and purposes; but were sure to incorporate the beliefs and purposes of others in the group leadership dynamic. The interviewees very pointedly encouraged the heart by supporting the commitment and action of others by being emotionally available and open to discourse that would build trust and deeper relationships. Some respondents said that leadership should start with top leaders including politicians (Lamb and Mark, 2010, p.7). They stated that organisations need effective leaders who have persuasion, led by example; understand issues, never emotional and ability to think strategically in order to review and implement collaborative policies.

Most respondents (76%) denounced Authoritarian leaders who feel that they know it all and based on fanatic ideologies, which is usually used in the security
organisations (Nordmeyer, 2012, p.1). Some respondents, however, supported authoritarian as some situations in the security demand drive (Goldman, 2000).

Discussion

The issue of choosing leadership styles in security organisations is a much debated issue as it has several interpretations. Others feel that as a military leader you always need to be aggressive and authoritarian especially in combat scenario (Nordmeyer, 2012, p.1). It is, however, recognised in this research that the concept of collaborative leadership and the transparency and accountability principles are usually well understood and accepted by the security actors as one of the preferred styles. However, it is the increased incidences of monopoly of force and self-interests among different security sector units that bring the research to the disadvantages of national security sector tendencies of autocratic leadership.

It was noted in this study that respondents who are supporting Authoritarian Leadership are mostly those that lead single organisations with some departments of the same institution. They are basically following the tactical and positional leadership in a single and bureaucratic organisation (Chrislip, 1994, p.127). Most of them were also junior leaders who may not have much experience in collaborative working with other organisations and they are used to being ordered to act. In the military, it is part of training to brainwash trainees to “act first and question later” in what they call, “Chita-chita, siya-siya”. It is also true that in tactical battle situations, security leaders use authoritarian commands to defeat the enemy (Chrislip, 1994, p.127). These scenarios, however, are being debated negatively in democratic dispensation, where orders to kill innocent citizens without legal justification is a crime (Cawthra, 2009, p.21). The author, however, is also aware from experience that some workmates would like to see their leaders fail and also that they may not be very knowledgeable, hence justification for authoritarian/coercive drive in some critical decisions (Northouse, 2013, p.5).

While, this could be a long discourse, this study is more concerned with coordinating various organisations and personalities with different roles, beliefs
and structures. This is collaborative leadership, and it is different in its nature and requirements from the intra-organisational form in which most leaders will have been schooled (Saxton, 2012, p.1), which need to be part of the on-going security sector reform and review of existing policies.

Table 4.9. Substantiating quotes on preferred leadership style

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Types and styles of leadership, Tactical and Positional leadership, Situational leadership, Authoritarian Leadership, Bureaucratic Leadership, Consultative leadership and Collaborative Leadership.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substantiating Quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“CL is preferred because of the visionary, integrity, moral courage, openness, interactive and one who accepts criticisms. Good listener, good analyser, good decider and good implementer”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Professional leaders with a heart of patriotism and shared national interests are likely to collaborate with other agencies”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Collaborative leader is more preferred who is listening, understands possible answers from various perspectives and working to achieve objectives as encourages others to be creative and find better solutions”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I like Collaborative leadership because Mr Know-it-all does not exist in real world. Collaborative leaders are able to think out of the box and come out with 360 degrees solutions”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I prefer collaborative style because I liken it to team work where you benefit from the different expertise of the team members rather than matching a boat sinking in an authoritarian style”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Democratic, participative, leading by example. Giving decisions/solutions based on research and consultations from well informed individuals/agencies, enhanced sharing of information and synergised efforts on threats”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Collaborative leadership would be preferred because decision made would be owned by the whole group and everybody would put in effort to achieve them”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Collaborative Leadership should not be a choice but a necessity. The world we live in is a global village and dynamic. We need to reform and review policies to fit in the situation”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is one reason that this study is advancing the thought that good leadership is critical to successful security operations. Success comes from aiming high with clear vision, ethos and communication that good leadership brings to a team or
organisation that have partnered. It is evident that national security is concerned with critical and pervasive threats that are on a large scale and are recurrent. A substantial body of literature has clearly shown how public administrators and leaders create and manage collaborations among successful governments, businesses and non-profits organisations. Indeed, collaborative management, particularly in government has become a hot topic and programme (Cheema and Popovski, 2010, p.2).

4.1.2.2. Effectiveness and the need for collaborative leadership in sustaining national security (F7)

Based on the literature, the author tried to investigate on whether Collaborative Leadership is effective in the security context and need to be encouraged as part of the security sector reform. There was an overwhelming response (99%) of the respondents who gave an affirmative response of yes and merely 1% said not sure (Chart 4.7). Collaborative Leadership is effective and desired concept in the security context as indicated by almost all respondents. They stated that CL would enable effective harmonisation of individual organisation’s security policies, sharing of security information and joint analysis, effective use of resources without duplication of effort, timely responses to threats and promote a peaceful environment for economic development and increased foreign direct investment. One respondent emphasised that Collaborative Leadership should “not be a choice, but a necessity”. The effectiveness of CL in increasing achievement of common goals and objectives corresponds to Thomas et al. (2011, p.4).

Chart 4.7. Need for collaborative leadership in the security context
This study signified that security leaders understand the need for collaboration to achieve sustainable National Security. The only challenge is that there are limited written frameworks, strategies and laws to guide this collaboration (Cabayan, 2009, p.96; Hiwa, 2009, p.2; Kakhobwe et al., 2013, p.7).

Table 4.10. Substantiating quotes from respondents on effectiveness and need for CL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constituent factors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborative Leadership, Stakeholders, working benefits and effectiveness and harmonisation of policies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Substantiating Quotes**

“I think it’s right and proper to have such collaborative leadership in the security sector in order to incorporate various stakeholders relevant in the security sectors so that issues should have a multifaceted approach for the common good of the ordinary citizens. Players should be identified on the merit to avoid backbiting. It should have no political interference. The ruling party’s crude intelligence groups should be subsumed in this grouping because once left out they could become a problem especially when government changes. We need a body that can be trusted by anybody”.

“CL is important because it will enhance harmonisation of policies thereby removing security bottlenecks”.

“Yes, this has the capacity of increasing the operational capabilities of organisations such as operation Chotsa Mbabva and control of illegal small weapons, as it allows better understanding of goals, objectives and strategies to achieve them”.

“Yes because collaboration gives people an opportunity to brainstorm on security reforms that can help to achieve peace”.

“The benefits of CL would include accelerated security, economic, social and political development”.

“Because collaborative set up gives room to all players and they are able to express views and the views benefits whoever is in power”.

“CL is a ‘peaceful platform’ where investment and other economic developments can survive. It is also useful for an efficient securitisation mechanism and timely response to threats”.

“Economy would improve and sustainable development would be assured with increased foreign direct investment (FDI) due to proper CL”.
Discussion

This is an important revelation in the security sector where not much literature has been written. While most security organisations employ authoritarian, tactical, positional and bureaucratic leadership styles, it is time to realise that security threats are dynamic and require collaborative and innovative effort to curb them (Curtis and McBride, 2011, p.18). This study also indicated that it is time for security leaders to accept that as a leader moves closer to the top, focus often shifts from the internal workings of the team or organisation, to an increasingly external perspective. The objects of interest become more about the environment in which the organisation operates, how this is changing, and how the organisation is predicting and reacting to these changes in order to maintain strategic edge. The positive and negative impact on cases of joint operations and control of small arms in Malawi support the findings of this study (Mwakasungura and Nungu, 2005; Msiska and Lazarus, 2014, p.4; Chauwa, 2014, p.1). In this study, while respondents strongly supported CL in the security context, it is also indicated that Collaborative programmes could be hampered by a few agencies and individuals, who want to promote their own interests or gains (F8; Cawthra 2009, p.27). The study, also revealed a number of barriers that hinder effective collaboration that result into breakdown of security, which are discussed in the following section.

4.1.2.3. Identification and mitigation of barriers to CL (F8)

Responding on the question of the main barriers to CL in Malawi, 58% of the respondents said Lack of financial support, political will and intolerance, 36% said lack of profession in organisations, 10% said different culture and lack of cooperation and 4% said lack of information capability (Chart 4.8). Some respondents added that other barriers to collaboration in Malawi are lack of clear focus on National Security, lack of appropriate leadership and the secret culture, lack of information compatibility, lack of political will and silo mentality. Other respondents mentioned additional challenges as political intolerance and interference in security matters, democracy without responsibility, too much political power and aiming to be in power all the time for individual gains, self-interest as some are busy trying to survive and enrich themselves, involvement of
people with no knowledge on security issues to run or comment on security issues, and religious extremism make CL fail (Table 4.11; Archers and Cameron, 2013, p.142).

**Chart 4.8 Barriers to Collaborative Leadership**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barriers</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of financial Support, Political will, interference and intolerance</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of profession in organizations</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different culture, lack of cooperation, silo mentality and wanting to remain in power and enrichment</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of information compatibility</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some of these barriers, including limited decision making processes, were well articulated in literature (Lamb and Marks, 2010, pp.6-8; Linden 2010, p.14; Allison and Zelikow, 2013, p.5). The author agrees with these findings as in Malawi, there have been cases of political intolerance evidenced by inter-party violence and over 46 political parties (Musuva, 2009, p.1; Kaisi, 2013, p.1; Nyirongo, 2014, p.1). Kuwali (2012, pp.80-81) adds that security organisations should not be politicised in the conduct of security matters.

**Discussion**

The main concern identified through this study is that while security and political leaders know about these barriers, there has been limited effort to resolve them through practical means like written documentation, which is the main gap to be addressed (Kuwali, 2012, p.75). It appears that leaders mainly react when there is a crisis and they aim to resolve it immediately and yet there are limited strategies and policies to implement these actions (Myers and McConnell, 2009, p.284;
Msiska and Lazarus, 2013, p.4; Allison and Zelikow, 1999, p.5), but without proper written long-lasting collaborative mechanisms. Some respondents have also noted the lack of empowering traffic police officers in Malawi to carry firearms on duty to be more effective in mitigating traffic offences, but also to enable them to quickly respond to crime if required. One respondent questioned as to how unarmed traffic police could confront armed robbers and drug traffickers using a stolen vehicle? Issues of political intolerance have resulted in some inter-party clashes.

Table 4.11. Substantiating quotes from respondents on barriers to CL in the security sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substantiating quotes: Barriers to Collaborative leadership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constituent factors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of professional, political interference, lack of leadership, lack of resources, capacity and technology, lack of vision and direction on national security and different culture.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substantiating Quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Competition among security organisations has remained a challenge for quite some time now. The clashes between MDF and MYP are examples of serious differences”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Lack of professionals in these agencies, Political interference and Inter-agency competitions are some barriers to CL. For example, traffic police officers move without fire arms”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Lack of Political will and support from some government officials hinders CL and makes it fail”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Lack of intellectual capital, Lack of political capital and interest, Absence of vision as regards the National Security, Different organisational culture and Working in Isolation and religious extremism”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Lack of leadership and the Secret Culture also make CL a challenge”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Sector leaders who feel threatened that collaboration will lead to loss of authority control and Silo mentality for individual gains and political interference”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Lack of knowledge of what security is, self interest in people dealing with security and many people are poor so they are busy trying to survive”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Inferiority complex, high corruption and lack of sound knowledge or professionalism of some senior members in the sector”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Lack of capacity (economic, institutional, infrastructure, technology etc.), lack of cooperation among other security organisations and bad organisational culture”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The study noted that these barriers, therefore, require specific solutions and processes to be addressed through a number of mechanisms including reduction of conflicts and competition for power.

4.1.2.4. Reducing conflict among collaborative set up (F9)

Responding to the question on how competition for power and authority could be reduced, 61% said outlining of clear roles in a joint work, 31% said appoint a chairperson for collaboration with powers and rights to report to the president, while 8% said not sure (Chart 4.9).

**Chart 4.9. Reduction of conflicts and competition**

Respondents expressed that competition for power and authority is a major obstacle to CL as stressed by Lamb and Mark (2010, p.5). Respondents also suggested a number of measures to reduce this problem such as writing simple and clear roles, establish code of conduct, set up security committees and appoint a chairperson who would coordinate security issues. Some respondents emphasised that the chairperson should be mandated to coordinate and report to the president. Others also suggested rotation of chairpersons as in Table 2.12, which the author sees as a reasonable contribution as this is not mentioned in other case studies on CL in the security context.
The author agrees with respondents who also emphasised that CL can only work if there are clear strategies for sharing power and influence and training and developing security officers together. (Myers and McConnell, 2009, p.301).

Table 4.12. Substantiating quotes on reduction of barriers to CL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent factors</th>
<th>Substantiating Quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Competitions for power, solutions to reduce competition, Chairperson and lead agencies, clear roles and Memorandum of Understanding.</td>
<td>“Conflicts can be reduced by following respective mandates in the constitution”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Political direction can help reduce power struggle as stated above. Selection of a standing committee to coordinate the collaborative process can also reduce the power struggle. Additionally, rotation of leadership of the Security Sector grouping amongst the leaders of different organisations can also reduce the struggle as every will be sure of his turn to lead the grouping”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“There should always be a chairmen / person for any collaborative set up and he/ she should be the only one who has the right to report to the Head of State. Chairperson could be on rotational basis”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Establish code of conduct and discipline and establish central national security office”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“By clear demarcation of responsibilities and transparent security policy and strategy formulation”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“By sharing resources when formulating, implementing and evaluating policies that are common to all stakeholders. Flexibility is also necessary so that there is no duplication of activities”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“By signing an agreed MOU”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Reduce conflicts by organising seminars, revise laws, establish coordinating bodies, educate people academically and develop country to prevent poverty”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1.3. Sharing power, influence and training security leaders together (CC3)

This study has indicated that the process of sharing power and influence is crucial to improving CL. (Thomas et al., 2011, p.4). This study sought the views of respondents on what they believe are the best factors and mechanisms that influence greater collaborative leadership and national security in Malawi?
Respondents identified several factors including joint training, threat analysis, decision making, operations, sharing credible information, incentives, contingency plans and continuous collaboration in peace and crisis periods (Tables 4.13 and 4.14).

Table 4.13. Substantiating quotes on sharing power and influence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent factors and substantiating quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituent factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint training, decision making, operations programmes (F9), time for collaboration (F10), incentives (F11), contingency plans (F12), build trust (F13), share relevant information (F14), security sector reform (F15), support from leaders (F16), organising security sector policy guidance (F17) and manage conflicts and cultural differences (F18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Develop a well-trained workforce, sharing and integrating national security information across agencies and creating collaborative organisations”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Formulation of a national security policy clearly spelling out what security institution will do and when”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Joint planning and training and it should be a daily routine”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Joint operations humanisation assistance to civil authority, peacekeeping, causes etc. and these need to be continuous”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Trust among the security stakeholders”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Deliberate government’s policy on interagency collaboration”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Availability of resources and joint training, sharing information and these to be done at all times because security actor relies on the other to effectively achieve certain objectives”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following sections outline these in more detail.

4.1.3.1. Conduct of joint security training, decisions, exercises and planning programmes in Malawi (F10)

On the question to outline collaborative activities conducted among the security actors, 48% of the respondents said Joint Security Course at Mzuzu University (MZUNI), 18% said patrols, 5% said sweeping exercises, 3% said road blocks and 25% said were not sure (Chart 4.10).
Discussion

It is interesting to note that while respondents mentioned that they have joint activities in training, monitoring illegal migration, patrols and roadblocks, some said that no practical exercises have been conducted jointly. Most respondents recorded that they conduct joint programmes with other organisations through the joint academic course at Mzuzu University. Only a few mentioned about practical training in peacekeeping between MDF and Police at Malawi Armed Forces College.

Chart 4.10 Collaborative activities in Malawi security sector

Worse still, 25% of respondents said they were not sure whether conducting joint training, exercises and planning was good enough. This is a concern that needs to be resolved because it means that no practical joint activities are done in organisations. As Linden (2010, p.60) said, these joint programmes build trust, confidence and collaborative profession to reduce cultural differences and achieve common goals. This study also solicited ideas from respondents on the question of whether security actors need to conduct joint training, exercises and planning programmes. The answers received showed that 83% agreed with the questions that indeed security actors need to conduct joint training, exercises and planning as they indicated “yes”, 10% of them indicated “no” and 7% were not sure whether this was a good idea (Chart 4.11).
Table 4.14. Substantiating quotes on collaborative activities in Malawi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academic studies, peacekeeping training, joint patrols, joint international exercises and operations, community policing, disaster relief and joint operations to combat crime.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Substantiating Quotes**

“Collaborative programmes include security studies at Mzuzu University, Water resources Management and Land Management. Security leaders, however, need to use some recommendations by the academia, which seem to be limited”.

- Monitoring of illegal immigrants, Security sweeping and visa applicants clearance”.

“The Malawi Defence Forces has in the past conducted several training and exercises with the Malawi Police Services, US Army, UK forces and France Paratroopers. Yes, the Malawi Defence has for the past years initiated training between its Officers and those from the Malawi Police Service. At Malawi Armed Forces College they conduct a yearly course called Managing Defence in a Wider Security Context which is also attended by the Malawi Police Service Officers”.

“There is a National Committee for the Control of Small Arms Proliferation, which composes the Police, MDF, Civil Society and politicians”.

“No clear programmes, apart from periodical meetings with concerned sectors”.

“Yes, on ad-hoc basis and normally it’s marred with suspicious and inter service rivalry as no enabling culture has been developed to encourage collaboration”.

Other respondents applauded the joint convoy training in Salima between MDF and the US army as part of the African Deployment Partnership Training (Bartel, 2012, p.2).

**Discussion**

Because of the increasing importance of national security needs in this time when terrorism and crime is the order of the day with their complexity, adoption of collaborative leadership through comprehensive security policy and strategy practices to provide more integrated services is one of the most plausible decisions to make (Myers and McConnell, 2009, p.316).
While respondents agree to conduct these activities, this study has, however, indicated that some respondents never heard of such programmes in their organisations, never seen any and never had any. Some only mentioned about the peacekeeping exercises and operations with SADC, US Army, UK forces, French troopers and UN missions and not much of joint training with other Malawian security organisations. The study also found another revelation of concern from some respondents (10%), who said that there is no need for joint programmes with other organisations. The observation by some respondents that there is limited coordination between the security actors and the academia to use and adopt some of their recommendations, is another factor that both political and security leaders need to consider. This is a manifestation that some leaders still need more education and skills on the dynamism of issues of security in addition to their normal basic training in their respective organisations (Archer and Cameron, 2013, p.156).

The need for partnerships is to discover and reconnoitre successful practices and lessons that can be learned from operations conducted individually, but for the benefit of the nation and analyse their trends and challenges (Myers and McConnell, 2009, p.301). Furthermore, a government has the most challenging and sensitive task of protecting the public’s interest, while at the same time, meeting the diverse requirements of its population (Constitution, 2010). The peoples’ expectations continue to rise as they demand more and better government services, however, at lower costs, which can only be achieved in a stable and
peaceful environment. To rate their government as a caring government depends on the quality of the services provided and the confidence they put in their leaders. While previously those responsible for national security had been largely confined to the President as the Commander In-Chief of the armed forces and security organisations (all of which include key intelligence agencies), currently officials from many more departments, levels of government and the business and community sectors play vital roles in national security in Malawi.

Table 4.15. Substantiating quotes from respondents on the necessity of collaborative activities in Malawi security sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent factors</th>
<th>Substantiating Quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping exercises, Humanitarian assistance and liaison with other International Communication union.</td>
<td>“I have never heard of joint training and exercises with other security organisations”. “Not yet as of now. Only trainings on environmental risk management have done”. “Have never had any”. “Security sector should have inter-agency training institutions whereby a bespoke Malawian operating doctrine and culture would be developed and sustained”. “Yes, we conduct joint training and exercises with police and other stakeholders. We do training with SADC and other countries together (UN and African Union personnel) as well as USA, UK and France”. “Yes, we have requested International Communication Union for the past two years to supply some satellite phones which we gave the dept. Of disaster management for use during the rainy season to rescue victims in the lower shire and other districts of Malawi”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Archer and Cameron (2013, p.114) noted that collaborative leadership occurs most easily when people know one another professionally before the need to collaborate emerges. This familiarity with other actors in the national security sector allows a degree of trust to be developed which, in turn, gives officers the confidence to accept others’ arguments regarding particular operational issues. When used strategically, collaboration produces positive impacts (Myers and McConnell, 2009, p.316).
The author had practical experience that gives evidence of the benefits of collaboration in the security sector. During general elections in Malawi in 2009, there was almost total peace and stability as there were minimal incidents of political violence. Prior to these elections, the author who was then the NSA convinced the president to call for an inter-agency meeting for all the core security leaders to discuss the security situation and devise strategies that would mitigate political violence. Indeed, for the first time in the history of Malawi, the State President Professor Bingu Mutharika called for a joint meeting at Sanjika Palace in Blantyre, which was attended by the MDF (Commander, Directors and Brigade Commanders), Police (Inspector General and Regional Commissioners), National Intelligence Bureau (Director General) and the Chief Secretary to the government.

The leaders briefed the meeting on foreseeable challenges and best mechanisms to resolve them. Measures taken, which included among others military flag shows and education awareness to all political parties to avoid violent acts, helped to mitigate anticipated threats. The security sector was vigilant to ensure that any law-breakers, including members of the ruling party, would be answerable to the constitution of Malawi (2010). The author believes that this was a great example of the successes of collaborative leadership and planning together, as there were no violent incidents on the polling day in the 2009 general elections compared to elections in 1999 and 2004 (Musuva, 2009, p.1). The only two incidents recorded by the author, who was the NSA, was the throwing of stones at a Democratic Peoples’ Party vehicle in Mangochi district, but without damage and interrupting United Democratic Front political rally in Thyolo district during campaign period (Musuva, 2009, p.1).

To the contrary, while this was very remarkable achievement, in 2011, there were a lot of challenges as seen by massive demonstrations and death of 20 citizens, shortage of fuel and foreign exchange (Kapito et al., 2011, p.7). This study attaches these security breakdowns due to the absence of collaborative leadership to enable informed decisions and appropriate actions by the government. In November, 2010, the author, who was coordinating issues of National Security,
was assigned to other duties and there was no replacement until July, 2011. It was during this gap that some challenges were also experienced; stressing the need for CL. Although this concern was resolved with the appointment of a new NSA in 2011, this study still exposes some challenges because of lack of coordinating legal mandate and parliamentary authority for the NSA and proper structures for effective collaboration.

The violent incidents in 2014 general elections, where a polling station was burnt in Blantyre and some property destroyed in Mangochi district (Mpofu, 2014, p.1) are some examples that confirm the author’s argument that there is need for more collaboration among security actors and other stakeholders to prevent these crimes. According to Nkosi (2012, p.2), when there is peace and stability in a country, there is more economic development, as was the case in Malawi in 2009 with a record growth of 8%. Kuwali (2012, p.86), however, asked “when and how should security actors coordinate”?

4.1.3.2. Time for conduct of collaborative programmes (F11)
Chart 4.12 indicates some answers from respondents on the preferred time for the Malawi security actors to collaborate. They mentioned that CL should be practiced every six months (45%), on weekly basis (37%), routinely and on daily basis, as threats are contemporary (15%), while 6% did not comment.

Chart 4.12. Appropriate time for practicing CL in Malawi
Discussion

These responses are commendable particularly on routine and daily coordination basis since responding to threats such as crime, terrorist attacks and disasters require speedy coordinated network. This argument is supported by Rabinowitz and Renault (2011), who said that collaborative leadership should be aimed at addressing challenges and creating new opportunities on regular basis that could be impossible to do by one person or organisation.

Table 4.16. Substantiating quotes from respondents on appropriate time for practicing collaborative programmes in Malawi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent factors</th>
<th>Substantiating quotes: Time for Practicing Collaborative leadership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Every six months, Weekly, Daily routine and throughout before crisis.</td>
<td>“It should be done every six months or as may be required”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“CL should be done weekly and also when there is need to do so. CL needs to be conducted routinely. Don’t wait for threats”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“CL should be practiced throughout the cycle of a policy from draft formulation through to evaluation”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“It should be a daily routine and not on ad-hoc basis. CL needs to be implemented before the crisis is occurred and practice this all the time. This should be on daily basis as threats are contemporary and information updated”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the respondents, it can be deduced that respondents showed a spirit of hesitation simply because in Malawi, CL is still in its infancy as such there is need to cultivate a culture of trust among the security sector units. It has also been clear that in Malawi, the call for collaboration is usually done when there is a crisis, instead of an on-going activity (Kakande, 2012, p.1). This study suggests that this is the opportune time for leaders in the security sector of Malawi to start collaborating in a more professional and practical manner to solve the many challenges and complex threats to NS. Collaborative leaders also need to be rewarded if the process has to be successful, either through promotions, financial or higher training opportunities among others (Archer and Cameron, 2013, p.156).
4.1.3.3. Incentives as motivation in Malawi’s National Security collaborative leadership (F12)

Responding to the question on whether their organisations reward people that encourage collaborative leadership, 37% said yes, 32% said no and 31% were not sure. Some respondents even said that their organisations do not support collaborations as they are seen to be interfering with other organisations (Chart 4.13). Increasingly, organisations are realising that they have to establish an equitable balance between the employee’s contribution to the organisation and the organisation’s contribution to the employee. Respondents mentioned that motivation and incentives in their organisations include promotions to higher ranks and sending individuals for higher training for those who are doing well, which is good for motivation (Thomas et al., 2011).

Chart 4.13  Incentives for collaborative leaders

While these are good examples here, this study has exposed some gaps in that incentives are only offered to leaders within the same organisation, which has fuelled lack of inter-agency collaboration (Zegart, 2007, p.77). In this study, there were no real examples for incentives awarded for collaborating with external organisations. The only convincing example was in Malawi Communication Regulatory authority (MACRA), where a legal lady manager was promoted to Deputy Director after initiating a collaborative document with telecom and ICT services. While these are commendable cases, they are rare examples done on ad-hoc basis, which still require written arrangements to be sustainable. What is even more worrisome is that most respondents said they have never heard that their organisations offer rewards to collaborative leaders, while one respondent
emphasised that collaborative culture is discouraged in their organisation to maintain superiority (Linden, 2010, p.59). The author sees a lot of work to be done in improving these collaborations. Security organisations have intelligence components, who receive information that need to be shared and fused for the good of the nation. Again, the results have to be looked at with some caution in that the results indicated that 37% consider rewards to be important to encourage collaboration to motivate security actors.

Table 4.17. Substantiating quotes from respondents on incentives for practising CL in Malawi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent factors</th>
<th>Substantiating Quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Promotions and training. | “Not sure as of now if our organisation provides incentives for collaborative leaders”.
| | “No comment but it’s very likely that it does give incentives”.
| | “I haven’t seen any direct reward been given in view of the public let alone a thank you. Collaborative culture is discouraged”.
| | “Yes, they are promoted to higher ranks because they perform well and they are sent for further training to improve their knowledge”.
| | “Yes. One of my lady managers in the legal section at MACRA initiated to form Consumer Affairs Section so that we can interact/interwork with consumers of ICT services and other organisations. In complementing her effort by the commission, the lady was promoted from manager to deputy director in the legal department”.

However, if one looks at the proportion of respondents who were not sure and this proportion is excluded, the analysis of this question indicate that proportion of satisfaction of rewards increases to 53% of the respondents who consider that rewards are necessary and can be instituted in the national security programs. The predicament here is that what credible conclusion can be drawn from this? It is possible that the 37% represents a fair response. It is also possible that almost half of the respondents may not be willing to provide the fair answer if the actors are
unhappy on the way rewards are given and are wary to voice their opinion. When
this is the case considering, it may be a challenge, if not impossible to give correct
conclusions. The author’s personal opinion and experience, however, help to
explain this observation.

In 2006, the author had experienced this challenge when the President said that the
author, who was the Director of Military Intelligence at that time, should not
interfere with other organisations when he had received some information and
shared it with NIB that required urgent attention. Looking at the type of
information received, which was about criminal activities, the author decided to
share it with the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB), which was the rightful
organisation to look at that issue, even though it was not requested (Linden, 2010,
p.61). When the author spoke to the NIB and conveyed the information, the NIB
expressed happiness and thanked the author for this cooperation. To the author’s
surprise, however, a few days later, he received a copy of a memorandum that was
written to the president by NIB reporting that the author was interfering with their
duties. In his remarks on the memo, the president wrote, “Brigadier General
Ngwenya, don’t interfere with NIB functions.” In 2007, the author went to UK for
further advanced training at the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS), which
was sponsored by the British government through bilateral cooperation.

When the author completed the course and returned to Malawi, the President
appointed the author the first National Security Advisor (NSA) in 2008. In his
brief, the President said that he had a lot of confidence in the author because of the
genuine reports and well analysed information that was reported from the MDF
commander, which was well coordinated and analysed by the author. The
president added that he noted a huge gap during the author’s absence. The
president then assigned the author to coordinate security issues with all other
security organisations including the NIB. The author noted this as one of the
incentives and responsibility by top political leaders to encourage collaboration,
while other security leaders may not want to cooperate for personal gains instead
of focussing on overall national security interests (Lamb and Mark, 2010, p.6).The
author’s personal experience presented in this study is meant to reinforce the point in question. It is a practical issue that demonstrates the need for Malawi to have a national security practical policy framework that would enable security actors to collaborate and share strategic information without fear of reprimand.

4.1.3.4. Generation of credible information through systems fusion and coding processes (F13)

On the question to identify mechanisms that would improve credibility of information to be shared, 55% said establishing information technology network, 40% said establishing centralised national intelligence fusion centre, while 5% did not comment. Respondents said that credible information would ease the problem of funding, reduce duplication of work among security actors and reduce cultural differences. Respondents also mentioned that credible information could be achieved through creating a central fusion centre, use of proper systems for analysing information using both scientific and non-scientific methods, employment of intellectual professionals and use of modern technological devices.

Chart 4.14. Credible information through systems fusion and coding processes

![Chart](chart.png)
Discussion

These are commendable revelations, as information security is a vibrant practice and development that must be effectively and proactively managed for security organisations to recognise and react to both external and internal threats. The author’s intention, through this study, is to transform both the Malawi Defence Force and the entire security sector in Malawi, as embodied in the Constitution of 1995, to work together and also share credible information to preserve the ability to mitigate and respond timely to any threat (Chirwa, 2013, p.10).

In this regard, the findings of this study support government, parliament and the Supreme court of Malawi for approving and facilitating the use of the modern technology equipment at Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA), which others labelled it as “spy machine” (Chibwe, 2014, p.1). Considering the many breaches of security, such as communications tax and tariffs for customers, intimidation of innocent citizens by unknown phone calls or messages and even terrorists or advanced criminal networks, they would be resolved through such technologies (Curtis and McBride, 2011, p.115). There are good examples of the use of technology that helped to uncover tragic terrorist attackers on fans watching the world football cup match in Uganda in 2010. The successful operation in France to track down the terrorists in the magazine attack on 7th January 2015 was also partly due to advanced technology. Technology network is important for Malawi’s national security. This study, however, cautioned the need for individual privacy and rights; and not to abuse technology, which needs to be balanced in the conduct of NS (Schnabel, 2008, pp.87-95; Charret, 2009, p.25).

It should also be noted that this study is not advocating for infringing on personal privacy rights but the need for credible information in case of security breakdown. The study suggests that these systems in Malawi can only be effective with appropriate revised laws, written security policy and procedures (Katopola, 2009, p.1; Chirwa, 2013, p.10; Kuwali, 2012, p.89; Kakhobwe et al., 2012, p.8).
Table 4.18. Substantiating quotes from respondents on generation of credible information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent factors</th>
<th>Substantiating Quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Information and Technology equipment, Central Analysis, Time saving and avoidance of resource wastage. | “A fusion centre is essential for concerted countermeasures, to ease in funding hiccups and to avoid wasting resources on one area of interest by different agencies”.
“Credible information can be achieved by being honest and sticking to those who have the knowledge. By proving the information to be true using both scientific technological network and non-scientific methods”.
“The approval by Parliament and Supreme Court on the use of MACRA integrated communication system labelled “Spy Machine” is commendable to help check credible information if required.”
“Credible information can be generated by having one centralised national fusion centre”.
“Relevant information will reduce time and resource wastage in searching for information, which is already available. It will also reduce duplication of activities and enable proper allocation of responsibilities”.
“Information shared should be up to date, original and timely”.
“Should be shared so that there should learning from each other but caution should be made not to release the information to people/ institutions that are not involved security matters”.
“Info is the resource that enables co-ordination and what type of action to take collectively”.
“Via common ICT database and computer network with different access levels”.
“By letting the national security authority/ council to formulate intelligence problems for intelligence gathering intentions”.
“By use of sophisticated accepted communication gadgets-normally point-to-point type, and also ensure sound training for the information sources”.

According to Phillips et al. (2000), the best fusion centre is among North Atlantic Treaty Organisation forces, but the author observed that literature was not giving a clear example of fusion centres among security organisations in specific countries, which is the main concern of this study. In USA, for example, the fusion centre is mainly the collaboration among the intelligence agencies on terrorism after the
September 2001 incident (Zagart, 2007, p.40). This fusion centre and joint working will also assist to establish high levels of trust and confidence among security actors in Malawi instead of gossiping and writing biased intelligence reports, which resulted in conflicts (Mandiza, 2002, p.124).

4.1.3.5. Building trust to share information and avoid leakage (F14)

Responding to the question on how trust could be achieved in sharing information and avoid leakage, 45% of the respondents said defining clear and simple roles for each security organisation in collaborative leadership, 42% said conduct professional training in security education and 13% said outline legal provisions to prosecute offenders and effective security vetting measures (Chart 4.15).

Most respondents also said that it is important to share information, as it is very crucial for decision-making and actions. Some respondents said that periodic inter-agency awareness briefs and meetings, and sharing action plans and measuring the same after implementation are important factors in maintaining trust and confidence among security actors. Some respondents, however, cautioned that not all security information could be shared as it is on the need to know basis, which is also argued by Riggio (2010), who noted that sharing operational information by US marines to Pakistan military had leaked and jeopardised the operation on Al-Qaeda. In Malawi too, the author recalls that during operation “Chotsa Mbabva” in 1995, one criminal suspect had deserted his houses and left a written note that he knew that security personnel would come to search his residence. This poses a huge challenge as to whether information should be shared or not, as too much sharing is also bad (Riggio, 2011, p.1; Archer and Cameron, 2013, p.29).

This dilemma is, however, resolved as some respondents said that the leakage of information can be prevented through, professional training, protocols on levels of information classification and accessibility, vetting and employing only those with a heart of patriotism and enacting relevant laws, taking oaths to prosecute those that leak secret information and signing MOUs. In Malawi, both the MDF and
Police Acts have provisions to punish officers who leak information, but the challenge is that there is no proper classification of the levels of secrecy and therefore difficult to determine who should be prosecuted (Joji, 2013, p.1).

**Chart 4.15. Building trust to share information and prevent leakage**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clear and Simple defined roles of each security actor</th>
<th>Professional Training in security education</th>
<th>Legal provisions to prosecute offenders and effective vetting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>45%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This reasoning is supported by Osman (2012, p.1), who suggest revision of the laws of Malawi to strengthen security. Table 4.20 outlines some quotes by respondents on building trust and confidence.

**Discussion**

It is noted in this study that unless these requirements are addressed in a written documentation and Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed to outline procedures for sharing information and joint working; this problem would continue and even get worse in a collaborative set up. The author also advocates that information shared should also be accurate and relevant as well as transparent for a common goal to instil trust and confidence as this will greatly help to avoid leakage (Linden, 2010, p.213). The author considers that the most important aspect is sharing strategic information, while actual operational intelligence need to be restricted to relevant organisations with the required vetting systems.
Table 4.19. Substantiating quotes from respondents on building trust and avoid leakage of information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building trust, sharing information, training in security, transparency and vetting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Substantiating Quotes**

“Trust can be achieved by training leaders in security education, vet and employ only those with a heart of patriotism and information security should be treated as a priority at all times. Sharing and access should be restricted to only those that are allowed to know the relevant information”.

“Trust and confidence can be achieved by promising the information provider adequate security in terms of concealing his or her identity”.

“To avoid leakage of information and build trust, people should take oaths so that they can prosecute whenever they have leaked information”.

“Professionalise security sector and remove political interference”.

“Stop negative cultural beliefs and educate the people academically”. “Build trust by working together and paying the people well to avoid security risks”.

“By signing oaths of secrecy for all staff of inter-agencies and also use of multi-level password in case of electronic information exchange”.

4.1.3.6. Sharing relevant Information to achieve National Security (F15)

As to the measures that would ensure information is credible and relevant, 58% of the respondents said conduct regular checks among security actors and 42% said provide true information through scientific and non-scientific methods.

Chart 4.16  Assurance of relevance information to achieve NS
Table 4.20. Substantiating quotes from respondents on assurance of sharing credible information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assurance of Relevant Information : Substantiating Concepts and Quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituent factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous review of information, laid out protocols, skilled personnel and modern technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantiating Quotes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Relevant information can be achieved through joint analysis. Information should be shared, as it is the backbone of security work. Information is vital as all operations have a base on a reliable information base”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Assurance of relevant information can be done by continuous review of data in a mutual trust. Timely collection of data and the data should be the latest”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Modern technology for collection and quality analysis are essential tools for achieving relevant information”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Information synthesis and verification are important factors to provide relevant information”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion

Relevant and important information for safeguarding peoples’ livelihood cannot be more than emphasised. Respondents said that information should be updated and should be the latest (Thomas, 2007, p.15). The author finds this as an important element to enable that information is updated and shared on daily basis as it impacts on effective decisions by security leaders. This calls for proper and laid out protocols for sharing relevant information including skilled personnel and technology among security organisations.

4.1.3.7. Implement further security sector reforms (F16)

On the question of whether the Malawi security sector is reforming, 82% of the respondents said yes, 8% said no, 5% said not sure and 5% did not comment (Chart 4.17).
Table 4.21. Substantiating quotes from respondents on security sector reforms in Malawi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substantiating Quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constituent factors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic reforms of security organisations and joint programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yes</strong> 87% 8% 3% 3% No Not sure No comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Yes, Malawi security sector is reforming. There are several examples in police and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defence through employment of female officers and government policies to support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security. CL is part of reform as it gives people an opportunity to brainstorm on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security reforms that can help to achieve peace as is the case with joint training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at Mzuzu university”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The Public Service reforms are good examples that government is supportive. There</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is, however, need for more reforms in security to combat crime and collaboration, as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>well as approval by parliament to prevent legal implementation challenges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“CL is important because it can help to avoid unnecessary duplications and ensure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>timely response to threats”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Collaborative leadership is the mainstay for improving national security and is a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>necessary concept for security actors”. We need various players, which is part of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reforms”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion

It is encouraging from the responses that the Malawi security sector is reforming through examples of active community policing programmes (Kainja, 2010, p.20), some joint exercises in peacekeeping, joint operations (Msiska and Lazarus, 2013)
and joint academic course at Mzuzu University, to mention but a few. The author is encouraged that one interviewee mentioned that Malawi needs a joint training institution for the security sector and believes that MZUNI is a good starting point.

However, there is a long way to go because most of these joint ventures are not legally documented to bind security actors, as there is no overarching national security policy (Kuwali, 2012, p.89). Other security institutions have not sent their students to this important and intellectual course arguing that it is mainly for the military, police and now NIB, who have joined the course. The author also feels that it is time when Malawi needs higher professional joint learning institutions, like the Royal College of Defence Studies in the United Kingdom, Defence College in Kenya and South Africa to enable more security institutions study together for longer period and in a more practical way. This is in addition to the joint symposium on security sector governance and national security strategy in Malawi organised by the USA Africa Centre for strategic studies (Garrison, 2013 et al., p.4) and Southern African Defence and Security Management network in liaison with Mzuzu University (Kakhobwe et al., 2012).

4.1.3.8. Support from political and security leaders for collaborative leadership (F17)

Answering on the question of whether there is support on Collaboration from Leaders in organisations, 78% said yes, 17% said no and 5% were not sure (Chart 4.18). Most respondents said that their leaders support CL citing examples that they provide funding for training and implementation of their plans including inter-departmental seminars (Kakhobwe et al., 2012). However, some respondents emphasised that their leaders do not listen and support them.

Discussion

The author commends this support from top political leadership. In 2009, the former President of Malawi, Professor Bingu Mutharika, approved the formulation of the National Security Policy. The Joint Security symposium on 13 September 2012, presided over by the former President, Dr. Joyce Banda, was
another proof of government support (Kakande, 2012 p.1). This top leadership support for national security was also emphasised by the President of Malawi His Excellency Professor Peter Mutharika during the national parliamentary budget session on 17th June 2014 to provide enough resources (Mutharika, 2014, p.9).

Chart 4.18  Support from leaders for CL in the security sector

The appointment of the professional former Commander of the Malawi Defence Force (MDF) in 2011 as the NSA to coordinate national security issues (Tenthani, 2011, p.1) was another significant support and achievement by the Malawi government, particularly that most countries in the world do not have the post of the NSA. It is, however, noted with concern as some responses indicated limited support. Some respondents said that so far, there were no real indications to support CL as funding was only for their routine training.

One respondent also literary said that their organisation discourages any other handshakes with other organisations, while others said there is no support because when leaders get relevant information, they do not share, but instead want to use it by themselves as also observed by Zegart (2007, p.59). One respondent said there is limited support due to low funding, also observed in literature (Kruger and Martin, 2013, p.3). Some respondents also observed that leaders of opposition parties seem to be supportive, but fall in the same dilemma when they get in government. The author agrees with these respondents because in most cases political leaders seek political mileage and sometimes don’t support or vote for laws that would strengthen security (Chrislip, 1994, p.32). It is, however, noted by
respondents that the initiative by the Malawi government on Public Service reforms will enable all stakeholders to work together and improve the effectiveness and performance of various organisations (Chilima, et al., 2015, p.23&26).

Table 4.22. Substantiating quotes from respondents on support from leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent factors</th>
<th>Substantiating Quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support from political and security leaders, direction, funding and cases for collaboration.</td>
<td>“Yes, my organisation has been very much supported by leaders so that we can use stage-of-the-art of telecommunications monitoring equipment, which can improve government’s revenue collection”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Yes, there is support through formulation of committees on various security organisations in targeting specific threats like disaster preparedness committee”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“So far there is not much support from top leaders, but the hierarchical nature of the organisation entails that the top leaders are at the liberty of initiating the collaboration process”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Somehow yes, there is support from leaders because institutions receive funds to implement their plans and they receive training in security matters”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“No, there is no support from leaders, for example the public can have information but instead of sharing and goes to the right organisation they will prefer to handle it themselves”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“The current operating environment discourages any other handshakes with other organisations without the blessing of top leaders”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“There is lack of political will due to low funding. Opposition sometimes act as if they want to support but not when they are in government due to personal interests. Sometimes the opposition just talk to destabilise the government”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some respondents said that other leaders were afraid to say the wrong doings and are afraid to do the right things because they wanted to seek sympathy. Some political leaders look at their immediate political gains and votes, but they forget that by supporting relevant structures to improve national security and economic development, will earn them longer political career and successes. The caution by some respondents that other opposition leaders just talk without effective contribution aimed at destabilising government is another concern to security and development that needs to be addressed. It was noted in this study that while
leaders may want to support CL, without proper understanding of a national security policy that would guide the processes, not much progress will be achieved. This study also suggests that support from political leaders need to emphasise on the legal framework (Hiwa, 2009, p.2; Osman, 2012, p.1; Kanyongolo, 2012, cited by Chirwa, 2013, p.10) and authority for collaborative policies. The issue of the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) not having a separate legislation since its establishment about 20 years ago and still operating under the Malawi Police Act, need to be revisited. The NIB needs to be delinked from the Police and have their own Act if they have to perform efficiently. These arrangements would be done through efficient structures.

4.1.4. Establishment of collaborative structures with legal mandate (CC4)

This study emphasises the important need for structures that would be put in place to support collaboration in the security context. Respondents were asked to indicate critical structures that would be useful in the Malawian security scenario. The constituent factors included clear organisational policies to guide collaboration with other institutions, protocols and technologies for sharing information, central national security coordinating office, joint security committees and a written overarching inter-agency national security policy and strategy (Table 4.24).

Table 4.23. Substantiating quotes from respondents on collaborative structures with legal mandate in the SS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collaborative structures, constituent factors and substantiating quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constituent factors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated national security policy (F19), protocols and technologies for sharing information (F20), national security coordinating office (F21), organisations at NSCO (F22) and joint security committees (F23).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Create collaborative structures with legal mandate to formalise national security policy designated to ensure that any threats to the country can be foreseen and managed with no or minimal damage.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Institute working and operational national security council and joint security committees and national security centre with legal mandate”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Establish protocols for sharing information through modern technology and classified channels. Share information via common ICT data base with different access levels”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.1.4.1. Understanding of national security policy (F18)

On the question of how respondents understand the National Security Policy, 55% said it is a broad concept of action adopted by government at national level, 40% said it is a guide for national security management for all security actors while 5% did not comment (Chart 4.19). Respondents indicated that they understand the purpose of the National Security Policy. They said it is a broad concept of action by government at national level, while others said that it is a guide for national security management for all security actors.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by govt at national level</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Guide for National Security Management for all security actors</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No comment</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were, however, also some differences in that some respondents said it can be a written document, while others said it could be a verbal statement.

Discussion

This study observed that the support for verbal policies on security matters creates a danger of non- sustainability of the CL as also stated by Cabayan (2009) in collaborative challenges facing the US government. No wonder, in Malawi leaders talk about collaboration (Kakhobwe et al., 2013), but most organisations do not have written policies to guide this process.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substantiating quotes: National Security Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constituent factors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Policy, Existing policies in organisations and its relevance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Substantiating Quotes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“National security policy (NSP) is a written or not written general guideline giving the general coordination of all security agencies on how to relate with others towards national security requirement”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“NSP provides coordinated approach through sound mechanisms”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“NSP is a practical combination of roles and policies and procedures”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“NSP is a policy that is designed to ensure that any threats to the country can be mitigated”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The feasible basic structure or systems of rules or ideas, which help an entity, make decisions. It is a plan of action agreed or chosen by a government to expedite national security”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“National security policy can be defined as guiding principles aiming to keep an object safe, in this case the values and interests by providing technical and administrative guidelines for the design, implementation and management national security interventions, programmes and activities required for the survival of a nation”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| “NSP will specify what roles to be played by what institution when need arise and also it will help to discipline security institutions behaviour by minimising ad hoc and costly decision making process by promoting the optimal use of resources in pursuit of specific objectives” | 4.1.4.2. Organisational written security policies to guide inter-agency collaboration in peace and in crisis (F19)  
On the question of whether organisations have written policies to guide inter-agency collaboration, 40% of the respondents said that they have written policies, 50% said no and 10% said not sure. Most respondents said that they do not have written policies except the Malawi defence Force, which has a written Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Department of Forestry and Wild Life and Electricity Supply Commission of Malawi to guide activities, while the Malawi Police Service has a policy to collaborate on community policing. Malawi Communication Regulatory Authority (MACRA) also indicated that they give an electronic copy of agreement with competition commission and other countries. While these are encouraging joint programmes, the author still feels that
there is more to be done in the overall collaboration to involve several stakeholders in issues of National Security.

The quotes by respondents (Table 2.16) support the author’s argument that organisations have limited written documents to guide collaborative leadership.

**Chart 4.20. Existence of organisations’ inter-agency security policies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Yes (MDF MOU with Dept. of Forestry, MPS with Community policing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Not sure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**

The views by respondents indicate non-existence of written and practical policies on security coordination with more stakeholders as some said that they don’t know, others said not yet, no there isn’t any and not sure of the existence of any document in this regard. This is not surprising to the author as he had already seen this gap and he conducted this study to make a contribution to practical collaborative policy framework that would also help to improve sharing of information among security leaders. These findings also confirm about the limited written security policies that would guide multi-departmental coordination, which was observed by Kakhobwe et al. (2013, p.8) during the inter-agency seminar that was held in Lilongwe, Malawi on 13th September, 2013.
Table 4.25. Substantiating quotes from respondents on written policies for organisations on CL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent factors</th>
<th>Substantiating Quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Written security Policies in organisations and guiding principles</td>
<td>“Yes we have, but it is so bulky to provide a copy. It is known as the Service Standing Orders.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“I don’t know that we have a policy to coordinate with other security organisations. What we have are out-dated colonial era protocols of which some structures are no-functional”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“We don’t have the policy yet, but it is in the process. It will clear demarcation of responsibilities, transport security, security policy and strategy formulation”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“I am not sure of the existence of any document in this regard. The existence of such documents will, however, help to seal off all security lapses and reduce duplication of activities while ensuring effective and efficient use of available resources”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“No, there isn’t any, but there used to be one in the past. This time there isn’t any since the SIS was delinked from the Police service”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“No, except MOU’s to guide activities such as with Wildlife and Electricity Supply Commission of Malawi”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Yes, we give electronic copy of agreement with competition commission and other countries”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Not sure, but we need it. It will specify what roles to be played by what institution when need arise and also it will help discipline security institutions’ behaviours by minimising ad-hoc and costly decision making process by promoting the optimal use of resources in pursuit of specific objectives.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1.4.3. Establishment of protocols and technologies for Sharing Information with other organisations (F20)

Responding to the question on whether organisations have policies or protocols to ensure systematic procedures for sharing information, 24% said yes, 48% said no and 26% said not sure. The large number of respondents (48%) who said that they do not have protocols and procedures for sharing information with other organisations are clear testimony that important information is not shared as required. Some respondents even commented that they have never seen one standard format for information sharing, while others said that they have but out-dated colonial era and they are non-functional.
Only one respondent from MACRA said that they have protocols with telecom operators aimed at successful provision in a standard format (Table 4.27).

**Chart 4.21. Existence of protocols and technologies for sharing information**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>26%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**

From the responses, one can clearly observe that there was general agreement among respondents that increased collaboration was essential for the government to fulfil its responsibilities to keep the country in peaceful atmosphere and harmless. However, most of the security professional actors believe that more time has been spent talking about improved collaboration by the executive than essentially doing the hard work warranting to ensure a unified, coordinated response before the nation can be stricken by terrorist attack, calamity or natural disasters (Kakhobwe et al., 2012, p.2; Table 4.25).

The study relates several cases of insecurity and uncoordinated response to security threats such as the violent demonstrations on 20th July 2011, due to this lack of information sharing (Chirwa, 2013, p.12). Security and political leaders are aware of some threats and the need to mitigate them, but they don’t share with others to enable a coordinated response, as was the case in 9/11 terrorist attacks (Zegart, 2007, p.64). The author agrees with Riggio (2011, p.1) for accelerated reforms and technologies in the security sector to adopt modern protocols to allow sharing of relevant information, otherwise, leaders will continue to talk about them but no meaningful collaboration will be achieved.
Table 4.26. Substantiating quotes from respondents on protocols for sharing information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substantiating Concepts and Quotes: Procedures and protocols for sharing Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constituent factors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocols for sharing information and standard format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Substantiating Quotes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Yes, we have protocols for sharing information and we share information with telecom operators aimed at successful provision of services in a standard format”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I have never seen one standard format for info sharing, but it is very important for collaboration”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Sharing of information is hampered by out-dated colonial era protocols of which some structures are non-functional”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1.4.4. Establishment of National Security Central Office (NSCO) coordinated by the NSA (F21)

Responding to the question on the need to establish a National Security Central Office (NSCO), 96% of the respondents said that there is need to establish 2% said no and 2% did not comment (Chart 4.22). Respondents added that this office should be coordinated by the National Security Advisor (NSA), who needs to have the mandate to coordinate with other organisations and report to the president of Malawi. One respondent emphasised that the NSA should provide a high level of leadership, direction and coordination among our national security and intelligence agencies. The NSA needs to interact directly with agency and departmental heads and the position’s responsibilities complement the roles and responsibilities of the current heads of agencies by enhancing whole-of-government coordination (Lamb and Marks, 2010, p.6).

**Discussion**

The author agrees with these observations, as literature does not mention powers or procedures for the NSA to call for a meeting with other security actors. This is also the case in Malawi as there are limited written legal mandates or protocols that guide the NSA to liaise with other security actors.
The author has experienced that without this office secretariat, when the president calls for a meeting with leaders of security organisations, they discuss on fragmented information, as there is limited collaboration. In such scenarios, while these meetings are important, some leaders still do not contribute much. The author recalls one senior leader responding to the President’s question asking for his contribution, he simply said, “Your Excellency, whatever you tell us, we will do as directed”. While others may be happy with such responses, the author feels that it is non-productive as issues remain unresolved. It would have been better to at least, present a brief synopsis of the situation, even if sources of the information are not disclosed. Directives and important decisions need to be issued after thorough positive contributions by relevant leaders (Linden, 2010, p.129). This study indicates that Presidents appoint security leaders to help them with strategic and professional guidance.

Respondents observed that the NSA is not given enough powers and mandates to coordinate with other organisations, which is a huge setback for Malawi and other countries. This is an important contribution from respondents to empower collaborative leaders with legal mandates, which contradict other researches, who said collaborative leaders usually have no formal powers but participate as peers and lead the process (Chrislip, 2002, p.44).

**Chart 4.22. Establishment of the national security coordinating office**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

141
Table 4.27. Substantiating quotes from respondents on establishment of NSCO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent factors</th>
<th>Substantiating Quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Security Central Office, National Security Advisor, Secretariat and good flow of information.</td>
<td>“There is need to establish the NSCO in order to produce a national security picture easily than security sectors working in isolation”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“The National Security Coordinating Office is important and would act a secretariat for all National Security related issues”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“It is important to establish the NSCO. This will help to ensure good flow of information and the NSCO will be the office to collaborate information from the different organizations”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Focal point is necessary” and the NSCO will serve this purpose”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“It is also important that the National Central office and National Security Advisor should have coordinating powers”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This study suggests that a Collaborative leader or NSA should have the mandate to ask other organisations to provide information relating to a particular situation if he/she has to advise political leaders correctly. This could be done in similar arrangement, as is the case with the Anti-Corruption Bureau and Public Accounts Committee of Parliament, who are able to call for personnel from various organisations to brief them on a special need. As seen from literature (Lamb and Mark, 2010, p.6), the NSA is the primary advisor to the President or Prime Minister and he/she would wish that there were total peace and stability in a country, unlike other organisations that have a particular field to perform.

From the author’s experience, some leaders do not want to support CL and therefore the desired national security (Myers and McConnell, 2009, p.282). A good example in Malawi was when the author was drafting a National Security Policy in 2009 in liaison with other security organisations as was approved by the former President Professor Bingu Mutharika. A letter was
sent to all relevant organisations, followed by the author’s personal discussion with leaders. While other organisations including Defence, Police, Immigration, Foreign Affairs, Disaster Management, OPC and Mzuzu University among others, attended several meetings that were arranged, the National Intelligence Bureau did not send a representative. The big question is, how do you deal with such scenarios, when the Collaborative leader or NSA have no powers to summon other security leaders who refuse to collaborate even when the State President has issued a written authorisation as was the case in this example?

This study also indicated that leaders who are well trained should handle issues of national security (Linden, 2010, p.14). In Malawi, however, at times, some key positions like Director General of NIB have been given to political leaders who have not done security training. While they may have tried their best to perform, realistically, a nation may not achieve sustainable national security, as these measures were temporal to try and resolve a particular problem. In national security, literature emphasises on relevant skills and the need for information sharing as soft power for effective decision-making and relevant procedures and protocols (Myers and McConnell, 2009, p.305).

This is one reason that the author is arguing that, how could security leaders including those at key institutions like NIB and NSA be non-security trained? This is not just a problem for Malawi, but other countries too. Currently the USA is considering changing the post of a Director of National Intelligence from a qualified trained security leader to a civilian leader who would embrace transparency in the wake of spy allegations on European political leaders. The author is not against this thinking, as it institutes better reforms. However, this study notes that it would be ideal to appoint personnel, whether civilian or military, who are trained and can handle security issues, otherwise nations including the USA could experience other disasters greater than the September, 2001 incident, if security issues are not well coordinated (Zegart, 2007, p.126; Myers and McConnell, 2009).
Respondents also said that for effective collaboration, the NSCO should have representation of officers from the core security actors who would act as secretariat and liaison on daily basis.

4.1.4.5. Organisations represented at NSCO (F22)

On composition of organisations that would be at the National Security Central Office (NSCO), frequency of respondents said MDF, MPS, Immigration, NIB, Prisons, OPC, EPD and Private security organisations (Chart 4.23). Respondents also mentioned a number of institutions to be represented at the National Security Central Office (NSCO) in order to jointly analyse threats and recommend appropriate responses and action plans. Some respondents also added Disaster management, Department of National Parks and Wild Life, Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and Civil Aviation (CA). Inclusion of EPD, FIU and CA are good contribution to the NSCO as they were never mentioned in literature.

Chart 4.23. Representatives at the National Security Central office

![Chart 4.23. Representatives at the National Security Central office](chart.png)

**Discussion**

This study has, however, identified a problem here in that while most organisations would want to be represented at the NSCO, it would result in a very large office. The study suggests that there is need for Malawi to agree on effective “Securitisation” of the threats (Charret, 2009, p.13) and decide on the core organisations to mitigate them representation at the NSCO. The responses
indicating the large number of MDF representation could be a result of leaders who believed that national security is only about military protection or because more respondents were from Defence. The other organisations and security actors would be included in the security committees and involved in regular meetings and symposiums as may be arranged by the NSCO.

Table 4.28. Substantiating quotes from respondents on representation at the NSCO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substantiating Concepts and Quotes: Representation at the Central National Security Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constituent factors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation at NSCO and Responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Substantiating Quotes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The NSCO need to comprise the MDF, Malawi Prison, Malawi Police, NIB, Immigration Department, and Ministry of Economic Planning”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Office of the President and Cabinet is an important high level government office to guide NS matters and should be represented at the NSCO”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The NSCO should include MDF, MPS, Immigration, NIS, Financial Intelligence Unit, National Parks and wild Life Dept. And Civil Aviation”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Main representation should include the OPC, Ministry of Foreign affairs, Home Affairs, Education, Health, Ministry of Information, Prisons, and Disaster Management, NGOs and Civil society organisations”.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

4.1.4.6. Joint security committees (F23)

On the need for establishing joint security committees, 97% said yes, no one said no and 3% did not comment (Chart 4.23). Respondents and focus group discussions recommended that Security Committees include National Security Council (NSC) chaired by the President, Strategic Policy Committee chaired by the Chief Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee chaired by the National Security Advisor (NSA), Border Protection and Internal Security Committee (ISC) chaired by Defence/Home Affairs/NSA and Disaster Management Committee chaired by the Office of the President and the Cabinet. Some interviewees, however, indicated that too many joint committees might complicate security issues, while others stressed to have them for effective collaboration and implementation.
This study noted that some similar committees are also established in the USA, Australia, Japan and United Kingdom (Lamb and Mark, 2010, p.6; Gyngell, 2010, p.7; Kano, 2013, p.2; Joji, 2013, p.1; Devanny and Harris, 2014, p.26). The suggestions by interviewees, however, have some few variations. In the USA model, it is the National Director of Intelligence that report to the President on coordinated intelligence, as the NSA has no coordinating powers (Lamb and Mark, 2010, p.6). This study looks at this as a gap, as the DNI mainly coordinates the intelligence community (Best, 2010, p.6; Pico, 2013, p.21), unlike the NSA who could liaise with other security actors in a broader perspective. In Japan, they have the best NS model with a well-established NS secretariat office (Kano, 2013, p.3). However, the Special Advisor, who is like the NSA, does not fully coordinate the NS secretariat. The post is more of political advisory and may not have much authority for coordinating with other security organisations, as is also the case with the USA model (Lamb and Mark, 2010, p.6).

In the Malawi scenario, interviewees recommend that issues of National Security should be coordinated by the NSA through the secretariat based at the NSCO (Gyngell, 2010, p.7). The NSA would have powers to coordinate and report to the President and National Security Council. This arrangement would have proper analysed information from organisations as well as joint security committees.
Table 4.29. Substantiating quotes from respondents on establishment of joint committees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint security Committees, and Responsibilities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substantiating Quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Joint committees can be effective in that they will bring different experts together who would brainstorm and come up with an informed decision/solution to a problem. The chairpersons of the committees could be on rotational basis, while the National Security adviser coordinates the daily office collaboration”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Yes we need joint committees to critically look at collaborative policies, internal security, joint intelligence and disaster management. After all we have the military being involved such as disaster activities both within and outside the country. So it’s better to formalise it”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Yes, these joint structures will form the basis for collaboration as well as tuning the security structure to be pro-active rather than current reactive state”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“These committees will be key (core) players that can mobilise the people in time of crisis. They have the expertise They should include Strategic policy committee, border protection and security committee, joint intelligence and management of disasters”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This study, however, cautions here that individual organisations will still have their powers, mandates and responsibilities to report direct to the President on issues affecting their individual roles as per constitution of the Republic of Malawi (2010, Chapter V111, section 93-1). A comprehensive inter-agency committee for the security sector is shown in Figure 4.1. Some may object that this model is complicated and a radical departure from current practice. In fact, this model is simply a more effective and explicit means of balancing competing authorities that draws upon a number of partial precedents (Lamb and Marks, 2010, p.6). For example, like the Director of National Intelligence, and the lead agency/organisation would be given presumptive authority for horizontal integration (unity of effort) defined not by organisational boundaries but by mission imperatives. Similarly, the rights of the senior functional leader in the vertical chain of command (that is, the department or agency head) request a Presidential guidance and decision whenever a subject is so contentious that the Security Committee cannot resolve them. The arrangement of these Committees
and the coordination role by the NSA will apply in a collaborative manner through the establishment of an integrated National Policy Framework and Strategy.

**Figure 4.2. Inter-agency National Security Committees for Malawi**

![Diagram of National Security Committees for Malawi](chart)

**Source:** Ngwenya (2015)

### 4.1.4.7. Integrated national security policy framework and governance structure for Malawi (F24)

The author was aware through his work experience that there was no single National Security Policy to coordinate all security actors in Malawi. A question was put forward to respondents on whether there is need for an integrated National security Policy Framework and strategy? Ninety two per cent of the responses (92%) said yes, 5% said no and 3% did not comment (Chart 4.25). Interviewees stressed the need for written policies and strategies in Malawi that would outline roles and procedures in a collaborative setting as per Table 4.30 (Gyngell, 2010, p.8).
Chart 4.25. Need for integrated national security policy framework and governance structure

The majority added that the Framework should include the structure, mode of operation, code of conduct and chain of command or governance and indicators to measure the successes of CL among others.

Discussion

The responses by some respondents to ensure that National security issues should not impinge on individual privacy was an important revelation for Malawi and other countries to balance the two concepts (Charret, 2009, p.25). In fact an effective National Security Policy would allow citizens to live in harmony with their environment, live comfortable while enhancing human and national development. This undertaking and inclusion in the National Security Framework will reduce the conflict among the security actors and enable close collaboration (Cabayan, 2009, p.9). These findings concur with Allison and Zelikow (1999, p.143) that proper established governance structures would improve decision making process. It was, however, clear from the respondents that most organisations do not have policy frameworks that could guide their organisations to work with others. One respondent said that their organisation has a written Framework known as the “Service Standing Orders”, but could not provide a copy saying it was so bulky. Another respondent said that their organisation was drafting a policy now but could not be availed for this study as it was still not official.
### Table 4.30 Substantiating quotes from respondents on integrated national security policy and structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent factors</th>
<th>Substantiating Quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integrated National Security Policy and Strategy and Issues to be included in the Policy.</td>
<td>“Integrated NSP will ease information sharing and flow”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“We definitely need the National Security Policy and it must be free from political contamination. The governance structure should be chaired by the President and Commander in-chief; and security actors need to collaborate both horizontally and vertically”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Not sure, our political players do not speak with one voice. There is no commitment especially those in power. It’s easier to talk about it when you are in opposition”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“An effective National Security Policy would allow citizens to live in harmony with their environment, live comfortable live while enhancing human development”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“NSP is a guide for national security management for all security actors which should include common complementing doctrine, standard names, channels of communication, roles and responsibilities and critical success factors”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“It is a blue print regarding how security related issues would be dealt with, it addresses priorities and spells out Malawi’s primary defence national interest. Policy usually involves a series of more specific decisions regarding national security”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“NSP is a written (or not written) general guideline giving the general co-ordination of all security agencies how to relate with others towards N-security requirement”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| | “NSP is important because Malawi is a democracy and we have part ways with the old ways of doing things”.

|  | “Integrated Collaborative Framework Model for the Security Sector should include; 
|  | *Draw up critical national interests, How to protect these national interests and threats, Reporting procedure, Hierarchy of the organisation/joint committee, Funding source and end state*”. |
|  | “NSP and structure should include chain of command (who reports to who) and Inter Agency Liaison, how to resolve differences of conflict parties, who will be the main stakeholders and how conflicts will be mitigated”. |
|  | “The NSP is important because there is hardly any collaborated effort in the security sector in Malawi that results in slow economic growth”. |
|  | “The NSP should be approved by parliament to be effective”. |
While these are some very good examples, they only highlight about a few institutions collaborating in their field, but this study was more concerned with an overall integrating policy among several security organisations, which is yet to be developed in Malawi (Chirwa, 2013, p.8). It is, however, encouraging that almost all respondents (93%) agreed that developing a coordinated National Security Policy is the key to successful collaboration in Malawi. In follow up interviews, some of the respondents that said no clarified that it was due to the fact that they still had a narrow traditional view of national security as being military protection from external aggression only. Some interviewees also emphasised that for effective governance, there is need to establish the National Security Council (NSC) and that security actors should liaise both horizontally and vertically. Based on this study, Malawi needs to formulate a collaborative NSP framework and governance structure (Figure 4.3).

**Figure 4.3. Malawi National Security Governance Structure**

![Diagram of Malawi National Security Governance Structure](image)

**Source:** Ngwenya (2015)

This study aimed at emphasising the need for both horizontal and vertical communication and flow of information for collaboration among organisations,
leaders and employees and security committees, particularly on issues of strategic importance and those that require collaborative effort. Evaluation of the set goals is also vital to measure the success.

4.1.5. Evaluation measures and Parliamentary legal authority (CC5&F25)

This study further sought to identify measurable evaluation and indicators to check if collaborative leadership is improved and effective in the security context of Malawi. It was found that evaluation should include measurable successes such as establishment of joint committees, timely response, peace and stability and that the CL and NSP should be graced by Parliamentary legal mandate. Responding to the question on how successful collaboration could be measured, 55% of respondents said through formation of regional groupings and committees, 33% said when organisations start talking about the importance of other organisations, 7% said looking at the safety and political landscape, while 5% said legal binding policies (Chart 4.36). Respondents also said that the number of joint operations, exercises, timely response and, when there is peace and stability in a country would measure successful CL.

Chart 4.26. Evaluation measures for successful CL and NS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formation of Regional Groupings and Committees</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When Organisations start Talking about Importance of Other Organisations</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking at safety and political Landscape</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal binding Policies</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion

In this study, however, it was noted that while these evaluation measures can indeed indicate successful CL and improved National Security, they are temporal if there are no written, legal binding and practical policies. These limited policy
reforms on security collaboration are not just in Malawi but also in other countries like USA (Lamb and Marks, 2010, p.7). Myers and McConnell (2009, p.285), however, points out that the USA has put in several mechanisms to improve national security collaboration through the appointment of the National Director of intelligence.

Table 4.31. Substantiating Concepts and Quotes: Evaluation measures for Successful CL and NS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substantiating Concepts and Quotes: Measuring Success in Collaborative Leadership and National security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituent factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators for successful CL, mechanisms for implementation and actions to effect implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantiating Quotes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Monitoring measures should be looking at the nature of security and political landscape. It may not be easy as of now and therefore, continuous review is important”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Success of collaboration will be measured when organisations start to talk about importance of other organisations. Evaluation could also be done by monitoring the number of joint operations being done and what the junior staffs say about collaboration”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“There is need for putting in place clear indicators during planning process that would be used to measure the results”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Evaluation could be measured through efficient distribution and co-ordination approaching to operations, - all without duplication”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Progress will be evaluated by level and amount of information shared, number of security threats contained and number of security breaches. Successes in CL can be measured when achievement in goals and objectives are seen, improvement in performance and when there is peace in the country”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Collaboration can be measured by the level of reduced corruption in various services mainly public services and by level of successful border control measures such as volume of human trafficking”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Collaborative leadership could be measured if issues of corruption are addressed with very harsh punitive measures and when agreed objectives are implemented”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“For effective measurement and agreement, parliamentary approval and legal binding is critical”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2. Summary
This chapter presented data analysis, findings and discussion of this study. An application of various analytical tools of thematic and grounded theory approach were used and enabled the identification of a comprehensive list of five core categories (CC1-5) and factors (F1-25) that influence Collaborative Leadership and National Security (Table 4.1). These key findings are; Strategic focus on SNS priorities, Promotion of national cultural practices and mind-set change, Sharing power, information and training security officers together and Establishment of collaborative structures with legal mandate. Others include evaluation measures and parliamentary approval of the practical policy framework.

This study also suggested that Malawi could formulate a much better National Security Policy, which would be well written with monitoring mechanisms for success and be a model for the entire world to prevent threats. What is also very important is to formulate practical regulations that would deal with leaders who do not want to support CL, as some do not share information at the expense of the desired NS (F8 and 15; Zegart, 2007, p.40).

Whilst the majority of respondents support CL, they indicated that it is mostly about alliances with international security organisations (F5; Chart 4.5). A few respondents also indicated some reservations to engage CL in the security sector (F7; Chart 4.7). These are critical findings that need to be considered and resolved as Allison and Zelikow (2013, p.5) argued that the few leaders in top or influential positions could affect the entire collaborative process and NS. This study, however, indicated that in Malawi, there is high political will to support CL and NS (F17).

From literature review and findings, a practical framework was developed termed “NACUSSEPA” model to guide collaborative leadership among the security actors to achieve sustainable national security and prosperity in Malawi, which is discussed in Chapter five.
CHAPTER 5

A PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR COLLABORATIVE LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN MALAWI

“Reforming the Public Service is not a matter of multiple choices. It must be done and will be done.” -Vice President Dr Saulos Chilima (February, 2015)

5. Introduction

As stated earlier, the main objectives of this study was to examine the effectiveness of collaborative leadership (CL) among security actors (SAs) and factors that would improve greater inter-agency collaboration to achieve sustainable national security (SNS) in Malawi. Presentation and discussion of the findings in Chapter four show that in Malawi, SAs are fairly working together. However, findings also reveal that adoption of CL approach among SAs is limited. Consequently, breakdown of some security issues such as border disputes, illegal migration, internal crime, violent demonstrations, corruption, and political intolerance have been the case. In turn, these issues have compromised both security and economic development of Malawi; hence the need for further policy reviews and reforms.

In view of the findings in Chapter four, Chapter five, therefore, proposed and outlined the practical policy framework for improving CL and SNS in Malawi. As threats to SNS are dynamic and vary depending on the environment, this framework describes a flexible approach that can assist government and national security actors to review and improve their institutional and inter-agency security policies.

5.1. A Practical Policy Framework (NACUSSEPA model)

Pursuant to the findings of this study, a practical policy framework and strategy for Collaborative Leadership and National Security in Malawi called “NACUSSEPA” was developed. The NACUSSEPA policy framework (Figure 5.1) was named from the core categories (CC1-5) or themes of this study’s findings, which are; clear focus on National Security and priority goals (NA),
promote national collaborative Cultural practices and mind-set change (CU), Sharing power and influence and training security officers together (S), establishment of collaborative Structures with legal mandate (S), Evaluation measures (E), and Parliamentary Approval (PA). It is an inter-agency collaborative model for CL, SNS, and hence prosperity in Malawi.

**Figure 5.1. A Practical NACUSSEPA Framework Model**

(Source: Ngwenya (2015))

Gartner (2011, p.1) defined a framework as the integrating and aligning of people, processes and technologies in order to realise a more strategic approach to
business intelligence, analytics and performance management initiatives. Regarding national security management, a framework is a guide that enables all security actors to work together, which should include agreed common goal and objectives, complementing doctrine, channels of communication, roles and responsibilities and critical success factors in preventing crime and insurgence as well as anarchy from within and outside the country (F24). This study, however, noted that implementation of CL is challenging and at times, it fails (F8). It is therefore, important to continue reviewing each phase of the framework back and forth as per contemporary security situation (F25). The following sub-sections outline the phases of the framework in more detail.

5.2. Phase I: Clear focus on the National Security and priority goals
The main issue of national security in Malawi is to create a country in which both the government and its citizens are secure and safe from threats to their well-being and dignity and enjoy political stability, sustainable economic development and social fulfilment. This phase involves setting a clear vision, goal and objectives, identification of risks and security actors (CC1, F1-4 & 24), which are more highlighted in the following paragraphs.

5.2.1. Agreement on the new concept of national security and objectives
Some of the typical tasks to consider in this phase include defining the high-level objectives to be accomplished in a specific time frame, usually 3-5 years (F1&20).

5.2.2. Assessment of threats to national security
One of the key elements of a CL and national security policy (NSP) framework is the national threat assessment (F2). Threat assessment is a scientific and technologically based process consisting of three steps: threat identification, threat analysis and threat evaluation. The scope of the assessment is to coordinate the use of resources and to monitor, control, and minimise the probability and/or impact of unfortunate events that might put at risk the objectives of the vision. Threat assessments provide valuable information for developing, executing and evaluating a strategy for CL. By carrying out a national threat assessment and
aligning the objectives of the strategy with national security needs, it is possible to focus on the most important challenges with regard to national security. In most cases, governments adopt an all-hazard approach, such as incorporating all kinds of national security threats like transnational crime and technical failures or breakdowns when assessing the risks at national level. Typical tasks to consider in this step are agreeing on a risk assessment methodology or securitisation to use. This study has, however, indicated that whereas Malawi’s security actors work together in analysis of the security situation, it is on ad-hoc levels as there is still no full time established central coordinating office that comprises core security actors (F21 & 22).

5.2.3. Identification of national security actors to mitigate threats, agreement on collaboration and assign duties

A successful national security strategy requires proper co-operation between public and private stakeholders (F3 & 4). Public stakeholders are important as they usually have a policy, regulatory and operational mandate. They ensure the safety and security of the nation’s critical infrastructures and services. Selected private entities should be part of the development process due to the fact that they are likely the owners of most of the critical infrastructures and services. Tasks to consider in this phase include identification of the owners of all critical infrastructures and services such as energy, transport, telecommunications and business premises among others. Engagement of both public and private stakeholders in the process by clearly defining their roles and responsibilities and defining the appropriate incentives that allow private and public stakeholders to participate in the process, are important factors to consider (F12). It is also vital to take into account the possible different or even conflicting interests of the public and private sector.

The involvement of the right stakeholders at the right time in the process of developing the strategy cannot be over-emphasised. Stakeholder involvement is necessary from a strategy content point of view and in order to gain commitment for executing the strategy later on. There is also need to explain how and why these
stakeholders contribute to the objectives of the strategy, the individual tasks and the actions plans such as pursuing a collaborative approach together with critical infrastructure owners and critical service providers in assessing threats and risks. Assign the government the role of a facilitator. The government can facilitate activities on a national level, such as information-sharing, cooperation and risk management (F13-15). It is also necessary to involve top-level representatives in order to create ownership and assign an alternate for each representative. Include civil society and civilians in executing the strategy from an awareness point of view, as they are the end users. By raising awareness at a national level, citizens will better understand national-security risks and this will enable them to proactively take measures to lessen or mitigate risks.

Also involve ministries with responsibility for security, safety and crisis management, such as defence, internal security, foreign affairs, justice, national telecommunication regulator and other national interest groups among others in developing the strategy (F3, 4, 21-23).

5.3. Phase II: Promotion of national collaborative cultural practices and change mind-set
This phase involves a critical assessment of the effectiveness and impact of collaborative leadership in achieving sustainable national security and mitigation of threats (CC2). Main tasks would include taking stock and review of supportive policies, available resources and barriers that hinder collaborative efforts.

5.3.1. Leadership Style, review of policies and analyse impact on national security collaboration
Before defining in detail the objective of the national security strategy, it is important to take stock of the status of the key elements of the strategy at national level including collaborative leadership set up as a key factor. At the end of this activity, important gaps must be identified. Some of the tasks to consider include taking stock of existing policies developed over the years in the area of national
security such as electronic communications, data protection, information sharing and security (F5). It is also important to identify all regulatory measures applied in different security sectors and their impact, so far, in improving national security (F7). Malawi need to analyse the roles and capabilities of existing public agencies mandated to deal with national security policies, regulations and operations such as the MDF, Police, NIB, Immigration and other stakeholders and identify overlaps and gaps to develop a clear collaborative policy (F19).

5.3.2. Identification of barriers to collaboration and mitigate them

This is an important step to identify barriers and challenges that would hinder effective collaboration and identify strategies to resolve them (F8, 9&24). These would include reviewing the old policies on security, compatible equipment and technological infrastructure among others.

5.4. Phase III: Sharing power and influence and training security officers together

The process and strategy phase outlines the what, how and when actions need to be done. For the National Security policy framework, these would include best strategies to be adopted such as joint training and assigning of specific roles to security actors (CC3).

5.4.1. Development of national security contingency collaborative plans, joint training and awareness programmes

National Security contingency plans are the interim structures and measures for responding to, and recovering services following, major security incidents that involve national interests (F10). The objectives of a NSP are to present and explain the criteria that should be used to define a situation as a crisis, define key processes and actions for handling the crisis and clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders during a national crisis (F19). Exercises enable competent authorities to test existing emergency plans, target specific weaknesses, increase cooperation between different sectors, identify interdependencies, stimulate improvements in continuity planning, and generate a
culture of cooperative effort to boost resilience (F10). National security exercises are important tools to assess preparedness of a community against natural disasters, technology failures, cyber-attacks and emergencies. Notable objectives for this phase are to identify what needs to be tested including plans and processes, people, infrastructure, response capabilities, cooperation capabilities and communication among others. Agree on the scenario of the exercise; make sure that the scenario is pragmatic and based on real incidents, agree on the evaluation and monitoring approach to be followed, define a clear media and public affairs strategy and agree on international cooperation as well as identifying and engaging the players of the exercise.

This is an important phase in raising awareness about national-security threats and vulnerabilities and their impact on society. Through awareness programmes, individual and security actors can learn how to behave in the online world and protect themselves and Malawi’s national interests from typical risks including leakage of sensitive information (F14). Awareness activities occur on an on-going basis and use a variety of delivery methods to reach broad audiences. Security awareness activities may be triggered by different events or factors, which may be internal or external to an organisation. Major external factors could include: recent security breaches, threats and incidents, new risks, updates of security policy and/or strategy and new laws.

Principles to follow in order to support an awareness-raising programme include defining the target of the awareness-raising campaign such as citizens and developing mechanisms for reaching out to these communities as is the case with community policing. It is also critical to create the national information security unique identity: choose specific information security topics that support the strategy objectives and then organise and advertise, not only in Malawi but also internationally, local events by using appropriate communication channels. Organise a national security week or day in order to engage the public, and private- and public-sector partners through events and initiatives like workshops
and conferences, with different subject matter every time (F11). Some presentation materials should also be translated into other Malawi local languages.

5.4.2. Building trust through joint operations and educational programmes

National security is continuously changing. It requires constant joint operations and education as noted in different versions of the concept by respondents (F1). Universities, military and security colleges, research and development institutions need to be empowered to train and educate more national security experts to meet the increasing needs of national security (F10). It is also important to support the security accreditation and certification of skilled personnel in key working posts in the industrial sector and create a national register with teaching skills.

National security threats and vulnerabilities are also international in nature. Engaging in cooperation with partners abroad is important to better understand and respond to a constantly changing threat environment (F4 & 16). The following points should be followed during the development of the framework; use the strategy as an instrument for fostering international cooperation, identify the countries to cooperate with and clarify the context of cooperation with each one. Assign this task on a national level to a lead organisation such as Ministry of Foreign affairs to provide the benefit that all national efforts to cooperate internationally are consolidated (F23). Promote international cooperation through information sharing like benchmarking, technological knowledge, and basic threat assessments and top-level public–private partnerships (F2 &15).

It is also important to join bilateral, multilateral or international treaties and conventions related to improve national security such as SADC and others (F4). Contribute to international efforts towards formulating standard operating procedures (SOPs) to be used for information sharing and response to real and major cross-country crises. Encourage participation in regional and international exercises as a means of supporting cooperation with strategic partners (F10).
5.4.4. Outlining reforms to balance security with privacy

Counter-terrorism measures and tools that tackle crime often invade privacy in the most brutal ways and, at the same time, lack of personal online security leads to breaches of that same privacy. A national security framework should seek for the right balance between these two concepts. Issues to consider should include national legal requirements for data and private protection when drafting national security-relevant regulatory policies (F14, 18 & 19).

5.5. Phase IV: Establishment of collaborative structures with legal mandate

This phase comprises established structures for implementing collaboration. They include a clear governance structure, joint infrastructure such as national security coordinating office (NSCO), technologies for sharing information and measurable timetable and written framework (CC4).

5.5.1. Establish clear national security and organisational policies

The national security strategy will succeed only if a clear governance and collaborative structure is in place (F18-20). A governance structure defines the roles, responsibilities, accountability and relationships with all relevant stakeholders (Figure 4.3). A public body or an interagency/inter-ministerial working group should be defined as the coordinator of the strategy (F23; Figure 4.2). This will be the entity that has the overall responsibility for the strategy lifecycle and the strategy documentation itself. Some of the tasks to consider in this phase would be to define who is the ultimate responsible for the management and evaluation of the strategy; usually it is a National Security Advisor as per findings of this study, that is appointed by the President of Malawi and is ultimately responsible for managing the national-security strategy (F21).

There is also need to define the management structure including an advisory body that advises the national security advisor of the strategy. Specify the governmental and private parties taking part in this structure. Usually this is done through a national security coordinating office, which has members from both public and private sectors, as found in this study (F21). Try to cover the widest spectrum of
stakeholders involved. The roles, mandates, responsibilities, processes, decision rights and tasks of this advisory body need to be outlined. These would include management of the national risk assessment and prioritising emerging threats, response to critical situations, engaging relevant stakeholders and fostering international cooperation needs to be clearly outlined.

5.5.2. Setting up protocols for sharing information and technologies

Information sharing among private and public stakeholders is a powerful mechanism to better understand a constantly changing environment (F13 & 15). Information sharing is a form of strategic partnership among key public and private stakeholders and is one of the soft powers. Owners of critical infrastructures could potentially share with public authorities their input on mitigating emerging risks, threats, and vulnerabilities, while public stakeholders could provide on a 'need to know basis' information on aspects related to the status of national security, including findings based on information collected by intelligence and other security actors units. Combining both views gives a very powerful insight on how the threat landscape evolves.

Some of the procedures for trusted information sharing include setting up internal and joint procedures to continuously review the implementation of adopted measures, properly defining the information-sharing mechanism and the underlying principles and rules that govern the mechanism such as non-disclosure agreements, and antitrust rules (F14). It is also important to provide the appropriate rewards for stakeholders, mostly for private ones, to participate and share sensitive information (F12). Keep the size of the information sharing scheme relatively small, but representative of all security actors to allow trust among experts to flourish (F14). Organise regular face-to-face meetings to share sensitive information. Identify modern technology for sharing information and scientific analysis (F13-15). Government should facilitate the process and provide logistical support. The initiative could be chaired both by the public sector and industry to symbolise the joint responsibility of the two stakeholders’ categories.
Development and use of modern technology is very critical for speedy sharing of information and secure means (F20).

5.6. **Phase V: Establishment of joint national security evaluation measures and parliamentary approval**

Once the strategy has been developed and is being executed, the extent to which the objectives are achieved should be assessed (CC5). By assessing the achieved results of the activities, it is possible to take any required corrective and preventative actions in order to align with or change the objectives of the strategy. Respondents also said that this phase should accommodate legal authority for effective implementation.

5.6.1. **Setting measurable objectives and evaluate outcomes**

This study has indicated that more joint threat analysis, decision making process, information sharing, recognition by security organisations about the good work done by other institutions and peace and economic development are some KPIs of a successful CL (F10-15 & 25).

5.6.2. **Parliamentary authority and political support**

Legal mandate through act of parliament is one of the key findings for successful implementation of collaborative leadership among security actors and other stakeholders (F25). It is, therefore, important that the process of developing the National Security Policy and Strategy should involve legal experts and members of Defence and Security committee of Parliament before it can be tabled in the National Assembly for final approval and authority. If there are no legal mandates, collaboration will fail, as there are several barriers such as culture, political and limited information sharing among others (F13 & 15). Based on the evaluation results, the CL strategy, activities, structures and identification of further national security needs and issues need to be enhanced accordingly in line with the practical NACUSSEPA framework model.
In summary, the author is confident that findings of this study and the practical framework are credible and trustworthy, as they have been subjected to a number of tests.

5.7. Credibility and Trustworthiness of the Study

Validity and reliability are the two assessments that should be carried out in a survey instrument to determine its quality (Saunders et al., 2009, p.156). Reliability is the extent to which an experiment, test, or any measuring procedure yields the same result on repeated trials (Yin, 2014, p.46). Validity refers to the degree to which a study accurately reflects or assesses the specific concept that the researcher is attempting to measure. In a qualitative study, these are realised through conducting a pilot study, triangulation, and peer review and member checking (Yin, 2014, pp.45-49), which the author conducted as explained in a paragraph on pilot testing and validity (Para 3.6). The credibility of gathered data was also achieved through careful selection of the units of analysis and mixed methods outlined in the following subsections that enabled triangulation (Yin, 2014, p.121).

5.7.1. Selections of multiple case units that deal with security matters

In this study, multiple organisations that are involved in the topic of the study were represented (Yin, 2014, p.31). The author selected fifteen organisations for this study using the following criteria:

a. The organisations were involved in the daily coordination and activities related to National Security in Malawi; and

b. To overcome bias, organisations were those that are spread in all the four regions of Malawi.

5.7.2. Respondents were represented from all core security organisations

For accuracy of the collected data, in the sampling stage, efforts were taken to ensure that the respondents were representatives of all core organisations that deal
with national security matters in Malawi as per units of analysis (Para 3.4, Table 3.1). Each organisation identified had more than two individual respondents who were involved in daily security activities. A total of 100 respondents were also of different leadership positions, varied years of work experience and different levels of academic and professional training to triangulate the findings. Furthermore, in-depth face to face interviews conducted by the author helped triangulation and to remove bias (Yin, 2014, p.115).

5.7.3. High response rate from individual participants
Various strategies were also adopted to achieve high response rate, which included use of three assistants and specific period of three weeks for submission of responses (Para 3.9). This resulted in 100 respondents and only one declined, which was a remarkable representation of the needed participants for this study. In-depth face to face and focus group interviews also enabled more credibility (Saunders et al., 2009, p.343).

5.7.4. Benchmarked with several international organisations
In phase II, the empirical study was undertaken by studying the successful and failure cases of other organisations and countries including the United States of America and the Southern Africa Development Community. The adoption of a multiple case study approach helped to identify the benefits across different organisations (Yin, 2014, p.57). Moreover, the developed framework is an enhancement of the framework developed from the analysis of the best practice by these organisations and a comprehensive review of literature. Hence, the developed framework is rigorous and valid.

5.8. Summary
This chapter presented a practical policy framework proposed for Malawi termed “NACUSSEPA” model to guide collaborative leadership among the security actors in order to achieve the highest state of national security and prosperity in Malawi. The practical framework emphasises on the requirement to set clear priority goals for national security, promote a culture of national collaboration
among security actors and mind set change, create collaborative structures with legal mandate and put in place well written measures for evaluation of the agreed objectives. More importantly, the policy should be approved by the Parliament of Malawi to be meaningful and effective. Credibility and trustworthy of the findings and practical framework were assured in this study as all core security actors were represented. Furthermore both surveys and case study approach were used to clearly indicate quantitative and qualitative data.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

“Collaboration isn’t an easy destination to reach. But while the journey might be arduous, the payoff once you arrive can be well worth the effort.” -Alice Dragoon (November 15, 2004).

6. Introduction

This chapter provides conclusive remarks of this study under six headings: Research problem, goal and objectives; Theoretical and practical contributions; Research methodology and validity; Limitations of the study; Recommendations and areas for further research.

As a general conclusion, this study indicated the effectiveness of Collaborative Leadership (CL) such as joint operations among security actors (SAs) to combat crime, which has resulted in making Malawi one of the most peaceful and developing countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The study has, however, also revealed that while Malawi is a peaceful nation; adoption of CL approach for sustainable national security (SNS) management is still limited. Findings further indicated that as a consequence of limited CL among SAs, breakdown of some security issues have occurred such as border disputes, transnational crime and corruption among others (F2; Omolo, 2012, p.1; Chalabi, 2013, p.1-4); Mulata et al., 2013, p.287; Mahoney et al., 2014, p.1). It is, however, pleasing to note that there is willingness for security actors and support from government to engage more in collaborative leadership (CL) to achieve sustainable national security (F3-7; Kakhobwe et al., 2012, p.8). There are, however, still some misunderstanding on what the new concept of National Security (NS) and CL means and therefore difficult to clearly agree on the security players (F1-4; Coates, 2011, p.4; Myers and McConnell, 2013, p.84).

The study, however, identified common principles and themes that characterise successful collaboration; clear focus on national security and common agreement on the goals and objectives, assessment and appropriate application of cultural practices such as effective style of leadership, sharing power, information and
influence through participative decision making, training and developing security officers together, creation of collaborative structures with legal mandate and effective evaluation measures and parliamentary approval. It is, however, indicated that there are several barriers that hinder effective collaboration including different cultures and absence of an overarching national security policy and strategy (F6 &18; Kuwali, 2009, p.89; Kakhobwe et al., 2012, p.8).

This study has also emphasised that an integrated written National Security Policy and Strategy Framework, to be approved by parliament to guide collaboration, is an important document, which Malawi needs to develop with utmost urgency (F18; Myers and McConnell, 2009, p.285). The issue of establishing more joint security committees and a central National Security office with legal authority for daily coordination by the National Security Advisor, even in peacetime, were found to be very important. The study has also highlighted that the current practice is that security actors mainly collaborate and share information during crisis period, which does not achieve the desired NS (F5; Kakande, 2012, p.1). The inclusion of Economic Planning and Development, Financial Intelligence Unit and Civil Aviation to the National Security Coordination Office are good contributions (F3), as they were never mentioned in literature. The following sections outline how the research problem and objectives were achieved.

6.1. Research problem, goal and objectives
The research problem of this study was, “to examine the effectiveness of Collaborative Leadership (CL) and consequently explore the major factors that would improve this CL among the security actors to achieve sustainable national security and prosperity in Malawi.” To address this research problem, a goal was formulated, which was, “to develop a holistic and strategic framework for practicing collaborative leadership by the security actors of Malawi.”

The development of the collaborative leadership practical framework with five core categories and constituent factors including national security focus, promotion of national cultural practices, sharing influence and training security
officers together, creating collaborative structures and effective evaluation measures and legal authority have addressed the research problem and achieved the goal for this study. The following paragraphs provide a brief overview of how the objectives for this study were accomplished.

6.1.1. **Objective 1: To understand the extent of collaborative leadership within the security sector of Malawi and its effectiveness on national security and economic development.**

To understand what security partnerships are capable of doing to reduce the misconception and collaboration gap in order to achieve national security, the study included a question for respondents to comment on the effectiveness and need for Collaborative Leadership (CL) in the National Security context. There was an overwhelming response (99%) of the respondents who gave an affirmative response of yes and merely 1% said not sure if CL was required or effective (Chart 4.7). Respondents stated that CL would enable effective harmonisation of individual organisation’s security policies, sharing of security information and joint analysis, effective use of resources without duplication of effort, timely responses to threats and promote a peaceful environment for economic development and increased foreign direct investment (F7; Table 4.10). One respondent emphasised that CL should “not be a choice, but a necessity” (Table 4.9).

Based on literature review, a number of cases were identified where the security sector in Malawi had done some collaboration and achieved meaningful security and resulted in accelerated economic development. Such cases were control of illegal small arms, joint operations to combat crime and disaster relief operations (F10). A variety of examples in breakdown of security were also revealed where security organisations did not practice collaborative leadership (Table 4.15). The violent civil demonstrations on 20th July 2011, where 20 people died, the large number of illegal immigrants transiting through Malawi to other countries, robberies and corruption are some examples of this security breakdown due to limited collaboration amongst other reasons (F7). This study, however, noted that
both literature and respondents had mainly indicated that collaborative leadership is done with international partners in peacekeeping operations or disaster reconstruction programmes (F5), a misconception that could affect the need for collaboration among security actors within Malawi and other countries.

6.1.2. **Objective 2: To identify key factors that would influence greater and successful collaboration among the security actors in Malawi.**

This study identified a total of five (5) core categories or themes and 25 constituent factors (F) that are unique to improving collaborative leadership and national security in Malawi. These are; Clear focus on national security and priority goals, promoting national cultural practices and change mind-set, sharing power, influence and training security officers together, creating collaborative structures with the NSA coordinating with legal mandate and effective evaluation measures and parliamentary approval (Table 4.1).

6.1.3. **Objective 3: To understand the new concept of National Security, threats and relevant security actors**

To assess the progress in the understanding of the term “National Security” since the democratic dispensation was ushered in 1994, a question was included in the questionnaire to seek views of this term. This study revealed that this concept is different from the old traditional security, where the main focus was on protecting the nation from external aggression only, as it also covers measures to protect various national interests and values including sovereignty, economic development, safety of citizens and their property as well as environment from threats both internal and external. To achieve meaningful national security, several stakeholders in the security sector need to work together in a professional collaborative manner. It was, however, noted that some respondents still believe that national security is the protection of the borders only by the military, hence difficult to understand the need for CL (F1; Chart 4.1).

The second research question that was put forward for the respondents to provide their views was; “Who are the actors in achieving National Security in Malawi? It
was overwhelmingly noted that in addition to the core security organisations, legislation plays a key role for implementation of collaborative activities in the country. Some security agencies have operated as rivals as exemplified in clashes between the MDF and MYP a paramilitary wing of the Malawi Congress Party in 1993, even though the MYP had their positive roles in Malawi’s security and development. Respondents further indicated that leadership for the security sector should start from the top political leaders (F17).

Respondents further indicated that the public and private security actors in Malawi need to coordinate on the security sector landscape including the Judiciary, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs and Internal Security, Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security, the Media and Civil Society Organisation among others (F3&4). Furthermore, the importance of systematic securitisation matrix to identify threats and priority goals is important for achieving successful CL and NS.

6.1.4. Objective 4. To identify barriers that hinder effective collaboration among the security actors and strategies for mitigating them.

The study identified several barriers to CL, which included different organisational culture, political intolerance, individual interests, limited resources and lack of skills and professional knowledge in collaboration, as most security leaders command single organisations (F8; Allison and Zelikow, 1971; Halpern, 2006 cited by Cawthra, 2009, p.27). The other prominent barrier is that collaborative leaders such as the NSA have no legal powers to coordinate with other organisations as noted both in Malawi and USA (F10; F23; Lamb and Mark, 2010, p.6). These barriers affect CL and consequently, results in breakdown of national security, hence the need for mitigation strategies, particularly the development of a practical and holistic framework for practicing CL in Malawi.
6.1.5. **Objective 5:** To develop a holistic strategic practical framework for Collaborative Leadership in Malawi in order to achieve sustainable NS and prosperity.

A practical framework for collaborative leadership termed “NACUSSEPA” model (Figure 5.1) was developed for the security actors of Malawi based on five core categories or themes of clear focus on national security and priority goals (NA), national cultural practices (CU), Share power, influence and training security officers together (S), creating collaborative structures with legal mandate (S), effective evaluation measures (E) and parliamentary approval (PA), which were identified from the findings of this study (Table 4.1). The National Security governance structure was also outlined in Figure 4.2. The following section further highlights more of these contributions by this study.

6.2. **Theoretical and practical contributions**

“Research is to see what everybody else has seen, and to think what nobody else has thought.” - Albert Szent-Gyorgyi (1893-1986), Cited by Michelle Annett (2009)

The main goal of this study was to develop a holistic framework for practicing collaborative leadership among the security actors of Malawi in order to achieve sustainable national security and prosperity. This study has provided an overview of national security and collaboration across organisational boundaries on the basis of an in-depth review of international and Malawi literature. Through a questionnaire and interviews, considerable findings have been developed as contributions, which are highlighted in the following sub-sections.

6.2.1. **A Comprehensive list of factors to effectively improve collaborative leadership and national security on domestic and international level**

A major contribution of this study was the identification of a comprehensive list of factors (F1-25) influencing collaborative leadership (CL) and national security (NS) among the security actors, particularly on domestic level, which is a main concern in modern emerging security threats. A set of measures and best practices were provided for each factor, which will guide stakeholders in implementing CL.
It was noted in this study that respondents had different versions of the definitions of National Security and Collaborative Leadership, which meant different understanding on how security actors could work together to achieve a common goal. These findings will therefore help inter-agency policies, structures and strategies to enable full collaboration and attainment of the desired highest level of National Security and prosperity in Malawi.

6.2.2. **Empowering collaborative leaders and the NSA with legal mandate to coordinate with other organisations**

The respondents recommended that the National Security Advisor (NSA) through the secretariat based at the National Security Coordinating Office should coordinate issues of National Security in Malawi (F23). The NSA would have legal powers to coordinate with other organisations and report to the President and National Security Council. This arrangement would have proper analysed information sieved from organisations as well as joint security committees (Figure 4.2). Currently, the NSA works as a personal assistant to the president. This is not just for Malawi, as the USA has similar arrangements, where the NSA is considered more of a political advisory position and does not necessarily coordinate other security organisations (Lamb and Mark, 2010, p.6).

6.2.3. **Fusion of information and a joint coordinating centre for all security actors during crisis and peacetime**

“*Sharing today, shinning tomorrow.*” -Kim Hwang-Sik (*Prime Minister of South Korea, 20*th *October, 2012*).

The study has identified the importance of information fusion, as one stop centre, for all security actors for effective analysis, decision-making and implementation of security programmes at domestic level and not just on international threats (F21). Fusion and sharing of information need to be on daily basis even during peace time as it is the basis for analysing the security situation and make long term strategies to prevent foreseeable threats that would have negative effects on Malawi’s peace and economic development. This fusion arrangement would also
mitigate threats that are generated internally including thefts and robberies, violence, and corruption.

6.2.4. **Addition to knowledge: Filled literature gap on effective collaborative leadership in the security sector of Malawi on domestic level and globally.**

The Malawi national security system has traditionally relied on international institutions for higher professional training and doctrine in security operations and collaborative working. This has served the national interest to a certain extent as most collaborations were in form of alliances, partnerships and mainly concentrated on international peacekeeping operations rather than domestic security, which are the major challenges at the moment in Malawi and globally. Like many other countries, Malawi is facing a more demanding national security environment on domestic level. Citizens and their representatives expect a system, which is able to understand, mitigate and respond effectively to the full breadth and depth of contemporary security issues to achieve the desired sustainable national security and economic development. To influence performance in an original and sustainable way, new tools and techniques are needed, as well a change in the mind-set. This study identified common principles that characterise successful collaboration both at international and domestic level, which will help to fill the literature gap at academic institutions and security professionals.

6.2.5. **Development of the first ever integrated National Security Policy framework for Malawi with written protocols and parliamentary approval to guide collaboration.**

*If you have an apple and I have an apple and we exchange these apples, then you and I will still each have one apple. But if you have an idea and I have an idea and we exchange these ideas, then each of us will have two ideas."*-George Bernard Shaw (1856-1950, cited by Genius media group, 2014).

This study developed a practical inter-agency collaborative National Security Policy and Strategy Framework termed “NACUSSEPA” model (Figure 5.1),
which Malawi and other countries might consider to adopt. The framework for
inter-organisational committees was also highlighted (Figure 4.1). The overall
governance and linkage between the top government leadership and various
security actors was also developed and illustrated (Figure 4.2). These are useful
frameworks as this study made several improvements to the gaps in the previous
case studies and the reviewed collaborative models of the USA, Japan and SADC.

6.3. Research methodology and credibility of findings

In this study, several measures were adopted at various stages to ensure the
credibility of the findings (Yin, 2014, pp.45-49). The adoption of surveys and
multiple case study approach helped to benchmark with other organisations and to
generate a rich value of quantitative and qualitative data. The interview data of
each case was verified and evaluated by comparing with data generated from other
sources within respective case organisations (Yin, 2014, p.110). To further
improve the validity of the findings, three main qualifying criteria were used:

a. The selected fifteen organisations and 100 respondents were involved in
daily coordinating activities in national security programmes in Malawi;

b. Organisations were those that are spread throughout the three
administrative regions of Malawi; and

c. Each organisation was represented by more than two respondents. In-depth
face to face interviews also provided triangulation and removed bias (Yin,
2014, p.115)

Whereas this study identified valuable findings, the author experienced some
limitations, which are worth mentioning (Saunders et al., 2009, p.550).

6.4. Research Limitations

“If you accept your limitations, you go beyond them.” - Brendan Francis cited by
Shade Dream (12 October 2012).
6.4.1. Limited literature and models on effective collaborative leadership among security actors

The major challenge with this study was limited availability of relevant literature and practical models on effectiveness of CL among security organisations, especially in the sub-Saharan Africa. There has also been limited research focused on improving the effectiveness of collaborative leadership in the security sector. Generally, research has been on separate topics of collaboration and leadership particularly in the private sector. In Africa, a few countries like Botswana and Ghana have National Security collaborative arrangements and the author visited their offices in 2008. However, there were no written frameworks available for reference, as they were also in the process of developing their inter-agency security policies. This problem was, however, addressed through benchmarking of some collaborative structures of the United States of America and the Southern Africa Development Community Defence Pact, who have the best security collaborative models.

The other challenge was on the decision to choose the number of respondents from each of the fifteen organisations. This was, however, resolved as more than two respondents, who were directly involved in daily coordination of national security issues participated in this study.

6.5. Recommendations

“The task of a leader is to get people from where they are to where they have not been.” - Henry Kissinger (July 13, 1995).

“Leadership is solving problems. The day soldiers stop bringing you their problems and recommendations, is the day that you have stopped leading them. They have either lost confidence that you cannot help them or concluded that you do not care. Either case is failure of leadership.” Collin Powell (2005).

This study indicated that Malawi security actors have achieved more in collaborative leadership through conduct of several seminars, joint training and
operations as well as joint decision-making. However, for Malawi to achieve the highest level of National Security and prosperity, the study further recommended the following:

6.5.1. Develop a Practical inter-agency National Security Policy and Strategy Framework that would outline written protocols and modalities for all security actors to work together in a collaborative manner.

6.5.2. Establish joint committees on security to enable them discuss and analyse national security issues and make coordinated decisions and implementation plans.

6.5.3. Create a joint national security coordinating office that would have personnel representation from the core security organisations and other institutions as may be deemed necessary. This will enable effective and systematic fusion of all essential information and joint action plans.

6.5.4. Empower the National Security Advisor with practical legal mandates and authority to enable him/her coordinate with other security actors to effect meaningful collaboration and assessment of the security situation.

6.6. Further research
The author suggests the following areas for further research to complement the recommendations outlined above.

6.6.1 Detailed structures and implementation of the framework
This study has outlined the framework for successful collaboration by the security actors. Further research could examine the detailed processes, structures and implementation measures that could be agreed by all stakeholders in Malawi.

6.6.2. Codes and protocols for sharing information
Since this study has highlighted the need for use of codes and protocols for
sharing information among the security actors, it would be a viable research to look at in detail how this could be done and the technological aspects required. This could also explore how this protocol should not be abused and leaked to the benefit of external users.

### 6.6.3. Constitutional authority and coordinating mandate for the National Security Advisor

An important revelation has been made here that a collaborative leader, especially the National security Advisor (NSA) need to have constitutional legal powers and mandate if he/she has to successfully coordinate other organisations. This could be another good further research to find out, especially what powers and how they could be legalised. Since collaborative leaders are required to work as peer with other participants, how the empowering of the NSA would be understood by other organisations. The study could also look at how much powers would the NSA require to prevent being too powerful, and distort the required collaboration.

### 6.6.4. Involvement of the civil society organisations and other NGOs

Collaborative leadership requires the involvement of several actors. In this study the main focus was on core security organisations. However, it was revealed that the civil society organisations (CSO), the academia and other players are also crucial in National Security and they are already performing some of their roles, but they are not much consulted. A lot of research is done by the academia, but there is limited coordination with core security actors and government to implement some of their recommendations. This could be an important study to ascertain exactly how these could be involved and consulted in Malawi through practical mechanisms.

### 6.7. Summary

“Collaborations are the vehicles for those of us who believe that we can make a difference.” - Hank Rubin cited by Glanz (2006, p.88).

Chapter six concluded this study by providing an overview of how the research
problem to examine the effectiveness of collaborative leadership in the security context and improve inter-agency collaboration was addressed. It also outlined how the research goal and objectives were achieved. The research methodologies for this study, validity of findings, the author’s contributions, recommendations and areas for further research have also been highlighted. While this study is for academic purpose, it is also a valuable opportunity for the Malawi security actors and other businesses to consider for improved collaboration and achieve the highest level and sustainable National Security and economic development.

In conclusion, time is of essence. General George Patton cited by Boone Pickins (September 2, 2008) emphasised that, “Be willing to make effective decisions. That’s the most important quality of a good leader. Don’t fall victim to what I call the ready-aim-aim-aim and aim syndrome. You must be willing to fire at the right time before you are fired.” This quote supports this study’s findings; that this is the right time for the Malawi national security actors to improve their collaborative effort by implementing the recommended factors and become the most peaceful country in the sub-Saharan Africa and be a global model!
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Dear Sir/ Madam,

**Introduction Letter: Inter-agency Collaborative Leadership Research Questionnaire**

I am conducting a study entitled “Collaborative Leadership for achieving sustainable National Security in Malawi: A practical framework”. The goal of the study is to develop a Practical Framework that would guide the Security Sector or Actors/organisations to collaborate more efficiently. While Malawi is known for its peaceful environment, today’s threats to Security are dynamic and require coordinated effort to prevent them.

The questions ask you to provide useful information and to express your perceptions about the impact of collaborative leadership in the security sector. The research is not about sensitive information but general policy management and leadership direction. Your responses will be treated with strictest confidence and your anonymity will be assured as your name or identity will not be used in any of the documents. Should you have any questions to clarify about the research, please contact me at email: nr6mpo@bolton.ac.uk or ngwenyareuben@yahoo.com.

This study is for academic purpose and a partial fulfilment of a PhD dissertation from the University of Bolton.

I thank you for your cooperation.

**Reuben Paulos Ngwenya** (Major General)
APPENDICES II: Research Questionnaire

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<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Years you have served in Organisation (Please Tick one)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>□ 1-10 Years, □ 10-20 Years, □ 30 Years and Above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>What are your Highest Qualifications?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>□ Secondary School/ Diploma □ Degree □ Masters degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>□ PhD</td>
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<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>What is the level of your position in the organisation?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>□ Senior Management □ Middle Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>□ Operational staff</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q2</th>
<th>Concepts of Inter-agency Collaboration</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>What do you understand by the term Collaboration? (Please tick)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Networking</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Alliance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4. Coordination</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5. Coalition</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6. Partnership</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7. Includes all of the above</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Explain your answer</td>
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<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>In your view, explain the meaning of Inter-agency collaboration</td>
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<tr>
<th>Q3</th>
<th>Collaborative Leadership</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>In your view what are the qualities or characteristics of a Collaborative Leader?</td>
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<td>..................................................................................</td>
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<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>How do you see Leadership in strengthening Inter-agency collaboration or collaboration with other organisations?</td>
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</table>
c. Which type of the two Leadership styles do you prefer and why?

1. Collaborative, who is listening, understands possible answers from various perspectives and working to achieve objectives as encourages others to be creative and find better solutions.

2. Authoritarian, who tends to do all the talking “has the answer” and Imposes solutions and making decisions as one person as it pleases him/her. Usually heads one organization or department. Give comment to your answer

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e. In your review, what is Collaborative Leadership?

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Q4 Concept of National Security

a. In your view, what do you understand by the concept of National Security? (Tick one answer).

1. Protection of the Nation from external aggression using the Military only.


   Explain reason for your choice above.

...........................................................................................................................................

b. What threats do you consider would endanger National Security in Malawi?

...........................................................................................................................................

c. In your view, do you think that threats mentioned above could be dealt with or mitigated by one organization or assisted by other organizations? (Tick one answer and explain why?

1. One Organisation

2. Assisted by other organisations

   Provide comment for your answer.

...........................................................................................................................................
d. Sometimes other people have not taken National Security or Peaceful environment as an important factor in their Policies. In your view, what would be the most benefits of National Security?

Q5  Security Sector/ Actors

a. What do you understand by the term Security Sector or Security Actors?

b. In your view, to combat threats to National Security in Malawi such as external aggression, cross border crime, illegal migration, terrorism, disasters etc., which main organisations/institutions would comprise the cluster of Security Sector or Actors?

c. Mention other organisations that would play supportive role in achieving National Security and explain how.

d. In the nature of modern Security situations, do you see non-government organisations such as media, civil society organisations, and human rights bodies; think tanks and universities, women organisations, etc. playing a role in National Security?

1. Yes 2. No 3. Not Sure

   Explain your answer.

Q6  Collaborative Leadership among the Security Sector/Actors

a. In September 2012, Malawi Government held a Multi-sector or Inter-agency symposium to mitigate ~Security threats in Malawi. In your view, do you think the Security Sector need to collaborate in managing security threats?

   □ Yes □ No □ Not sure

b. If your answer is yes, in what ways or practical mechanisms could the security Sector collaborate?

   Provide comment for your answer to above?

   ............................................................................................................................

c. In your organisation, which would benefit more from a collaborative set up?

   1. Top Leaders/ Managers
   2. Lower employees
   3. Other Organisations
4. All Organisations

Provide Comment to your answer.

In your organizations, who usually initiates the collaboration process?

1. Top Leaders
2. Lower employees
3. All Employees

Give reasons for your answer.

f. Does your organisation reward or give incentive to people who initiate collaboration?

1. Yes 2. No 3. Not Sure

Provide comment or examples for your answer.

g. Do you see Collaborative Leadership as an important part of the Security Sector Reform that the Security organisations are undergoing to improve collaboration and National Security? Why?

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<tr>
<th>Q7</th>
<th>Challenges/Barriers to effective Collaborative Leadership</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Mention the major challenges or barriers that hinder effective inter-agency collaboration among the Security Sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Culture or different organisational beliefs and practices are one of the main barriers to inter-agency collaboration. What mechanisms would help to resolve this problem?</td>
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<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>In your view, what would be the main benefits if Security organisations collaborate efficiently?</td>
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<tr>
<th>Q8</th>
<th>Improving Inter-agency collaboration in the Security Sector</th>
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<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>In your view, what are the key factors that would improve inter-agency collaboration in the Security sector?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>When or at what time do you think Collaboration should be done among the Security actors?</td>
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<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Has your organisation conducted joint activities with other</td>
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</table>
organisations such as joint training, exercises in disaster management, sharing of resources, decision making etc. to promote Security?

1. Yes 2. No 3. Not Sure

Provide Comment to your answer.

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d. In your view, how could you measure whether collaboration is implemented successfully?

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Q9</th>
<th>Sharing of Information in the Security Sector</th>
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<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Security issues are usually sensitive to be discussed in public and yet sharing of information is also very important to enable effective decision making by leaders at various levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In your opinion, should information be shared among the Security Sector/Actors/organisations? (Tick answer below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Yes 2. No 3. Not Sure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Give reasons for your answer on why information should be shared or not.</td>
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<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>How would you ensure that information shared is relevant and credible aimed at achieving the National Security goals?</td>
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<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>Systematic Fusion and Coding of information helps to ensure that all relevant information has been received from various sources and gives a clear picture for decision makers. How could this be achieved in the Security Sector?</td>
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How could you instil trust and confidence among the Security Sector to share information and to prevent leakage of vital information?

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<th>Q10</th>
<th>Leadership Support for Inter-Agency collaboration</th>
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<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>In your view, do you think there is support from leaders to improve collaboration in the Security Sector and your organisation? Give examples of the support.</td>
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<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>So far, what programmes does your organisation have to collaborate with other institutions?</td>
</tr>
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</table>
c. Does your organisation have a write up to support or guide collaboration with other organisations? (If yes, give a copy)

d. How do you mitigate or reduce the problem of competition for power and authority among leaders of various organisations in a collaborative set up?

f. Does your organisation have a policy or standard format or protocol for sharing information with other organisations that may require coordinated decision making or operation?

1. Yes 2. No 3. Not Sure

Provide Comments to your answer (and Give a copy if you have).

Q11  Strategy and Practical Framework to improve Inter-agency Collaboration in the Security Sector.

a. What do you understand by the term Practical Framework?

b. In your view, what is National Security Policy?

c. In a democratic society, there is great demand for reforms. In Malawi, do you see the formulation of the National Security Policy and Integrated Framework as a desired Security Sector Reform?

1. Yes 2. No 3. Not Sure

Give reason for your answer.

2. Does your organisation have the written Framework or Strategy to guide inter-agency collaboration? (if yes, give a copy).

3. In your view, do you think there is need to have an Integrated Framework or legally binding Policy as is done in some countries like USA, Japan and UK that would enable Security Actors to work more closely in addition to individual organisational roles spelt out in the Constitution and Acts? Give reasons.

4. If your answer is yes, do you think there is need for a separate National Security Central Office where core organisations
would be represented to facilitate this Framework and Collaboration while respecting the individual roles and mandates of the other organisations as is also done in the countries mentioned above? Give reasons.

5. Which organisations do you suggest should form part of this National Security Central Office?

6. Do you see the need for forming Joint Security Committees such as National Security Council, National Disaster management Committee, etc. to jointly collaborate in policy decisions and preventing threats, while maintaining lead departments?
   1. Yes 2. No

7. What Joint Security Committees do you suggest for Malawi to establish to effectively discuss and improve NS? Provide reasons for your answer.

8. In your view, what major components or guiding issues should be included in the integrated Collaborative national Security policy Framework Model for the Security Sector in Malawi?

Q12 General Comment
   a. Give your additional comments on your perception about the effectiveness and improving inter-agency Collaborative Leadership in the Security Sector.
Dear Sir/Madam,

I am a student in Strategic and Change Management programme at the University of Bolton. I am studying on the effectiveness of Collaborative Leadership in achieving high level and sustainable National Security in Malawi.

During this study, you will be asked to answer some questions as to why and how you think collaborative leadership would be an effective leadership style to improve national security. This interview was designed to be approximately a half hour in length. However, please feel free to expand on the topic or talk about related ideas. Also, if there are any questions you feel you cannot answer or that you do not feel comfortable answering, feel free to indicate this.

All the information will be kept confidential. I will keep the data in my personal flash disc and at a secure place in case of my reference only. In case of clarification, contact me through my email. This interview is designed to learn first-hand information about this topic. Upon completion of this study, all data will be destroyed.
Participant’s Agreement:

I am aware that my participation in this interview is voluntary. If, for any reason, at any time, I wish to stop the interview, I may do so without having to give an explanation. I understand the intent and purpose of this research. The researcher has reviewed the individual and social benefits and risks of this study with me.

I am aware the data will be used for academic purposes. I have the right to review, comment on, and/or withdraw information prior to the thesis submission. I understand that if I say anything that I believe may incriminate me, the interviewer will immediately delete the recording and ask if I would like to continue the recording. The data gathered in this study are confidential and anonymous with respect to my personal identity unless I specify/indicate otherwise. I grant permission for the use of this information for a:

...........................................Thesis (Interviewee permission)

I grant permission to use:

...........................................Just a pseudonym

I will be given a copy of this consent form that I may keep for my own reference.

I have read the above form, and, with the understanding that I can withdraw at any time, and for whatever reason, I consent to participate in today’s interview.

____________________    _________________________
Participant’s signature     Date

____________________
Interviewer’s signature